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I.

I n t r o d u c t i o n
The landscape of preservation is undeniably changing. Religious historic sites with

active congregations have gained access to federal funding for preservation projects. The
legal framework for preserving religious buildings is evolving and in an attempt to define the
new boundaries, I have endeavored to research the jurisprudence within which the current
framework has been conceived. Historic Preservation:

First Amendment Considerations

exhaustively details significant cases that have defined the First Amendment Religion Clause
morphology. The awareness of this legal framework is indispensable if preservationists
intend to maintain the recent Save America’s Treasures triumph.
The land use regulation and historic preservation nexus is tumultuous and inherently
polemical in nature. This is evidenced by inconsistent case law that has evolved from the
struggle for continuity while facing larger issues and inevitable change. The framework for
the historic preservation of religious sites is deceptively sturdy, seemingly resolved but the
concept belies the tortuous issues including resistance to landmarking by religious
institutions, the constitutionality of federal grants for religious sites, the tax exempt status of
religious organizations, religious land use zoning, and emergency assistance to disaster
stricken religious sites. The interplay between the underlying issues is compounded when
proponents for religious freedom and proponents for historic preservation further frustrate
the delicate tug of war between the competing interests. The two forces of personal religious
freedom and necessary government protection of historic properties collide in any such
preservation battle and works to significantly complicate the issues. The rights of religious
entities, however, are set apart in the U.S. Constitution. The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution were intended to prevent Congress from

1

making a law that effects the establishment of religion or hinders the free exercise thereof.
The sense of balance the intended guidance was created to establish was never achieved.
Currently the debates continue, and beneath them writhe zealous sentiments on both sides.
The historic preservation of religious sites is a consummate legal balancing act. The
scales of justice have balanced the interests of the parties based on judicial interpretation of
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. These interpretations dictate the rights of
religious institutions to resist control as well as the need for local, state, and federal
governments to uphold their responsibilities to the citizens. The analysis of Religion Clauses
jurisprudence is significant to preservationists even if only a handful of the cases deal directly
with preservation. The historical trends and the nuances on which cases either differentiate
from previous precedent or create new precedent are imperative for preservationists to
appreciate. This Thesis treads on soft ground, impressed with the wandering steps of
inconsistent courts and a heterogeneous society still divided over the ever-changing role of
religion in society. The ultimate goal was to understand the constitutionality of federal grants
to religious properties by tracing the development of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
from Supreme Court’s early interpretations of them to today’s interpretation which allows
the funding for the historic preservation of active houses of worship.
The historic preservation of religious properties begins with an understanding of the
legal basis for preservation. The need for a structured and systemized land use arose from an
increasingly complicated and rapid expansion of growth. “As society shifted from a rural to
an urban society, public land regulation became important especially to city governments
trying to control industry, commerce, and housing within its boundaries.”1 This culminated

1

Legal Information Institute, “Land Use Law: An Overview.” Found at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/land_use.html.
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in an explosion of sophisticated techniques of preserving the country’s cultural capital. In
1966, Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966.2 In
response to the growing concern about the future of historically and culturally significant
buildings and landscapes, the objectives the NHPA were outlined as follows:
Congress finds and declares that -- (1) the spirit and direction
of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic
heritage; (2) the historical and cultural foundations of the
Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community
life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to
the American people; (3) historic properties significant to the
Nation's heritage are being lost or substantially altered, often
inadvertently, with increasing frequency; (4) the preservation of
this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its
vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational,
economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched
for future generations of Americans.…3
The NHPA subsequently established the National Register to promote protection of
nominated historic and cultural resources.4 The Register was not empowered to regulate the
use and care of the nominated resources, but a listing on it is one of the prerequisites for tax
benefits to those structures that comply with the Secretary of Interior Standards. Sections
106 and 110 of the NHPA requires federal departments to consider the possible effects of
their actions on properties that are either on or are eligible for the National Register.
The NHPA stimulated the enactment of a multitude of city based historic
preservation ordinances, beginning in the 1970’s, and provided the necessary guidance for
state enacted legislation. State level legislation was developed with a similar structure and
intention to that of the national level, but also had the additional power of enacting local
enabling laws. These enabling laws granted the necessary police power to regulate historic
preservation through preservation ordinances. Review boards or commissions review any
2
3

National Historic Preservation Act. 16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.
Ibid., Sec. 1(b).
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private actions under the preservation ordinance in either an advisory or a binding capacity.
Though governments at all levels may control growth, the majority of issues and ultimate
cases that pertain to historic preservation evolve from local concerns. “Three typical
situations involving…private entities and the court system are: suits brought by one
neighbor against another; suits brought by a public official against a neighboring landowner
on behalf of the public; and suits involving individuals who share ownership of a particular
parcel of land.”5 The constitutionality of historic preservation ordinances under the First
Amendment becomes an issue when a plaintiff brings suit claiming that a government action
infringed on his or her Free Exercise rights or violated the Establishment Clause.
The Courts have increasingly recognized the legitimacy of historic preservation. The
battle to preserve structures of significance began with a few cases that served to legalize
government authorization of historic preservation. In Berman v. Parker6, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of the Washington, D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency to
condemn property and transfer it, intact. “The acquisition and the assembly of real property
and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment
plan…is hereby declared to be a public use.”7 Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the
Court, explained that:
owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete layout, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of
Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted
areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for
human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of
the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating
4

Ibid., Sec.a(a)(1)(A)
Id., “Land Use Law: An Overview.”
6 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
7 Ibid.
5
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all such injurious conditions by employing all means
necessary and appropriate for the purpose. 8
This ruling gave great impetus to preservationists who believed that aesthetic reasons
justified their efforts to preserve. The District Court addressed the issue of using the power
of eminent domain to acquire a non-blighted building and transferring it to another. Slum
razing was distinct from taking “a man’s property merely to develop a better balanced, more
attractive community.”9 This distinction saved the Act by “construing it to mean that the
Agency could condemn property only for the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and
prevention, its concept of ‘slum’ being the existence of conditions ‘injurious to the public
health, safety, morals and welfare.’”10 Public welfare was interpreted broadly:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive….The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 11
This broad interpretation including physical, aesthetic, and economic values allowed for
decisions based on health as well as beauty. “If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.”12
The significance of Berman lies in legitimizing the field of preservation by increasing
the government’s reach to regulate based on preservation interests alone. Similarly, the other
major case that addressed historic preservation interests was Penn Central Transportation Co. v.

8

Ibid.
Ibid.
10 Ibid. 117 F. Supp. 705, 724-725.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
9
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City of New York13 which sustained the constitutionality of the restrictions that designated
landmark buildings. In 1978, the owners of Grand Central Terminal were denied permission
to construct a fifty-story office tower because the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Committee had designated it as a landmark. The owners filed suit claiming that the denial
constituted a taking without just compensation. Justice Brennan explained that the recent
surge in historic preservation was spurred by the rush of blanket renewal programs,
especially in the inner cities, that were inconsiderate of historic structures. He explained that
“large numbers of historic structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed without
adequate consideration of either the values represented therein or the possibility of
preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive ways.”14 Local
governments enacted ordinances because of their increasing belief that historic structures
enhanced the quality of life. Brennan explained that “structures with special historic, cultural,
or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all.”15 The Court concluded that
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Committee’s intention was to promote the
general welfare and that the landmarks law, as applied to the Grand Central Terminal, was
not a taking. The decision was monumental for the field of preservation. It legitimized the
efforts of preservationists and confirmed that police powers exercised in furtherance of
historic preservation objectives benefited the general welfare.
Advocates of historic landmark and historic district ordinances face a much greater
challenge and more uncertainty when the building to be preserved is a religious edifice.
Freedom to exercise one’s religion is fundamental and the built in conflict between the two
religion clauses of the First Amendment raises difficult complexities based on countervailing

13

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Ibid.
15 Ibid.
14

6

considerations. Recently enacted legislation has tried to address the plight of religious
organizations. For example, the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act was
enacted in 2000 to provide greater protection of religious institutions from unfair treatment.
The free exercise rights of these groups were endorsed by providing an exemption for
religious land uses from otherwise constitutional zoning and landmarking legislation.
The solution to the mêlée between the Clauses has been a continuous tinkering that
operates to balance the competing goals. This balancing act began in the 18th century but was
only put to the test during the 19th and 20th centuries. The sixteen words of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses forbid Congress from making a law respecting an
establishment or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. As ratified in 1791, the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, states that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.16
The Framers of the Constitution applied the First Amendment to Congress and the federal
government. This Clause was further strengthened when the Supreme Court incorporated it
in the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment post-Civil War which ensured
that the Clause was applicable to the States. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as ratified in 1868, states that:
no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.17

16
17

United States Constitution. Amendment I. Please refer to Appendix B.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. Please refer to Appendix B.
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The interpretation of the Amendments has changed since their passage. The individual cases
that interpret and apply these Amendments reveal a slow but deliberate trend from the
endorsement of Separationism, or complete resistance of landmarking and grants, to one of
Neutralism, or the allowance of grants and regulation.
According to Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle, Professors of Law at the George
Washington University Law School, “true Separationists oppose both the landmarking of
worship sites and the payment of grants to owners of landmarked worship sites. Committed
Neutralists, however, favor both the regulation and the support of landmarked worship sites
precisely to the same extent and on the same terms that other structures are regulated and
supported.”18 Lupu and Tuttle advocate Religion Clause symmetry e.g., what the government
may regulate, it may also subsidize and specifically advocate “that the religion-specific line
between permissible and impermissible subsidy (and regulation) should be drawn between
the exteriors and interiors of houses of worship.”19 The persistent growth of the historic
preservation field as well as the increasingly vociferous nature of religious groups that enter
the public policy realm has lent significant support to Neutrality.
The trend towards Neutralism is evident in the most recent interpretation of the
Constitution which allows for the preservation of religious sites with active congregations.
The change in policy that enabled the Save America’s Treasures grants to be applied to
active religious historic properties can be traced to the internal deliberations of the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC). In the past, the OLC has maintained that grants to active houses of
worship were unconstitutional. A memorandum written in 1995 by Walter Dellinger,

18

Lupu, Ira C. and Tuttle, Robert W. "Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the
Survival of Separationism." Boston College Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 5, September 2002. p. 1140.
19 Ibid. p. 1139.
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Assistant Attorney General, entitled the “Constitutionality of Awarding Historic
Preservation Grants to Religious Properties”20 was crucial to the Department’s stance.
Dellinger’s memorandum referred to several Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution and was subsequently implemented as the Department’s official guideline. He
began by discussing Tilton v. Richardson21 which approved federal school construction and
repair grants even though the school in question was religiously affiliated. The case
established that religious groups were not to be excluded automatically because of their
religious nature. It was clarified, however, that the funds may be granted but may not go
directly to any religious activities. The grants per se were not found to advance religion but
the conveyance of the building to the institution after 20 years was and thus in part
invalidated. The Dellinger memorandum also referred to Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist22 that made essentially the same point. The Court invalidated certain maintenance
and repair grants to parochial schools because it was determined that such unchecked grants
may advance religion. The same logic was applied to Hunt v. McNair23 in which grants to
pervasively sectarian institutions were considered unconstitutional even if such grants were
permissible in situations involving secular institutions. Dellinger commented that
“nevertheless, we have no doubt that you are correct in assuming that most if not all active
houses of worship would fall within this category. Indeed, the notion that religion plays
something less than a vital and pervasive role in an active church’s mission might appear
inconsistent with a proper respect for religious institutions as well as with common sense.”24
Dellinger explained that the issue with preservation grants to pervasively sectarian
20

Walter Dellinger, “Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Preservation Grants to Religious Properties.”
October 31, 1995. Found at: http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm.
21 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
22 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
23 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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institutions was the ineluctable sectarian nature of these institutions. “As the Court has
explained, the reason for the prohibition on direct monetary grants to pervasively sectarian
institutions is the unacceptable risk that where secular and religious functions are
‘inextricably intertwined,’ government aid, though designated for a secular purpose, will in
fact advance the institution's religious mission.”25 The extrication of the building from the
religion it houses was problematical for Dellinger. What was ordinarily considered secular
such as roof repair or window renovation was not considered secular when applied to a
church. He stated that “though a structural element like a roof can be characterized as
‘secular’ rather than ‘sectarian’ in most contexts, the distinction cannot be maintained in any
meaningful sense when the roof is a component part of an active church.”26 The conclusion
was that the inability to separate the religious and secular elements of an active house of
worship effectively denied grants to the historic preservation of such structures.
Dellinger also referred to First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle27 which endorsed the
importance of free exercise over any such historic preservation rights. Dellinger revealed that
the reasoning behind exempting religious houses of worship was persuasive and that the
Free Exercise Clause limited the government in landmarking religious buildings. The
separationist sentiment underlying the position of the OLC stance was further endorsed by
the White House. “Both the [Ronald] Reagan and the [George H. W.] Bush Administrations
took the position that direct financial support of active churches would be inappropriate in
light of Establishment Clause concerns.”28 Dellinger concluded that a reversal of official
protocol was not imminent. “We think, however, that a court applying current precedent is

24

Id., Dellinger Memorandum (1995).
Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
28 Id., Dellinger Memorandum (1995).
25
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most likely to conclude that the direct award of historic preservation grants to churches and
other pervasively sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause.”29
As of 1995, however, federal historic preservation grants were given to properties
listed on the National Register. They were funded by the federal government and awarded
by the states. Since the 1980’s however, the influential separationist attitude has subsided and
instead a more neutralist approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court. The Dellinger
Memorandum was antiquated even in 1995 when it was written. The qualifications necessary
for National Register listing included that the property must prove “significance in American
history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture,” including “integrity of location,
design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association.”30 Religious properties can
qualify for National Register status if it “deriv[ed] primary significance from architectural or
artistic distinction or historical importance,”31 with the states being the final arbiter of
worthiness.
In 1992, Congress amended the NHPA to authorize preservation grants to religious
properties. The amended Act stated that:
Grants may be made under this subsection for the preservation, stabilization,
restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular,
does not promote religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are
historically significant. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
authorize the use of any funds made available under this section for the
acquisition of any property referred to in the preceding sentence.32
After a series of internal inquiries, on April 30, 2002, the OLC also amended its position and
released its official opinion regarding the status of the restoration of historic religious
29

Ibid.
National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1995).
31 Ibid.
30
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properties. The modified policy allowed for the federally funded preservation of religious
properties.
The quintessential example of the application of such a grant was the Old North
Church in Boston which is currently being restored by a grant from Save America’s
Treasures. Though the religious site is actively used by a congregation of 150, it is also a
museum that opens its doors to 500,000 annual visitors. The federal grant of $317,000 to the
foundation created by the congregation was intended for repair and renovation. The
previous issue of dissecting the secular from the religious functions and the question of
whether the aid intended for the secular function would advance the religious function were
not advanced.
Save America’s Treasures was established by the White House Millennium Council
Executive Order 13072 on February 3, 1998. In part, the Order was established to:
Make recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior regarding the
provision of assistance from funds made available for Save America's
Treasures in the Historic Preservation Fund to public and private entities
that are protecting America's threatened cultural treasures. These treasures
include significant documents, works of art, maps, journals, and historic
structures that document and illuminate the history and culture of the United
States….33
In total, President Clinton earmarked $95 million in federal grants from 1999-2001 and
President Bush has proposed $30 million each year from 2002-2004. The grants, which
are managed by the National Park Service, must be matched dollar-for-dollar with nonfederal funding. “To date, over $242 million in public-private funds has been raised to
save our nation’s treasures. Together, the public and private commitments and the greater
public awareness of the nation’s needs will result in the largest increase in preservation
32

Id., 16 U.S.C. § 470a(e)(3) (2002).
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activity in over thirty years.”34 The eligibility for a grant is still limited to 501(c)(3)
nonprofit organizations including religious institutions, and local, state and tribal
government agencies but has now been expanded to include religious properties with
active congregations. “Historic properties and collections associated with active religious
organizations are eligible to apply for grants. They must meet the Selection Criteria and
Review Criteria, including national significance.”35 The grants may be used for
preservation and conservation:
Include[ing], but are not limited to, historic structure reports and
conservation plans, structural engineering assessments, architectural
planning, paint analysis, material conservation analysis, archeological
investigation, ongoing maintenance plans, and site management plans.
Landscape planning is eligible either as part of a historic structure report or
as a separate conservation plan. Planning grants may be used for temporary
emergency stabilization efforts implemented while the planning process is
under way.36
The grants for bricks and mortar construction, historic resource surveys, as well as expenses
pertaining to preparing nominations are expressly prohibited.
This thesis continues by first examining the Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and
is followed by the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The ability to grant federal funds to
religious historic properties with active congregations can only be truly understood in
context as well as in magnitude by a careful analysis of the relevant judicial decisions.

33 White House Millennium Council Executive Order 13072, February 3, 1998. Found at:
http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/about.htm.
34 “Save America’s Treasures.” Found at http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/about.htm.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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II.

Free Exercise – Early Case History
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were intended to be mutually

sustaining. Over time, however, the interpretation and the subsequently delineated
boundaries have worked to enforce and perpetuate tension between the Clauses. This
tension is described by Norman Redlich, author of Understanding Constitutional Law. He states:
In our modern welfare state, stringent separation of government and religion
may at times deprive religion of an otherwise generally available benefit; thus,
free exercise is inhibited. Conversely, the Supreme Court has recently held
that free exemptions of religious practitioners from otherwise generally
applicable laws favor religion in a manner inconsistent with strict
separation.37
These early cases are generally described as devoid of any unifying principles but are
nevertheless significant. As history reveals, two sets of tests were established to determine
whether a law violated either Clause. The Supreme Court first tested the Free Exercise
Clause in 1878, over 100 years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. “While ‘neutrality’ is
still a central principle of both clauses, we have no single standard for determining what a
religiously neutral act is. Instead, we must examine the neutrality or permissibility of a law in
terms of the challenge to it.”38
The Reynolds v. United States39 case involved George Reynolds, a Mormon polygamist
from Utah who did not agree with a federal anti-polygamy law and claimed that polygamy
was part of his right to exercise his religion. He reasoned that his right was protected by the
Free Exercise Clause which states that Congress cannot make any laws that prohibit the free
exercise of religion. Reynolds was charged with bigamy after trying to marry Amelia Jane

37 Norman Redlich, et al. Understanding Constitutional Law. Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. San Francisco,
CA. 1999. p. 505.
38 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda. Principles of Constitutional Law. 2004. p. 741.
39 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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Schofield while already being married to Mary Ann Tuddenham – specifically, in violation of
section 5352 of the Revised Statutes law stating that:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether
married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States
have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more
than five years.40
The District Court sentenced Reynolds to two years hard labor and fined him $500. Chief
Justice Waite examined the issue and concluded that the pertinent question is “whether
religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of
the land.”41 Waite concluded that “laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”42 His
reasoning was justified by expounding on other exemptions that would be necessitated if
polygamy was permitted.
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under
which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife
religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of
her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to
prevent her carrying her belief into practice?43
Waite explained that if such exemptions were made, the laws created would lose their
effectiveness. The laws created would be undermined by religious belief and relegated to a
secondary position engendering a nation whose citizens each had their own set of laws.
Waite explained that this would render “the professed doctrines of religious belief superior

40

Ibid.
Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
41
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to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”44
Justice Waite thus set the precedent that government can step in and modify the
behaviors of citizens even when they claim their actions are part of their religion. He stated
“it matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief and belief
only.”45 The preservation of this authority is essential for the government to maintain its
power and survive as more than a mere façade. Neutral, generally applicable laws, without
specific implications for impact on religious beliefs became the standard. The lower court’s
decisions were upheld and the judgment was affirmed.
Exemptions from the law based on religious beliefs were tested again in 1963 with
the Sherbert v. Verner46 case. The appellant, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church, was fired from a textile mill where she had worked for 30 years because
of a new policy that required employees to work on Saturdays. This new policy conflicted
with her religious beliefs, which required her to specifically not work on Saturdays, her
Sabbath day. While unemployed, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits
under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. The Employment Security
Commission denied her benefits because they determined that she qualified for work, as
opposed to being disabled, and thus did not qualify for benefits. Both the lower court and
the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Sherbert’s claim that the South Carolina statute
burdened her right to free exercise.
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The 7-to-2 Supreme Court ruling reversed the decisions reached in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court viewed the previous rulings as particularly harsh, in effect forcing
Sherbert to choose between her job and religion – a mutually exclusive choice. Justice
William Brennan equated this choice to a governmental fine imposed for Saturday worship.
He explained the ruling:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant
for her Saturday worship.47
Brennan further explained that the actions of South Carolina were discriminatory. “The
unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the
religious discrimination which South Carolina's general statutory scheme necessarily
effects.”48 The ruling established a threshold trigger to justify any encroachment on religious
liberty: a compelling state interest must exist to justify an infringement of First Amendment
rights. Brennan explained:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation." No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the
present case.49
If a compelling state interest was proven, the infringement on the free exercise of religion
would be justified. No such compelling state interest was established in Sherbert and an
exemption was made. The South Carolina Supreme Court was reversed and the case
remanded.
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Sherbert v. Verner set the precedent for exemptions. The way was cleared for religious
believers to have reasons, justified by their religion, for them to be accommodated from
otherwise generally applicable laws. It is important to note that the Court was greatly
influenced by the civil rights litigation of the 1950s and 1960s. “It had become clear to
Brennan that the Court must give a ‘heightened scrutiny’ to cases in which fundamental
rights were at stake and require the state to demonstrate that the law in question served only
the interests that were of paramount interest.”50 The substantiation of any encroachment on
religious liberty via the establishment of a compelling state interest is a recurring element in
future cases.
The 1968 Westchester Reform Temple v. Frederick W. Brown51 case was a product of the
exemption-based case law. This case clearly shows the power of religious institutions to
justify, based on their right of Free Exercise, their unique societal position. Further, this case
shows how this power is wielded to effectuate different treatment from laws that would, in
other cases, be applicable to all other citizens.

Figure 1
Westchester Reform Temple in Scarsdale, New York.
50 Clare Mullally, “Religious Liberty in Public Life.” February 15, 2004. Found at:
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/rel_liberty/free_exercise/index.aspx.
51 Westchester Reform Temple v. Frederick W. Brown et al, Constituting the Panning Commission of the Village of Scarsdale,
239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968).
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The case involved the Westchester Reform Temple, a single-story synagogue, located
on a 6.7 acre lot on a heavily traveled residential road in Scarsdale, New York. The Temple
initiated measures to expand its facilities to meet the increasing needs of its Congregation.
The Planning Commission rejected their proposals for expansion due to the unmet setback
requirements. The plan called for a 62-foot setback on one side and a 29-foot side-yard on
the other which was inconsistent with the required 130-foot and 40-foot requirements. The
Temple claimed that the arbitrary setbacks violated their First Amendment rights.
The Planning Commission predicated its rejection of the expansion on the established
zoning laws. The Temple, however, based their position on the Supreme Court’s perception
of the law as well as another New York case, Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board.52 In
that case, clear rules were articulated about the status of religious entities. "Churches and
schools occupy a different status from mere commercial enterprises and, when the church
enters the picture, different considerations apply."53 This distinctive status clearly resonates
with existing Supreme Court developments. These precedents allowed the court in Westchester
Reform Temple v. Brown54 to analyze the case based on the peculiar status of religious
institutions.
Westchester Reform Temple’s status as a religious entity excluded its requirement to
comply with generally neutral laws which were not unconstitutional per se. Judge Keating
explains that an exception was made to established police powers:
Religious structures enjoy a constitutionally protected status which severely
curtails the permissible extent of governmental regulation in the name of the
police powers, but the power of regulation has not been altogether
obliterated.55
52
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Though Keating clarifies that the government still has some powers to regulate religious
entities, he makes it clear that in this case the government does not. The opinion justifies the
zoning procedure but concludes that the free exercise issue outweighs the benefits of zoning.
Keating states:
We have not said that considerations of the surrounding area and potential
traffic hazards are unrelated to the public health, safety or welfare when
religious structures are involved. We have simply said that they are
outweighed by the constitutional prohibition against the abridgement of the
free exercise of religion and by the public benefit and welfare which is itself
an attribute of religious worship in a community.56
Though the Planning Commission’s goal is to implement reasonable regulation, the power
religious entities posses to evade generally applicable rules outweigh the Commission’s
objectives. The Court clearly follows this logic. Keating states that “where an irreconcilable
conflict exists between the right to erect a religious structure and the potential hazards of
traffic or diminution in value, the latter must yield to the former.”57 The court sided with the
Temple and followed the established Supreme Court’s direction. The First Amendment was
the clear winner in this heavy-weight challenge between police power and First Amendment
rights. Unmistakably, religious entities stand in a unique realm.
The 6-to-1 ruling in the 1972 Wisconsin v. Yoder58 Supreme Court case involved two
Amish fathers, Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, who refused to send their children to school
after the completion of the eighth grade. These fathers, members of the Old Order Amish
religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, had violated Wisconsin's
compulsory school-attendance law which stated that children must attend school until the
age of sixteen. The respondents were “charged, tried, and convicted of violating the
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compulsory-attendance law in Green Country Court and were fined the sum of $5 each.”59
Yoder and Miller claimed that the compulsory-attendance law violated their free exercise
rights as stated in the Free Exercise Clause.
Chief Justice Burger explained that the compulsory-attendance law, though created
neutral and underscored by a strong compelling state interest, effectively burdened Yoder.
He states:
However strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is
by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.60

Burger advised that decisions should not be absolute, but balanced, depending on case
specific circumstances. Though a facially neutral law such as compulsory school attendance
has as its basis a compelling state interest, it may, without intent, burden the free exercise of
religion. The impact of this compelling state interest objective was too harsh. Yoder’s
burden “is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels
them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”61 Thus, the Supreme Court again granted an
exemption. The rights of Free Exercise, free of any substantial burden from a government
action, were placed above a government’s compelling interest. Burger explained that a
“regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”62
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The facially neutral compelling state interest of uniform education was outweighed by First
Amendment rights.
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The free exercise of religion has proven to be a heavy-weight rival to government
interests. The Sherbert and Yoder cases have safeguarded the First Amendment rights of
people and organizations. Repeatedly, their precedents have outweighed government
interests in the name of these rights and have paved the way for religious exemptions. The
Sherbert-Yoder era produced mixed results, but consistently upheld the right of Free Exercise.
The first exception to the trend of upholding the rights of religion is the 1980 Society
for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Spatt63 case. In this case, the Court of Appeals of
New York found that the designation of the Society for Ethical Culture’s property, located
on an entire Central Park West block at Two West 64th Street, New York, was not
unconstitutional. The Society deemed the designation “a confiscation without due
compensation and an interference with the free exercise of the Society's religious purpose.”64
Specifically, the Society believed “that it is improper to restrict its ability to develop the
property to permit rental to nonreligious tenants.”65

Figure 2
Exterior view of Society for Ethical
Culture in New York.
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Founded in 1876 "to unite in one group, in one bond, those who had religious
feeling and those who simply cared for moral betterment,"66 the Society is known for its
religious, educational and charitable endeavors. The Society is located in two five-story
buildings on an approximately 20,000 square foot parcel. The suit involves only the
historically designated Meeting House, built in 1910, not the Ethical Culture School, built in
1904. “Only the Meeting House has received landmark designation. It occupies
approximately 40% of the Central Park West property, the value of which has been
estimated at about $4,000,000.”67

Figure 3
View from Society for Ethical
Culture in New York.

New York City's Landmark Preservation Commission designated the Meeting House
in 1974 for its exquisite art nouveau façade. The building was assessed as the:
best piece of Art Nouveau architecture yet designed in this country, and
compares well with the magnificent German department store buildings
whose excellence is so great as to almost promise a future for this style.68
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Notwithstanding the contentious designation, the Meeting House was "a tangible symbol of
the Society's permanent social contribution and a rich architectural element of the fabric of
our City." 69 Although the trial court agreed with the Society regarding insufficient historical
or architectural significance and found the designation unconstitutional, the Appellate
Division reversed on the grounds that landmark designation is a permissible land use
regulation. Justice Wachtler explained:
we have recognized that despite this particularized burden on the owner,
landmark designations, if not unreasonable, are not an undue imposition
under proper circumstances.70
Unlike previous cases involving historic preservation, the legitimacy of designation was
established. Equally shocking, Wachtler explained that the Society’s role as a religious
institution did not excuse it from following reasonable regulation, especially since the goals
of the Society were secular in nature. He stated:
although petitioner is entitled to First Amendment protection as a religious
organization, this does not entitle it to immunity from reasonable
government regulation when it acts purely in secular matters.”71
Furthermore, the Society’s status as a charitable organization changes the equation of
landmark designation restriction. Wachtler states:
with this standard now set, and the emphasis properly placed on how the
restriction effects the charitable activities of the organization, it is clear that
on this record the landmark designation withstands constitutional scrutiny.72
This conclusion indicates the Court looked beyond the religious status of the Society and
delved into the specific results of the designation and found that the designation did not
impede its ability to perform charitable work.
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During the 1960’s the Society decided to develop the property to take advantage of
its lucrative location. The plan called for:
the demolition of the school and Meeting House, high-rise development of
the entire site, and lease of the property to a developer for 99 years at an
annual ground rent of $ 175,000. According to this proposal, a high-rise, 800
unit, 240,000 square-foot luxury apartment building was to be built, in which
the society would occupy 27,500 square feet on the lower floors.73
Ultimately, this plan was expected to generate a $ 2,000,000 mortgage loan. The Society
justified its plans to demolish the building and develop the land by claiming that the
increased revenue would contribute to furthering the goals of the charitable organization.
The sorting of the facts led the court to pinpoint that “it appears that market conditions, and
not the designation, prevented the society from taking remedial action to cure the buildings'
shortcomings.”74 The Society insisted that both buildings be torn down to increase revenue
and further their charitable work while eliminating the option of developing only the Ethical
Culture School parcel of 60%. The plummet of the New York City real estate markets
rendered the project worthless.
The court acknowledged the unique stance of religious institutions but looked deeper
into the motives of the Society to conclude that the First Amendment rights were not
violated. The Appellate Court decision was affirmed. Though the Court rejected the
argument that a decline in market value impinged on the Free Exercise rights of a religious
organization, the Court declined to further the Society’s protection when it steps into the
realm of purely secular matters. Though the Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt case is not a
distinctive victory for historic preservation in terms of the implementation of preservation
values based on their societal merit, the case levels the field and furthers the religious
property landmarking litigation.
73
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The only consistent theme in religious property landmarking litigation is the
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory rulings of the Courts. The next case, involving the
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church, a Colorado non-profit Corporation that wanted to
expand its facilities with the construction of a new gymnasium to meet the increasing needs
of the community demonstrates such a reversal. The City of Lakewood Department of
Community Services allowed the new construction, provided that certain conditions were
met. The new construction would be approved if the Church would agree to supply a public
right of way in addition to certain street improvements such as new curbs, gutters, and
sidewalks.

Figure 4
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church
in Lakewood, Colorado.

The 1981 Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood75 case determined
that the conditions imposed on the Church were not an unconstitutional use of police
power. Justice Lee, delivering the opinion, asserted that though the actual construction of
the religious site may be regulated to ensure the public health, safety, and general welfare,
74
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“the law provides preferential treatment for churches”76 This ‘preferential treatment’ was not
the exemption of religious entities from police powers, but, as Lee explains, religious entities
are subject to the police powers as long as the state justifies its imposition. This conditional
relationship must be proved. Lee states that “this court has previously held that churches are
subject to the police power when the state can show a substantial interest.”77 After the state
justifies its substantial interest, the state must show that an alternative does not exist. Lee
quoted from the 1973 case Pillar of Fire v. DURA78 and DURA v. Pillar of Fire:79
We must balance the interests involved in the controversy before us and
recognize that the state must show a substantial interest without a reasonable
alternate means of accomplishment if the state is to be constitutionally
allowed to take the birthplace of the Pillar of Fire Church.80
The Court decided that though the conditional requirement of public improvements in
conjunction with the dedication of public lands was not unconstitutional in return for a
permit, a compelling interest was not justified. The privileged treatment approved for
religious entities is unmistakable. This restricted position, unassailable by neutral and
generally applicable land use regulation continues to be a common theme in religious
organizations’ fight against Historic Preservation.
The contentious City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church81 case of 1982 ended with a split
decision, again representing the uneasy position of the Courts. Justice Floyd Hicks, writing
for the concurring Justices intimated the heated judicial battle. He stated: “as is apparent
from the extended period we have held the matter under consideration, the court has not
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been of one mind on the issues concerned.”82 The city tried to enjoin the First Baptist
church-operated school after certain violations of the building and zoning regulations were
identified. The Church claimed that the building code and zoning regulations violated its
First Amendment right of religious freedom. This case is indicative of police power and
religious entity skirmishes. Appallingly, the court sided with the rights of religious entities.
The nature of the dispute places the health and safety of the public at risk for the sake of
maintenance of the religious entity status.
The First Baptist Church created the Washington Christian Academy in 1978 to
advance the education of its youngest members. The church-operated school, conducted in
the basement of the church was cited for noncompliance with the building code safety
standards, as applied to educational edifices. As dissenting Judge Dolliver explained, the
evidence of multiple violations is overwhelming. The building is inadequate as a school for
several reasons including:
inadequate floor space, inadequate ventilation, no approved fire alarm
system, no fire extinguishers, no fire detectors, no sprinkler system, no fireretardant walls and ceilings, no lighted exit signs, no exit signs at all, stairs
that are too narrow, doors that do not open out, and stairs of inconsistent
rise and run. In addition to these violations which constitute a safety hazard,
there are health code violations such as inadequate restroom facilities.83
Based on these violations, the trial court shut the school down until compliance could be
confirmed. The trial court made explicit that the religious uses were not burdened. “The
building's use as a church was not affected.”84 The Church complained that the
“uncompromising enforcement…would deny to church members the right to guide the
education of their children by sending them to their church-operated school, a fundamental
82
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and constitutionally protected right.”85 The Church believed that even though the impact
was not directly on religious practices, an impact nonetheless existed.
Justice Hicks explained that “where, as here, two legitimate and substantial interests
collide, one may ultimately have to give way to the other. In such a situation, the court's
function is to balance the interests of the parties and, if an accommodation cannot be
effected, determine which interest must yield.”86 Hicks believed that the trial courts ignored
this principle and did not balance the interests. He also believed that the trial court did not
“determine that uncompromising enforcement of the building code and zoning ordinance
constituted a governmental interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause."87 In addition to not balancing the interests of
the parties and not determining a sufficient government interest, the trail court also did not
consider other options to determine which accommodated the religious entity most. “Finally,
the trial court did not consider whether the means chosen to enforce the governmental
interest were necessary and the least restrictive available to achieve the ends sought.”88
The religious status of one party changed the balance requirement. Hicks states “this
case concerns more than the mere routine application of a building code and a zoning
ordinance.”89 The solution, as purported by the Court, was to infuse the issue with flexibility.
Hicks stated:
There should be some play in the joints of both the zoning ordinance and
the building code. An effort to accommodate the religious freedom of
appellants while at the same time giving effect to the legitimate concerns of
84
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the City as expressed in its building code and zoning ordinance would seem
to be in order.90
The Court dissolved the injunction and sustained the status of religious entities. As will soon
be evident, the Washington State religious land use jurisprudence differs significantly from
the U.S. Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause precedence. These issues have unavoidably
“touched off a holy war.” 91
The 1986 Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick92 case once more pitted the
interests of historic preservation against the interests of a religious institution. The Church of
St. Paul and St. Andrew is located at West End Avenue and 86th Street in New York City.
The Church occupies a 150-foot by 125-foot parcel and includes a church, parish house and
rectory. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission designated the church and
parish house as a landmark in 1982. It is a "brilliant exemplar of the eclecticism that spread
through American architecture in the late 19th century representing a fusion of Early
Christian, German Romanesque and Italian Renaissance styles.” 93 Just before the
designation, however, the Church determined that its financial situation revealed a bleak
future. The meager financial resources were well documented in affidavits and described by
dissenting Judge Meyer:
In 1980, it was estimated that exterior repairs in the amount of $ 250,000
were required. When this action was commenced in 1982, that estimate had
risen to $350,000. Other than the buildings and land and a small endowment
of approximately $ 35,000, there are few assets. The church operates with
annual pledge income and donations from its membership together with
other contributions, which totaled approximately $ 60,000 in 1982 and barely
met the most necessary of salary and maintenance expenses.94
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The Church concluded that its best option was to renovate the Church and develop the land.
Because of the long-continued disrepair of the church, the expense of
maintaining and heating it, and its meager financial resources, plaintiff had
developed a rebuilding program which included plans for the complete
renovation of the church and the construction of a commercial high-rise
condominium on part of the property.95
The Church claimed that as applied, the Landmarks law was unconstitutional.
Justice Hancock delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals stated that in New
York, noncompliance with landmark designation is taken very seriously. “Violation of the
maintenance and repair requirements subjects an owner to a fine of not more than $250 and
not less than $ 25, or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both.”96 Hancock
explained that the Church plan to develop the land was intended to "provide a new building
with appropriate facilities and income for plaintiff's continuing religious and charitable
program, thereby assuring its survival."97 Facing criminal sanctions however, the Church
describes that it cannot afford to fulfill the requirements and obligations of the designation
and Landmarks Law. The Church argues that the sheer size of the structure (it was built to
seat a congregation of 1,400, but currently only caters to 250 members) renders it
unmanageable.
The Church believed that the Landmarks Law amounted to a taking as well as
burdened its First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the Church claims that the
Landmarks Law interferes with its charitable duties. “The statute, as applied, physically or
financially prevents or seriously interferes with the carrying out of the charitable purpose.”98
The case, however, was deemed not ripe for judicial interpretation. The Court of Appeals
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agreed with the Supreme Court that the case was not ripe. “The issue presented -- whether
the alleged interference with plaintiff's ability to carry out its charitable purpose amounts to a
constitutional injury -- is not ripe for judicial determination.”99 The Court explained the
concept of ripeness as:
administrative action which produces the alleged harm to plaintiff; the focus
of the inquiry is on the finality and effect of the challenged action and
whether harm from it might be prevented or cured by administrative means
available to the plaintiff.100
The Court found that the Church did not apply for a Certificate of Appropriateness101 and
thus never received approval or denial for its plans. The failure to get such Certificate
brought the proceedings to a halt. The Court did however acknowledge the status of
religious organizations but did not see the need to alter the application of the ripeness
doctrine because of the religious status of the Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew. “Unless a
special exception to the ripeness doctrine is to be created, plaintiff's status as a religious
organization has no relevance.”102 The 4 to 3 decision concluded that the Constitutional
infringement claim cannot be determined. Interestingly, this case differs from the 1980
Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt in that the Church planed to renovate the Church as well as
develop a certain area, not demolish it.
The Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew case caps the end of the Sherbert-Yoder era.
Though these cases have produced mixed results, they have consistently upheld the right of
Free Exercise. The next section, the Attempted Smith Shift revolved around the pivotal
1990 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith103 case. In
effect, it reshuffled the heavyweight challenge and knocked religious entities out of their
99
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distinguished realm. As represented in the historic preservation regulation and religious
rights battle, its intended effect however, was different than the outcomes.
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Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith,104 was a
pivotal 1990 case, indicating a shift in Supreme Court principles and set a new precedent.
The plaintiffs Alfred Smith and Galen Black, both counselors at a drug rehabilitation center,
were fired after ingesting peyote, and filed a suit after their applications for unemployment
compensation were denied. The plaintiffs purported that since they ingested peyote for
religious purposes in their Native American Church, the denial of their unemployment
benefits violated their First Amendment religious right. In the 6-to-3 decision, the court
boldly moved away from the sanctioned application of strict scrutiny guidelines to
government actions as witnessed in Sherbert-Yoder. The Sherbert-Yoder era effectuated a
standard in which religious free exercise rights were strongly protected. Instead, the court
considered the case based on the general applicability of a law guideline, as established in the
1878 Reynolds v. United States case. The required heightened scrutiny standard for government
actions that even unintentionally burden religious beliefs or practices was concluded.
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, stated that the religious
motivation for using peyote does not place Smith and Black beyond the grip of criminal law.
Smith and Black believed that “their religious motivation for using peyote places them
beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious
practice.”105 Scalia further stated that the contentions of Smith and Black are flawed. They
believe that "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring any individual to
observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that
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his religious belief forbids (or requires).”106 The Court rejected the “strict scrutiny test” and
allowed religious beliefs to be burdened by laws generally applicable to everyone so long as
they promote a substantial state interest. It was determined that religious beliefs do not
excuse citizens from compliance with valid laws, even if they indirectly affect religious
practices. Scalia stated:
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate....The mere possession of religious convictions which
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.107
In reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision, this Supreme Court returned to a standard
instituted in Reynolds v. US. Scalia reaffirmed that a neutral, generally applicable law should
govern conduct, without regard to indirect affects on religious practices. Scalia addressed
that religions may have to tolerate disadvantages for the sake of democracy. He believed:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or
in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all religious beliefs.
In spite of the burdens placed on Smith and Black, they were denied unemployment
benefits. The Court specifically did not recognize the case as a pure employment benefits
case such as Sherbert and Yoder. Instead, the Court really sidestepped the employment
benefits issue. The most convincing rationale the Court used was its cogent explanation for
not applying the Sherbert-Yoder compelling interest requirement. Scalia explained:
The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it
is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met
106
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before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race,
or before the government may regulate the content of speech, is not
remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it
produces in those other fields -- equality of treatment and an unrestricted
flow of contending speech -- are constitutional norms; what it would
produce here -- a private right to ignore generally applicable laws -- is a
constitutional anomaly....108
This “private right to ignore generally applicable laws” is what Smith undermines. Had the
respondents won the case, the First Amendment’s protection of religion would be widened
to include many exemptions not necessarily intended by the Framers. Scalia explains that:
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind -- ranging from compulsory military service to the payment
of taxes to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child
neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to
social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws,
animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for
equality of opportunity for the races.109
The intention of the Smith ruling was to ensure that such a Pandora’s Box of exemptions is
not opened and that neutral and generally applicable laws even if they incidentally burden
religion pass Constitutional muster.
The 1990 Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Commission110 case was
decided in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The conflict began when the
Boston Landmarks Commission designated the historic interior of the Church of the
Immaculate Conception, located in Boston's South End. The Court admitted that “there are
few finer examples of classic mid-Nineteenth Century church design.” The Jesuits claimed
that the designation of the interior of the church violated the free exercise clause of the First
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Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court already granted summary
judgment to the Jesuits and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
In light of dwindling membership, Church officials decided to renovate the building
to better ensure their future financial needs. “The plan called for renovation of the main
church into office, counseling, and residential space.”111 The Commission quickly designated
the interior of the Church to stop the renovation. The designation restricted permanent
alteration of the "nave, chancel, vestibule and organ loft on the main floor -- the volume,
window glazing, architectural detail, finishes, painting, the organ, and organ case.112
Justice Lunch, writing for the majority, explained that designation of the interior was
found to violate Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.
Article 2 states:
No subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or
estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to
the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others
in their religious worship.113
The Jesuits claimed that their inability to change the interior of their Church violated their
rights. The Court concluded that “Article 2 protects the right freely to design interior spaces
for religious worship, thus barring the government from regulating changes in such places,
provided that no public safety question is presented.”114 Justice Lynch stated that the interior
designation was exceedingly invasive. “The government intrusion here is substantially more
invasive, reaching into the church's actual worship space.”115
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Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Commission

deals

Historic

Preservation’s

battle to preserve religious buildings another
blow. Lynch explained that the Court did
consider the worthiness of preservation. He
stated:
The

government

preservation,

interest

though

in

worthy,

historic
is

not

sufficiently compelling to justify restraints on
the free exercise of religion, a right of
primary importance. In short, under our
hierarchy of constitutional values we must
Figure 5
Interior view of Society of Jesus of
New England in Boston.

accept the possible loss of historically
significant elements of the interior of this
church as the price of safeguarding the right of

religious freedom.116 This consideration, however, was not favorable to the objectives of
historic preservation. The landmark designation was found to burden religious worship and
was deemed unconstitutional. The next case, however, was a long awaited triumph for
preservationists. Unfortunately, its success was a mere speck on the regulation of historic
religious property timeline.
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The next case, Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church v.
City of New York

117

is a significant post-Smith case that directly addresses historic religious

landmarking issues. St. Bartholomew’s Church is a Protestant Episcopal Church built in
1917 and located on the east side of Park Avenue between East 50th and East 51st Streets in
the City of New York. The Church brought suit after the New York Landmarks
Preservation Commission denied their request to replace an adjacent structure, the
Community House, with a fifty-nine story office tower. They claimed that landmark status
violated the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause and Takings Clause.

Figure 6
St. Bartholomew’s Church in
New York.

117Rector,

Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York and the Landmarks
Preservation Commission of the City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
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In 1967, the Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York
determined that pursuant to the Landmarks Law, St. Bartholomew's Church, the exterior of
the Community House and the surrounding property should all be designated landmarks.
The 1919 Church structure was designed by architect Bertram G. Goodhue. Justice Winter
explains that:
the Church building is a notable example of a Venetian adaptation
of the Byzantine style, built on a Latin cross plan. Significant
features include its polychromatic stone exterior, soaring octagonal
dome, and large rose window. Perhaps most significantly, Goodhue
incorporated into his building the Romanesque porch of St.
Bartholomew's former Church building at Madison Avenue and
44th Street. Designed by the renowned architectural firm of
McKim, Mead & White, the porch is composed of a high arched
central portal flanked by two lower arched doorways, all supported
by slender columns.118
Though not the point of contention in this case, the description of the Church is significant
when determining the significance of the other structures. The relationship of the Church to
the Community House, the focus of this case, is meaningful when determining the overall
significance of the landmarked structures. The Community House is described by Justice
Winter as a terraced seven-story structure located at the corner of Park Avenue and 50th
Street just neighboring the Church. “Completed in 1928 by associates of Goodhue, the
Community House complements the Church building in scale, materials and decoration.”119
The Landmarks Preservation Commission deduced that these architectural features as well
as the inherent value based derived from the complementary relationships between the
buildings warranted protection. The Commission affirmed “St. Bartholomew's Church and
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Community House have special character, special historical and aesthetic interest and value
as part of the development, heritage and cultural aspects of New York City.”120 This
uncontested designation necessitated special approval for any alteration or demolition of the
landmarked structures.
Beginning in 1983, pursuant to the obligations of landmark status, several
applications were filed for permission to change the Community House. The commission
summarily rejected them. First, the Church requested a “Certificate of Appropriateness” to
tear down the Community House and erect a 59-story tower in its stead. After altering its
plans from a 59-story to a 47-story tower to appease the Commission, and then filing for a
“hardship exception,” the Church was denied again. Frustrated, the Church filed suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief in 1986. Along with other claims, they declared that the state
landmark designation burdened its free exercise of religion “by excessively burdening the
practice of religion and entangling the government in religious affairs.”121
The Church viewed the Landmarks Commission’s denial to grant a permit for
demolition and construction of the new office tower as an imposition on their rights as a
religious institution. They claimed that the denial had negated its ability to “carry on and
expand the ministerial and charitable activities that are central to its religious mission.”122
They claim that the development of an office tower was necessary to shore up their
dwindling assets as well as provide additional space for their activities. “The Church
concludes that the Landmarks Law unconstitutionally denies it the opportunity to exploit
this means of carrying out its religious mission.”123 Circuit Judge Winter explained that the
limitation was not severe enough to warrant any change of action. He explained that St.
120
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Bartholomew’s Church had three sources of funds with an overall endowment of $ 14.3
million. The Church claimed that their overall endowment could not sustain the imminent
debt produced by the Commission’s recommended renovation and that in effect, the
renovations negatively impacted its future earnings potential.
The Church's principal argument is that a major improvement expenditure of
the type required to repair and renovate the Church building and Community
House would severely damage this ‘precarious’ balance of revenues and
expenses. Because such expenditure would come from endowment funds,
the Church contends, future investment income will inevitably decline as the
result of a depleted portfolio. Such a decrease in future revenues, it
concludes, will produce ‘severe deficits.’124
Though the designation did monetarily restrict the Church, the takings claims failed because
of the Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York City125 precedent. Circuit Judge Winter
turned to Employment Division v. Smith,126 the new shepherd, intended to guide.
Such an invasion into a religious entity’s finances would never be allowed pre-Smith.
The Court justified the Landmark Commission’s actions of incidentally impinging on the
activities of the Church and not the beliefs which are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
“No one seriously contends that the Landmarks Law interferes with substantive religious
views.” Additionally, Justice Winter defends the Landmarks Law by quoting from Smith.
The Landmarks Law is a facially neutral regulation of general applicability
within the meaning of Supreme Court decisions. It thus applies to ‘any
improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a
special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value.’127
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Federal District Court’s decision and ruled that the
actions of the City of New York and the Landmarks Preservation Commission were
constitutionally valid. The historic preservation ordinances were again deemed facially
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neutral laws of generally applicability. The courts deemed that the Church’s right to free
exercise was not substantially burdened by the landmark designation and the subsequent
denials of demolition permits. The Court also analyzed the impact of the Smith decision. The
Court described that post-Smith:
the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes). The critical distinction is thus between a neutral, generally
applicable law that happens to bear on religiously motivated action, and a
regulation that restricts certain conduct because it is religiously oriented.128
As long as a law is determined to be generally applicable and does not target a specific
religion or its practice, little governmental justification is necessary. Without the influence of
a system of individualized exceptions in this case, regard as to whether the government had
used the least restrictive means to further a compelling interest was not an issue. “In sum,
the Smith case meant that the compelling interest standard would be applied under the U.S.
Constitution to a much smaller number of cases than had previously been thought.”129
Finally, the hallowed realm that religious entities have held for so long have given way in
favor of historic preservation! Or so preservationist’s thought.
Just two years after Smith, in First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle,130 the rules
changed once again. The promising headway that the Smith and Saint Bartholomew Courts
made was uprooted to the dismay of preservation organizations. The First Amendment
rights of religious organizations persevere as the relentless factor that determines the survival
of the historic preservation of religious sites.
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Figure 8
Sketch of First
Covenant Church in
Seattle, Washington.

The First Covenant Church is located at the corner of Pike and Bellevue Streets in
Seattle. In October of 1980, the Seattle's Landmarks Preservation Board nominated the First
Covenant Church as a landmark. The First Covenant Church fit the 1977 Landmarks
Preservation Ordinance criteria:
designate, preserve, [and] protect,…improvements and objects which reflect
significant elements of the City's cultural, aesthetic, social, economic,
political, architectural, engineering, historic or other heritage . . .[.]131
Though the Church fit the necessary requirements, the Church vehemently opposed the
designation. The opposition was to no avail and after several contentious public hearings the
Board approved designation anyway in September 1985.
The case records indicate that “the church and City unsuccessfully negotiated about
the controls that the City would impose on the church.”132 The controls the city exercised
were delineated in the Designation Ordinance which required that while the Ordinance did
not dictate any religious activity, it did require approval of any changes to the architecturally
significant building. The Ordinance had several components that immediately impacted the
Church upon designation including:
interference with the Church's freedom to alter the exterior of the church
structure; necessary secular approval of any proposed alteration of the facade
requiring additional paperwork, negotiations and hearings; a limitation on the
131
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Church's ability to sell its property; and uncertainty of discretionary approval
confronting the Church in its planning of any exterior change.133
The designation also affected the market value. “In addition, an uncontroverted affidavit
stated that landmark designation of the church resulted in a depreciation of the market value
of the property from $700,000 to $400,000”134 The application of the Ordinance is pivotal to
First Covenant Church’s claim that its First Amendment right of free exercise was violated.
Justice Dore explained that “applying the City's ordinances to First Covenant burdened the
church's right to free exercise of religion under the federal and state constitutions. And the
majority, again for different reasons, concluded that the liturgy exemption did not mitigate
the burden on free exercise.”135
The landmark designation and subsequent regulation was found to violate First
Covenant’s Free Exercise rights. The rights of the Church were violated administratively and
financially.
The ordinances burden free exercise "administratively"
because they require that First Covenant seek the approval of
a government body before it alters the exterior of its house of
worship, whether or not the alteration is for a religious
reason. Further, they burden First Covenant financially,
because they reduce the value of the church's property by
almost half.136
The court dealt historic preservation another blow by determining that the preservation of
historic structures is not a compelling interest. Justice Dore explained:
We hold that the City's interest in preservation of aesthetic and
historic structures is not compelling and it does not justify the
infringement of First Covenant's right to freely exercise
religion. The possible loss of significant architectural elements
is a price we must accept to guarantee the paramount right of
religious freedom.
133
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The basis for this decision was the application of Sherbert. With this application, the majority
concluded that historic preservation was not a compelling state interest “that justified the
burden on First Covenant's right to free exercise and, therefore, that applying the City's
ordinances to First Covenant violated First Covenant's free exercise rights under the state
and federal constitutions.”137 The Washington Supreme Court, on remand from the Supreme
Court, was required to use the Smith test and found the test to be inapplicable because they
considered this case to be a “hybrid situation.” Smith was not applied in this case because the
church claimed infringement of its free exercise and free speech rights. The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court’s decisions and judged that the landmarks preservation ordinance
unconstitutionally infringed on the religious organization's religious freedom.
The 1993 Supreme Court Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah138 decision
reaffirmed the Smith standard as well as introduced many to the Santeria religion. The
Santeria religion was established in the 19th century when Yoruba slaves from western Africa
were transported to Cuba and were exposed to Roman Catholicism. “The resulting
syncretion, or fusion, is Santeria, ‘the way of the saints.’”139 Justice Kennedy explains that the
interesting amalgam created a worship of orishas. “The Cuban Yoruba express their
devotion to spirits, called orishas, through the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic
symbols are often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees attend the Catholic
sacraments.”140 Problems arose when the city of Hialeah, Florida enacted a ordinances aimed
at preventing the Church of the Lukumi Babalu, a not-for-profit corporation founded in
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1973 from animal sacrifice, as required for religious purposes. The Church claimed these
ordinances violated their First Amendment right to exercise freely.
As soon as the Church leased land in Hialeah, the city council passed five resolutions.
The enactments included Resolution 87-66 which declared that “[t]he City reiterates its
commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which
are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”141 Ordinance 87-40 warned of criminal
punishment to “[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any animal.”142 Resolution 8790 “declared the city policy ‘to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals’ within Hialeah, and
announced that any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice ‘will be prosecuted.’
Sacrifice is important to keep the spirits going. Kennedy explained:
They depend for survival on the sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth,
marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new
members and priests, and during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed in
Santeria rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats,
sheep, and turtles. The animals are killed by the cutting of the carotid arteries
in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten, except after healing
and death rituals.143
The city, however, exempted animal slaughter for food consumption. Justice Kennedy
explained that “all ordinances and resolutions passed the city council by unanimous vote.
Violations of each of the four ordinances were punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or
imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both.”144
The Supreme Court did not interpret these Resolutions and Ordinances as neutral or
generally applicable. The compelling state interest was weak. Instead, the city council tailored
the Resolutions and Ordinances to meet their specific objectives: removal or obstruction of
141
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the Church of the Lukumi Babalu from the City of Hialeah. The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the District Court. The District Court ruled in City of Hialeah’s favor
“although acknowledging that the foregoing ordinances are not religiously neutral.”145 The
court concluded that:
compelling governmental interests in preventing public health risks and
cruelty to animals fully justified the absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice
accomplished by the ordinances, and that an exception to that prohibition
for religious conduct would unduly interfere with fulfillment of the
governmental interest, because any more narrow restrictions would be
unenforceable as a result of the Santeria religion's secret nature.146
Justice Kennedy explained that “the ordinances’ texts and operation demonstrate that they
are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria’s central element, animal
sacrifice”147 The Ordinances were deemed gerrymandered. He stated: Moreover, the latter
ordinances’ various prohibitions, definitions, and exemptions demonstrate that they were
‘gerrymandered’ with care to proscribe religious killings of animals by Santeria church
members but to exclude almost all other animal killings.”148 The Ordinances also do not
show a compelling government interest. He stated:
The legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and
preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far
short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice, such as general
regulations on the disposal of organic garbage, on the care of animals
regardless of why they are kept, or on methods of slaughter.149
In a concurring statement, Justice Scalia opined: “The ordinances ha[ve] every appearance of
a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers], but not upon
itself." This amounts to complete disregard to what ‘general applicability’ is supposed to
144
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enforce. To scold the City Council of Hialeah as well as remind governing bodies of their
obligations, Kennedy states: “Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised,
designed to persecute oppress a religion or its practices.”150
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu case was the last case argued before Congress
intentionally treaded on this historically contested ground. Congress’s objective was to
implement a standard for all Courts to follow when deciding First Amendment claims.
Overall, it was anticipate that the Religions Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 would add a
measure of stability to the historically unpredictable Free Exercise Clause litigation.
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V.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)151 of 1993 became law after a

unanimous voice vote in the House and a 98-to-2 vote in the Senate.152 RFRA was
Congresses attempt to allay the burdening of religion even by neural and generally applicable
laws as established by Smith. RFRA was an attempt to provide guidance and ultimately
stabilize the tremendous latitude courts exhibited in their decisions. Both RFRA and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 tried to shore up
the First Amendment rights of religious organizations.
Congress initiated the research by returning to the roots of the issue – back to the
Constitution itself and the need for the First Amendment. “The framers of the Constitution,
recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution.”153 They affirmed that the right to practice a religion was
an unalienable right and should be protected. They acknowledged that even laws that were
neural may burden the exercise of religion. “Laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”154 Congress
ensured that RFRA protected First Amendment rights even from generally applicable laws.
RFRA stated that “government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”155
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religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”156 This compelling interest test
was specifically addressed in the legislation by declaring that it was erroneously eliminated in
Employment Division v. Smith.157
The purpose of RFRA was specific. Its ultimate goal was to protect the free exercise
of religion. Congress believed that the most reliable way to ensure this was to restore the
precedents established in Sherbert v. Verner158 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.159 The basis for this
restoration was to reinstate the compelling interest test and to “guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened and to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”160
Exemptions, however, were allowed that enabled, in effect, the government to substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion. The burden was permissible if the government proved
that the action was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”161 Once the burden
was satisfactorily established by the plaintiff, the government must prove that the action is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest and has been carried out in the least
restrictive way.
RFRA was thus intended to guide and stabilize. It was a response to Smith’s
sanctioned burdens on religion via the establishment of neutral and generally applicable laws.
RFRA was designed to guarantee that religious institutions were not substantially burdened.
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The response to RFRA has covered the entire spectrum, drawing harsh criticism as well as
praise.
Some have vilified RFRA as an ‘unconstitutional grab for power’ by
Congress, while others remain steadfast in their belief that RFRA was a
legitimate expansion of rights that correctly imposed ‘the highest standard of
constitutional protection from one of the most important freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution.’162
Unfortunately, it also placed Historic Preservation in an increasingly awkward position and
perpetuated preservation’s uphill battle.
Post-RFRA cases involving historic preservation are limited. Specifically, two cases
directly address preservation. The first, Cardinal William H. Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of
Cumberland163 involves St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Church, located in Cumberland,
Maryland. Pursuant to the 1974 Historic Zoning Ordinance that created the town’s Historic
Preservation Commission, the historic religious structures became part of the Washington
Street Historic District. Occupying an entire city-block, St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic
Church, built between 1848 and 1889, is comprised of “a ‘massive’ monastery with a large
chapel, and a corridor known as the ‘White Elephant,’ which connects the monastery to the
sacristy of the Church.”164 The monastery and chapel, however, have been vacant since 1986
due to financial difficulties.
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Figure 9
St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic
Church in Cumberland, Maryland.
Consequently, in 1995, the Church applied to the Cumberland Historic Preservation
Commission for a Certificate of Appropriateness to demolish the structure and build a
Church Annex. The choice to demolish was made on the basis that:
the estimated cost for reconstruction simply to retain and adequately
maintain the structure exceeds $380,000. . . plus significant annual
maintenance costs…and the estimated cost for a complete renovation of the
entire building exceeds $2 million dollars.165
The Church claimed that the financial burden impeded its ability to fulfill their duties. The
inability to demolish the structure “is a significant financial liability and whose presence
prevents the parish from meeting the religious needs of its congregation.”166 This Certificate
was denied and the Church filed suit claiming that the Ordinance and denial of demolition
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request violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and substantially burdened their
First Amendment rights.
The City moved to dismiss on the basis that RFRA is unconstitutional. “This purely
legal argument is appropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss. If RFRA itself is
invalid, then no set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs could entitle them to relief under that
statute.”167 The United States District Judge Frederic N. Smalkin explained the complicated
issues and found that both parties were confused about the application of RFRA.
According to the defendants, the statute violates the separation of powers
because it imposes a rule of constitutional interpretation upon the courts.
The plaintiffs and the United States take the position that RFRA ‘simply
provides prophylactic statutory protection for the Fourteenth Amendment's
free exercise guarantee, as substantively interpreted by the judiciary’.168
Notwithstanding the confusion, the objectives of historic preservation were promptly
curtailed. The Court deemed that “the ordinance neither furthers a compelling government
interest nor constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering possible interests of the
government in historic preservation.”169 In effect, the City did not prove a compelling
governmental interest enough to justify the refusal to demolish. In this extreme
interpretation, historic preservation was deemed neither neutral nor a generally applicable
regulatory law.
One issue raised was that of individual exemptions. The ordinance had detailed
exemptions, e.g. for economic hardship, that allowed alterations if any of these criteria were
met:
(1) The structure is a deterrent to a major improvement program
which will be of substantial benefit to the City of Cumberland;
(2) Retention of the structure would cause undue financial
hardship to the owner; or
167
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(3) The retention of the structure would not be to the best interest
of a majority of persons in the community.170
The Court ruled that the availability of exemptions for certain criteria allowed for the
addition of other criteria, including religion. Judge Smalkin quoted from Bowen v. Roy171 when
he opined that “where the State has in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may
not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."
Hence the Court moved away from Smith which “recognized that where the government
enacts a system of exemptions, and thereby acknowledges that its interest in enforcement is
not paramount, then the government ‘may not refuse to extend that system [of exemptions]
to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."172 Historic preservation was not
recognized as a compelling enough reason.
In a bold move, the Court held that Cumberland did not provide enough evidence of
the compelling state interest to support Historic Preservation Ordinance No. 2970 and
denial of Certificate of Appropriateness for the demolition. The Keeler Court did not apply
Smith or Saint Bartholomew and found that Church’s right of Free Exercise was violated.
Historic Preservation was deemed not neutral or a law of general applicability. This is a trend
that the Maryland State Courts predictably follow. Historic Preservation through landmark
designation has been consistently rejected. RLUIPA, as we shall see, could possibly fuel
these types of cases. This legislation may stimulate and further embolden the privileges that
religious organizations have that enable them to exist above the general rules that apply to all
other organizations.
The second post-RFRA case that involved the Free Exercise Clause and Historic
Preservation directly was First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle
170
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Landmarks Preservation Board.173 First United Methodist Church, built in 1907, and a
corresponding chapel and community center, built in 1950, are located in downtown Seattle
on the west side of 5th Avenue between Marion and Columbia Streets. The parcel of land is
divided with the First United Methodist Church situated on the northern part of the
property and the chapel and community center located in a separate building on the
southern part of the property.174 In spite of the highly contested landmark status, the Church
was nominated in 1984 and approved in 1985. “In December 1984, Seattle's Office of Urban
Conservation nominated both the interior and exterior of the church for landmark
designation under the Landmarks Preservation Ordinance.”175 The 1910 structure was clearly
meritorious of designation. The “Beaux Arts style sanctuary, with 66-foot high interior
ceiling, brick and terra cotta façade, and orange tile-covered central dome”176 was created by
the well known Seattle based architects
James Schack and Daniel Huntington.

Figure 10
First United Methodist Church in
Seattle, Washington.
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The Trial Court ruled that the Landmark Preservation Ordinance was
unconstitutional. Justice Baker, opining for the Court of Appeals, explained that the Court
agreed in part. The Court disagreed, however, and clarified that landmark designation itself
does not interfere with the exercise of religion. “Merely designating property as a
landmark…does not interfere with the free exercise of religion.”177 The Court deduced that
only the application of the restrictions rendered the Ordinance unconstitutional. “It is the
placing of restrictions on the property which causes the prohibited interference. We
therefore hold that the portions of the LPO which place restrictions… cannot be applied to
the church building owned by First United as long as the building is being used primarily for
religious purposes.” This ruling indicates that preservation was considered a legitimate
government interest. Justice Baker explained that
our ruling that these provisions cannot presently be applied
to the church building does not invalidate the entire LPO.
The City may still choose to designate the church building as
a landmark, but the landmarks board cannot restrict
modification of the structure in any way unless and until the
structure ceases to be used primarily for religious purposes.178
The Court excused the Church from complying with the Ordinance as long as the structure
was used for religious purposes. The Court further asserted that once the property changes
to a use that does not include religious use, then the preservation ordinance would be in
effect. “The Court of Appeals, reversing in part, held that the City could enact an ordinance
designating the church a landmark as long as it refrained from imposing any controls ‘until
the structure ceases to be used for primarily religious purposes.’"179 First United was not
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satisfied and appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. They received a more favorable
ruling.
Justice Durham explained in detail the Court’s decision to reverse. In the 5 to 4
decision, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Landmarks Preservation
Ordinance, as described in the Seattle Municipal Code, does impose an unconstitutional
burden on the United Methodist Church. The Church appealed to the City’s Hearing
Examiner claiming that the Church’s state of disrepair required significant attention and
funds. Justice Durham explained that the Church believed that “repairs to the church would
be affordable only absent government controls.”180 United Methodist also maintained it
needed smaller sanctuary claiming that the size of the current building was too large for its
congregation which was estimated at only half of its patronage of 40 years ago. “The present
sanctuary is too large to foster as dynamic and meaningful worship services as desired.”181
The decline in patronage was attributed to the dynamic changes in city function significantly
the “expansion of the commercial core of the city, the construction of the freeways, the
construction of vastly expanded medical and commercial facilities on First Hill are some of
the changes in Seattle which have contributed to the decline in the Church's membership.182
First United Methodist Church believed that it was their right to utilize their property as they
wished, especially in light of their financial situation. “United Methodist argued that it should
be free to designate any portion of its property for commercial use in order to fund religious
and social service programs.”183 The Washington State Supreme Court agreed with the First
United Church on September 27, 1995.
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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Washington State Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and reaffirmed that the Preservation Ordinance was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court deemed that the Court of Appeals did not apply the strict scrutiny analysis and
ultimately, the Church did not prove that the landmark status burdened its right to free
exercise. The Court did, however, reaffirm that the City could designate the church a
landmark once the structures “cease[d] to be used primarily for religious purposes.”184
Specifically, the Court stated that Landmark status can be confirmed as long as the controls
that were embodied in the designation were not enacted. The Court had issue with the
‘primarily for religious purpose’ phraseology which it deemed “wholly amorphous.”185 As the
Christian Legal Society stated, this terminology implies that the
burden will fall to the church to prove that its building is
being used primarily for religious purposes, which will be
open to interpretation. Suppose that the congregation rented
the building to community groups each night of the week, so
that the total number of hours for such "secular" use
exceeded the number of hours spent in worship. Is that a
cessation of primary use for religious purpose?186
The Christian Legal Society statement addresses the overall complexity of religious land use
as well as the myriad of subtleties involved when deciding the impact on religious entities.
The Court went on to explain how landmark designation would restrict United
Methodist and burden its First Amendment rights if the Church decided to sell its property.
The very survival…of First United Methodist Church of
Seattle... depends on its having the freedom to sell its
sanctuary for demolition and commercial redevelopment. The
record makes clear, however, that the Church is not claiming
a right to maximize revenue for the purpose of commercial
gain, but only for the purpose of furthering its Christian
mission.187
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The Supreme Court sided with United Methodist Church and acknowledged that this type of
restriction is impermissible. The landmark status unduly burdened their free exercise rights
by “creating administrative or financial burdens.”188 The impediment caused by First United
Methodist Church’s inability to sell its property and exploit the profit to advance their
religion is excessively burdensome. Justice Durham reiterated that “The free exercise clause
prevents government from engaging in landmark preservation when it has a coercive effect
on religion. This protection does not cease if United Methodist sells its property.”189 Durham
pinpointed that this case exemplifies exactly what the First Amendment was created to
safeguard.
The First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner190 case concluded that even a
nomination for landmark status can be declared unconstitutional. It is unclear precisely how
the Court determined that this case was ripe for adjudication. It is evident that the realm of
religious entities has remained strong - even withstanding the hefty blow from Smith. State
enacted RFRAs are clearly not needed in some states where religious entities are afforded
greater than average refuge. As has become evident in the Washington cases, the
Washington State Constitution confers considerable protection for religious freedom – more
than is afforded by the federal Constitution.
The Munns v. Martin191 case of 1997 clearly illustrates the distinctive position of the
Washington Supreme Court. In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that even the application of
an ordinance that incorporated a demolition delay violated the Washington Constitution
when applied to a structure owned by a religious entity. In 1996, Frank Munns, the Catholic
188
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Bishop of Spokane, Washington, attempted to demolish St. Patrick's School in Walla Walla.
The Bishop intended to demolish the structure and build a new pastoral center. Since its
construction in 1928 the building was used as a school. Since 1974, the building had several
functions including fulfilling educational, social, and community needs.192 The new center
would focus on Catholic education needs as well as other Church activities. “There is no
dispute that the proposed functions of the pastoral center will be in furtherance of the
church mission.”193
In 1994, Frank Munns, the owner of the property located next to the Church,
applied to the City of Walla Walla for a demolition permit. As stated in Walla Walla
Municipal Code, the permit was required due to the nature of the change which included the
conversion of a historic structure. The next day, Robert Martin, the City's Development
Services Manager, consulted the community regarding the historic and architectural
significance of St. Patrick's School. The response regarding the significance of the structure
was overwhelming. “They contend the building is the only example of Romanesque revival
architecture in Walla Walla, and was built to complement the Gothic architecture of the St.
Patrick Church built in 1881.”194 This initial assessment was bolstered during the required
10-day stay. The Walla Walla demolition permit ordinance requires “a 10-day period for
comments concerning the demolition of any structure over 50 years old, or ‘places of
historic value.’”

195

During this 10-day holding period, the community was allowed to

respond to the proposed changes. “Based on the comments the City received during the 10day holding period (numerous letters protesting demolition), on August 15, 1994, Martin

191

Frank Munns, et al v. Robert C. Martin, 930 P.2d 318 (1997).
Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid., Walla Walla's demolition permit ordinance WWMC 20.146.040.
192

62

declared a 60-day stay in the issuance of the demolition permit to allow for a hearing before
the Planning Commission.”196 The Trial Court found the issuance of the stay had a coercive
effect on the practice of religion.
This is not a deminimis delay. In our cases, the potential
burden
of
an
ordinance
creates
constitutional
infirmity….More significantly here, the additional delay is
specifically for the purpose of permitting opponents of the
proposed demolition to attempt to broker various alternatives
to the church's planned religious purpose for the structure.
The ordinance indicates the delay is designed to provide an
‘opportunity for acquisition, easement, or other preservation
mechanism to be negotiated after the public hearing.’197
The potential for an additional time delay was deemed an administrative burden. The Trial
Court ruled that both the municipal ordinance and the additional rule requiring the
establishment of possible historic loss burdened Munns’ First Amendment rights.
On appeal to the Superior Court of Walla Walla County, Justice Philip A. Talmadge
clearly stated the issue.
we are confronted yet again with the question of whether a
local land use ordinance designed to further historic
preservation and aesthetic purposes violates our State's free
exercise of religion clause when applied to a structure that is
part of a church's religious ministry.198
The Court investigated whether the state’s Free Exercise clause pertains to a church building
clearly used for religious purposes but is not considered the house of worship. Specifically,
the Court investigated whether the established Walla Walla ordinance burdened the Roman
Catholic Church’s free exercise of religion either administratively or financially. Talmadge
explained that the ordinance did in fact burden the Bishop administratively. “The Bishop's
plans are in furtherance of his fundamental right to the free exercise of his religion. The
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ordinance therefore has a coercive effect on the practice of religion. That being the case,
the appellants have the burden of showing a compelling governmental interest in creating
delay.”199 The Court also investigated the nature of the demolition permit ordinance’s
required 60-day stay or “cooling off period.”200 Initiated due to the nature of the religious
ownership, the period is required “during which the religious organization is subject to
negotiation with governmental and private authorities before an historic or architecturally
significant structure can be demolished.”201 This 60 day stay was rescinded based on the
decision reached in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle202 which determined that an historic
preservation ordinance was not a compelling government interest and in effect violated the
First Amendment. The Court reiterated that the “possible loss of significant architectural
elements is a price we must accept to guarantee the paramount right of religious freedom.”203
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order to dismiss the appellant's petition for a
writ of mandamus.
The Munns v. Martin204 case clearly illustrates the immense latitude the states possess
when deciding local land use issues. The Washington Court has historically not shown any
leniency for historic preservation and continuously denies even the legitimacy of
preservation. Its distinctive position is defined by consistently effortless religious freedom
victories. The evolution of historic preservation, however, is hindered in the state of
Washington as evidenced by the Munns ruling in which a landmark designation of an historic
school owned by a religious entity is deemed unconstitutional. The Washington state
allowances and protections are so entrenched that with or without the RFRA a religious
199
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entity is given enhanced protection. But as the next case demonstrates, the ability of RFRA
to affect the outcome of historic preservation versus religious freedom cases becomes
incontrovertible.
The significance of the City of Boerne v. Flores205 case lies in its verdict that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court delved into the
relevant Free Exercise case history and re-established the standard for scrutiny. The Supreme
Court recognized that RFRA was a backlash to the Smith decision that did not apply the
balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner206 and tried to resolve the issue by setting a higher standard
of scrutiny than that applied in Smith. Many historic preservationists looked to this ruling as
heaven-sent. They hoped that the muscle behind the religious freedom protection clauses
would deflate and allow opportunities for other legitimate purposes to exist. Many in the
field had hoped that this standard of scrutiny would be applied in future free exercise claims
jurisprudence.
The case began when the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, P.F. Flores, brought
action under RFRA challenging the denial of a building permit to enlarge the church. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division
decided RFRA was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Tenth amendments. The
Fifth Circuit Appellate Division reversed in part and declared RFRA constitutional. In 1997,
the Supreme Court granted Certiorari, reversed, and declared RFRA unconstitutional. This
decision rippled through the historic preservation community and rekindled a great hope in
the field’s validity. As witnessed previously, one step towards the embrace of preservation is
unfortunately interpreted by the Courts in vastly different ways, usually to the dismay of
204
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preservationists. Even with RFRA declared unconstitutional, religious freedom rights have
been confirmed a time-honored foe.

Figure 11
Interior view of St. Peter Catholic
Church in Boerne, Texas.

The 1923 mission style St. Peter Catholic Church located in the historic district of
Boerne, Texas sparked a Supreme Court case and established Free Exercise case law
precedent. Due to its inability to accommodate its parishioners, the parish decided to enlarge
its structure. “Both the city and the parish were growing rapidly, and the church regularly
had to turn away 40 to 60 parishioners for the 11:00 a.m. Sunday Mass. In response to the
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overcrowding, the Archbishop of San Antonio, P.F. Flores, approved an expansion plan.”207
The 1993 plan included a complete rehabilitation that would consequently remove much of
the Church’s authenticity. Meanwhile, the Boerne City Council passed Ordinance 91-05208
that authorized the city's Historic Landmark Commission to create historic districts and
identify individual buildings as landmarks. This required that any changes to the structure be
approved by the Historic Landmark Commission.

Figure 12
Exterior view of St. Peter Catholic
Church in Boerne, Texas.
The earliest conflict centered on the actual boundaries of the Historic District.
This was quickly solved by ensuring that the boundaries were redrawn. “Any dispute as to
the actual boundaries of the City Historic District, as to whether the church was within the
207Jared Roberts. “City of Boerne v. Flores and the United States of America: Congress Versus the Court in a
Struggle Over Free Exercise: Will Employment Division v. Smith Survive?” Found at
http://www.dcl.edu/lawrev/98-4/roberts.htm.
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district or not, were de facto answered when the City amended the boundaries of the
Historic District to include the entire church structure.”209 The next issue arose when the
Church filed a building permit that would “completely gut the church building, destroying
the building itself, save for the distinctive mission-style façade.”210 This permit was rejected
and a suit was filed by Archbishop Flores alleging that the preservation ordinance was
unconstitutional and violated RFRA.211

After the Solicitor General intervened on the

Church’s side to uphold the constitutionality of RFRA, the Senior District Judge, Lucius D.
Bunton held RFRA unconstitutional. “The Court is cognizant of Congress' Authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet it is convinced of Congress' violation of the
doctrine of Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.”212
Congress reshuffled the separation of powers and assumed power it was not delegated.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. They
concluded that RFRA was constitutional because the judiciary's authority to interpret the
Constitution was not removed. Instead, the new legislation created new protections in
addition to the constitutional rights already recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court
felt differently and deemed RFRA unconstitutional in a 6 to 3 decision. Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Kennedy began by defining the core issue: “the
parties disagree over whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' §5 power "to enforce"
by "appropriate legislation" the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any
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person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" nor deny any person "equal
protection of the laws."“213
The Court began the intricate process of delineating the issues by considering
Congress’s intent and method exercised when enacting the RFRA. The Court deduced that
when enacting RFRA, Congress relied on §1 of the 14th Amendment which states in part that
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.214
The safeguard that the state cannot deprive a person of these rights was coupled with §5 that
states “the Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.”215 This empowers Congress to enforce the guarantees of §1. Although the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that RFRA was constitutional, the Supreme
Court ruled otherwise. The Justices felt that the enforcement power conferred to the
Congress was improperly applied and consequentially traversed the visible as well as invisible
lines that entail the separation of powers. “RFRA is not a proper exercise of Congress' §5
enforcement power because it contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal state balance.”216 Justice Scalia concurring in part, with whom Justice
Stevens joined, wrote:
The issue presented by Smith is, quite simply, whether the people, through
their elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall control the outcome
213
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of those concrete cases. For example, shall it be the determination of this
Court, or ratherof the people, whether (as the dissent apparently believes)
church construction will be exempt from zoning laws? The historical
evidence put forward by the dissent does nothing to undermine the
conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be the people.217
The question before the Court centered on the issue of whether or not RFRA was deemed
enforcement legislation under the 14th Amendment. If RFRA was characterized as
enforcement legislation under the 14th Amendment, this triggered the question of whether
Congress exceeded its constitutional power.
RFRA's most serious shortcoming, however, lies in the fact that it is so out
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections, proscribing state conduct that the Fourteenth
Amendment itself does not prohibit. Its sweeping coverage ensures its
intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting
official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter.
The answer was yes. The Court found that Congress’ enactment of RFRA was substantive
rather than remedial. The problem, as Justice Kennedy explains is that the legislation not
only enforces the Clause, but also changes the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”218 Kennedy
admits that the “line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern.”219
Though difficult to discern, the line exists. Kennedy explains that “there must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive
in operation and effect.”220 This was the issue the Court dealt with. Congress does not have a
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substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment. If it did, the
Constitution would be subverted and Congress would reign. As Kennedy stated, “under this
approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.”221
RFRA was deemed an intrusion too large to permit – RFRA was held unconstitutional as it
applied to the states, concluding that it exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Stevens concurred that RFRA violated the First Amendment. He also placed
the backlash against Smith in context. He gave a great example.
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or
an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption
from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because
the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives
its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally
applicable, neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under
the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon
that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for
religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.222

Boerne v. Flores breathed life into the historic preservation field. It reopened the door closed
by RFRA on the preservation of religious landmarks. The optimism was fueled in part by
the long anticipated voice from above – not from the heavens, but from the Supreme Court
that held RFRA was unconstitutional because it trenched too hard on state sovereignty to
regulate to promote the public welfare and because it transgressed the separation of power
doctrine by trying to change first amendment principles that the US Constitution had
articulated in the Employment decision. The Supreme Court ruling was expected to be the
guide that would establish some uniformity in the arena of historic preservation and freedom
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of religion cases. The Boerne much needed boost to the historic preservation field was
heeded. The Post-Boerne era began with a small victory for historic preservation.
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VI.

P o s t - B o e r n e
The 1998 Metropolitan Baptist Church v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs223 case culminated in a small victory for preservation. The Church claimed
that its rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA were violated when the District
of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board refused its request to have a public hearing
continuance.
The District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board established the
Greater Fourteenth Street Historic District after the Logan Circle Community Association
petitioned for designation. “According to the application, the area possessed unique
historical and architectural characteristics related to the development of 14th Street, N.W., as
a transportation corridor.”224 The appellant, Metropolitan Baptist Church, owned five
rowhouses in the area located between 1701 and 1711 13th Street, N.W. The application
described these rowhouses as “multi-storied brick buildings with multi-storied polygonal
bays, corbelled cornices, stringcourses and other decorative brickwork."225 Significantly, the
Church’s actual house of worship is not included in the historic district boundaries but is
located nearby. A sixth property, also owned by the Church, is included in the district but
not in the suit.
According to the statement given by Reverend Dr. H. Beecher Hicks, Jr., the pastor
of Metropolitan Baptist Church, the first rowhouse was acquired by the Church in 1939. He
explained that currently, the rowhouses were used by the Church for their Church-related
functions. Specifically, the “five properties provided space for a variety of church projects
223
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including a pre-school, a Sunday school, food and clothing distribution centers, and self-help
classes.”226 Hicks explained that the properties were imperative to the fulfillment of the
Church’s “Vision 2000” goals which included expansion of their ministry by building new
structures where the five rowhouses currently exist. He stated:
The church had incurred a debt of approximately two million dollars in
connection with the five rowhouses, and a bank had secured the properties
as collateral. Members of the church community would not have invested in
these properties over the decades if they had anticipated that their plans
would be ‘so unjustly and unreasonably thwarted’ by historic designation.227
With this background, the Court delved into ascertaining whether the District of Columbia
Historic Preservation Review Board abused its authority and violated the Church’s rights.
The Church believed that the designation would slow the Vision 2000 plan by
requiring certain permits. They contend that the designation would impede their ability to
renovate the rowhouses and thus unconstitutionally burden the church's free-exercise rights.
“Because the rowhouses have been designated historic, however, the church would be
required to comply with various permit procedures before it could begin renovations as part
of its Vision 2000 plan.”228 Because the Church established the case depending on what
might happen in the future, the Trial Court decided that the Church’s free exercise rights
were not burdened because the issue was not ripe yet. “The historic designation did not
interfere with the church's current use of the properties for its social programs, and, as for
the Vision 2000 plan, the church had not even tried to apply for a permit to alter or
demolish the properties as it wishes.”229
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The trial court also concluded that the designation of the district and the inclusion of
the Church’s rowhouses were without problem. On the issue of First Amendment rights, the
trial court found that the claim was not ripe.
With respect to the church's religious-freedom claims, the court held that
they were not ripe for adjudication because (1) there was no evidence that
the church's current use of the rowhouses was impeded by the historic
designation and (2) the church's future plans for the properties were not yet
impeded because the church was free to apply for a permit to alter or
demolish them, and such a permit might well be granted.230
The Church appealed this decision and Associate Judge Steadman delivered the opinion.
Steadman agreed with the Trial Court decision that the Board “did not abuse its
discretion or otherwise err in the denial of the motion.”231 RFRA was not pivotal in the
appeal as evidenced by the Church’s tactical switch since the Superior Court ruling. Due to
the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,232 the Church focused their case
on proving that it was ripe for adjudication. Regarding the ripeness issue, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Judge Steadman explained that ”in
any event, we are not persuaded that the particular record before us, even with the stricken
exhibits, presents the question of unconstitutional burden in a sufficiently concrete factual
form to ensure that a definitive constitutional ruling at this point would not be premature.”
The 1998 City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian Church233 case was the second post-Boerne
era victory for historic preservation. The Michigan Court of Appeals applied the standards of
Smith, Boerne, and Saint Bartholomew’s Church to reject the Church’s claim of First Amendment
infringement.
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Figure 14
The Towner House pre-restoration
in Ypsilanti, Michigan.

Figure 15
The Towner House post-restoration in

Ypsilanti, Michigan.
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The Church purchased the “Towner House” in 1972. The property was built in 1837
and “represents the earliest example of post-log cabin living by settlers in the area.”234 The
Towner House became part of a Historic District as created by the Ypsilanti Historic
District Ordinance in 1978. Even before the designation, the Church planned to demolish
the structure. “Ironically, it could have then done so, but it instead acceded to the wishes of
preservationists who were, as it turns out, unable or unwilling to move the building.”235 The
Church concluded that their attempt to deal with the preservationists was fair but
unfortunately failed and resumed their original plans to demolish the structure by applying
for the necessary permits. Ypsilanti denied two applications for demolition of the historic log
cabin to make room for a parking lot. “Counterdefendants, through a succession of leases
with defendant, organized in an attempt to forestall defendant's decision because of the
Towner House's historical and architectural value.”236 The Church felt that the treatment
they received was unfair, especially in light of their original attempts to work with the
preservationists. They claim that
After the designation, the necessary permits for the planned demolition were
not only denied, but the church was required by the city to expend
considerable amounts of scarce money to repair the building – a structure for
which it had no particular use. In short, the city has forced the church to
spend significant funds to repair a building it does not want.237
The second denial was appealed to the State Historic Review Board which agreed with the
Historic Preservation Commission’s decision.
The First Presbyterian Church argued that the City of Ypsilanti burdened its free
exercise of religion rights under the RFRA. Due to RFRA’s invalidation in City of Boerne v
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Flores238 the Court used the standard of review established in Employment Division v. Smith239
The Court believed that even buildings with religious uses are subject to generally applicable
laws. The Court also believed that the Church’s rights were not infringed upon specifically,
rendering the law neutral and generally applicable. “Here, the ordinance applies to all
building owners within the historic district without distinction. Thus, the ordinance is a
facially neutral, generally applicable law requiring only minimal review to determine that
prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of the ordinance but merely the
incidental effect.”240 The court believed that the burdens, if there were any, were incidental in
nature. The Court gave an example. “If allocating funds in defendant's budget for renovation
of the Towner House would decrease the funds available for other areas of defendant's
mission, this effect does not indicate that the ordinance singles out defendant for differential
treatment.”241 The Court was confident that the burdens, incidental in nature, did not replace
the authority of the Church with the goals of historic preservation. The Washtenaw Circuit
stated:
Although defendant's control of its financial resources may be fundamental
to its free exercise of religion, the ordinance in question here does not
directly force defendant into refraining from spending money in certain
areas, such as outreach to the community….Thus, the ordinance in this case
does not give the historic preservation commission authority over
defendant's ecclesiastical decisions. In short, the ordinance is a law of general
application which does not burden defendant any more than other
citizens, let alone burden defendant because of its religious beliefs. 242
The Court made it clear, through the use of Smith in St. Bartholomew’s and Boerne, that the
ordinance, as applied to all properties in the historic district, is facially neutral and generally.
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Figure 13
First Presbyterian Church in
Ypsilanti, Michigan.

The Church’s contention that the Ordinance was equivalent to a taking was also
rejected. “The fact that the ordinance in this case affects defendant more severely than
others does not itself result in ‘taking’. Historical preservation benefits all the citizenry both
economically and by improving the overall quality of life in Ypsilanti.”243 The Church’s
contention that the Historic District Commission abused its power was also rejected. The
Church claimed that the demolition of the Church would have been granted if any of the
following conditions existed:
(1) The resource constitutes a hazard to the safety of the public or the occupants.
(2) The resource is a deterrent to a major improvement program that will be of
substantial benefit to the community.
(3) Retaining the resource will cause undue financial hardship to the owner.
(4) Retaining the resource is not in the interest of the majority of the community.244
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The Court again reaffirmed the denial of the demolition permit and confirmed that these
conditions did not exist. The Michigan Court of Appeals applied the established standards in
Smith, Boerne, and Saint Bartholomew’s Church. Using these standards, the Court of Appeals
rejected the Church’s claim of First Amendment infringement. Unfortunately, the historic
preservation victories are short lived.
The Diocese of Toledo v. Toledo City-Lucas County Plan Commissions245 began as another
step forward in the progression of historic preservation but on Appeal, succumbed to
“appellant's constitutional arguments [that were] rendered moot and found not welltaken.”246 The Lucas County Court of Common Pleas found that the denial of permission to
demolish a house in an historic district to establish a parking lot did not burden the Diocese
of Toledo’s First Amendment Rights but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the
decision. The judgment was reversed again in favor of the Diocese of Toledo.
The Diocese of Toledo purchased a house in the historic district of the Old West
End, Toledo, Ohio in January 1996.247 Justice Knepper explained that “the house was
purchased for $ 17,500. Prior to closing, appellant authorized the removal of interior leaded
and stained glass windows and french doors. Also removed from the residence were exterior
windows; however, there is no evidence that appellant authorized their removal.”248 After
receiving two public nuisance notices, the Church applied for a Certificate of
Appropriateness to demolish the house and build a parking lot.249 The Old West End
Historic District Commission denied the certificates and the Trial Court agreed. The
incorporation of the house in the Historic District, though in need of repairs, still
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contributed to the overall character of the neighborhood. “The structure does maintain the
character of the historic district. It is considered a gabled cottage style house in the book
American Vernacular Design.”250
The Diocese appealed the Trial Court’s decision which they believe “erred in
affirming the decision of the Toledo City-Lucas County Plan Commission, denying a
Certificate of Appropriateness to permit the Diocese of Toledo to demolish the property."251
The Diocese explained that the retention of the house was a financial burden that impinged
on their ability to promote their charitable activities. The Diocese tried to establish that other
means of disposing of the liability were investigated. They explained that they searched for
investors.
It is the appraiser's understanding that the purchase price for the subject was
$17,500 this coupled with a renovation cost of 110% of the estimate or
$37,100 results in a total of $54,600. With [a] ‘When Completed’ value of
$59,000, the estimated margin for a proposed developer would be less than
ten percent. This is not adequate to attract a developer and realistically the
project must be viewed as not feasible.252
The Trial Court entertained different appraiser estimates for repair. Other evidence was
introduced that the property was so dilapidated that even repair was not feasible. “The
property has so severely deteriorated over the past year through obvious abuse and neglect,
that sadly, it cannot be economically restored today.”253 The Trial Court concluded that
based on this evidence, denial of the demolition permit did not amount to an undue burden.
The Court found that the method in which the Toledo City-Lucas County Plan
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Commissions derived their decision “was supported by the preponderance of substantial,
reliable, and probative evidence.”254
The Court of Appeals contributed additional information which introduced evidence
debunking the Diocese’s position regarding the potential economic use of the property. “At
the time of the Diocese’s application, there was a reasonable economic use for the structure,
rehabilitation by Neighborhood’s in Partnership was economically sound, and the NIP
offered a feasible and prudent alternative to demolition.”255 Significantly, the Court found
that “if appellant established that there was no reasonable economic return for the structure
and rehabilitation was not economically sound, then it was irrelevant, and appellant did not
need to prove, whether the structure contained features of architectural or historic
significance, contributed to maintaining the character of the historic district, or whether
there was a feasible and prudent alternative to demolition.”256 The Court concluded that the
estimates of rehabilitation and overall cost to the Diocese were too much. “We find as a
matter of law that based on the economic information available at the time of the
application, and the testimony from renovation experts and appraisers…the amount of gain
after renovation could not earn a reasonable economic return.”257 The Court thus concluded
that the Diocese should have been granted the demolition permit. “We find that the
preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence establishes that appellant has
met its burden.”258 The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas was reversed
and the goals of historic preservation undermined yet again.
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The First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic District Commission of the Town of Ridgefield259
can be considered another notch in the belt of historic preservation. The Church followed
procedures to reclad their structure with vinyl siding instead of painting, an intensive
procedure that would have to be intermittently repeated. Because of its location within an
historic district, the applications for a Certificate of Appropriateness to allow the installation
of vinyl siding on its church building were denied. The Church filed suit claiming that this
denial to utilize the vinyl material on their structure violated their right to free exercise. The
Appellate Court affirmed and adopted the decision of the lower court by applying the Smith
analysis. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the importance of Historic Preservation and its
legitimacy as a use of police power. The Church believed that the Historic District
Commission decision should be reversed for two reasons: “should be reversed because it
improperly (1) relied on undefined aesthetic considerations in denying its application for a
certificate of appropriateness and (2) burdened its free exercise of religion.” 260
Justice Mihalakos delivered the opinion. He explained that vinyl siding as a material
was investigated by the Historic District Commission and deduced to be an inappropriate
material. “The record before the commission reflects that the plaintiff's proposal to ‘reclad’
its church with vinyl siding does not fall within the scope of “ordinary maintenance or
repair.””261 The Church claimed the motivation for the used of vinyl was its need to repair
the structure. Unfortunately, the application of this material would harm the structure more
than help and in effect destroy some of its authenticity. “The record reveal[ed] that the
application of vinyl siding on the church [would] create a loss of trim detail, cause a
substitution of V-groove for tongue in groove siding and change the clapboard width and
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shine.”262 Along with the loss of authenticity that would incur because of these changes, the
material is foreign and not within the realm of general repair, hence requiring the Certificate
of Appropriateness from the Historic District Commission. “Since the plaintiff is not
proposing to reapply or restore the existing material, i.e., a coat of paint, the plaintiff's
proposal falls outside the scope of "ordinary repair."”263

Figure 16
Exterior view of First Church of Christ
Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut.
The Church claimed that the true issue is merely an aesthetic consideration. Even
though the Connecticut case law has not defined the importance of aesthetic considerations,
the Court reaffirmed that aesthetic control is legitimate. Justice Mihalakos cited “As for the
plaintiff’s contention that the commission abused its discretion by exceeding the bounds of
permissible aesthetic considerations, our Supreme Court has stated that aesthetic
considerations are valid in land use regulation.”264 The Church claimed that the Historic
District Commission acted illegally and arbitrarily by not providing a fair hearing by
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essentially predetermining that vinyl siding was not appropriate thus precluding the option of
granting a Certificate of Appropriateness. They state that “no applications for Certificates of
Appropriateness to install vinyl siding have ever been granted by the commission.”265

Figure 17
Interior view of First Church of Christ
Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut.
The Church claimed that the process and ultimate rejection of the Certificate of
Appropriateness as part of the historical district regulations burdened its right of Free
Exercise. The Connecticut Superior Court answered by reasserting the legitimacy of historic
preservation. “The Supreme Court has recognized that the preservation of a historical area
or landmark falls within the meaning of general welfare and, consequently, the police
power.”266 The Court found that the laws applied to the Church were within the scope of the
state's police power. Quoting from Employment Division v. Smith267, the Court said “the first
amendment cannot be extended to such an extent that a claim of exemption from the laws
based on religious freedom can be extended to avoid otherwise reasonable and neutral legal
265
266

Ibid.
Ibid., Quoting from Figarsky v. Historical District Commission, supra, 171 Conn. 208.

85

obligations imposed by government.”268 In this case, the Court was able to look beyond the
claims and legitimize the historic preservation discipline as well as deduce that in this case,
the implications of preservation did not equate to diminishing the rights to of the plaintiff to
assemble or express their religious views. Justice Mihalakos opined that the Free Exercise
rights of the First Church of Christ were not violated and the plaintiff’s appeal was
dismissed.
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VII.

Religious Land Use Institutionalized
Persons Act

The invalidation of RFRA and the multiple post-Boerne historic preservation victories
placed religious rights groups on edge. RFRA’s attempt to restore the standard of strict
scrutiny was invalidated by the Court which deemed that Congress was only permitted to
develop laws that would enforce the standard of protection as opposed to establish new,
stricter standards, as attempted by RFRA. In 1998 and 1999, Congress again attempted to
implement a guide by enacting the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA). The bill would
have established:
a ‘strict scrutiny’ test for state and local laws that infringe on the free
exercise of religion. The new standard [would require]... that such laws
must further a ‘compelling interest’ by ‘the least restrictive means.’
Under current law, state and local governments must prove only a
‘rational relationship’ to the government’s interest. To trigger a claim
against a state or local government under the [proposed] bill, an
individual must demonstrate that the government ‘substantially
burdened’ his freedom of religion and places the burden of proof on
the government.269
The Act failed due to the Commerce Clause connection. RLPA would have “prohibited a
State from placing a substantial burden upon a person’s religious exercise under the
following conditions: (1) in a State-operated program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance; or (2) in or affecting international or interstate commerce."270 The Act
failed to get support and also received negative press. While protecting one freedom,
religious freedom, the Act would have negatively affected children in child abuse and neglect
cases.
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RLPA could have devastating effects for children whose parents disapprove
of medical treatment due to religious beliefs. Parents could use RLPA as a
defense for withholding needed medical care from their children or engaging
in other child abuse or neglect if they cite religion as their reason for doing
so. Therefore, a person could use the federal law as a defense in court against
state or local child abuse or neglect charges.271
In 2000, to quell nervous feelings, President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)272 into law after passing Congress almost
unanimously. RLUIPA directly addressed the issues of zoning and landmarking and was
established to settle what religious entities declared outrageous discrimination at the hands of
land use regulations. It was carefully crafted to withstand claims of unconstitutionality by
incorporating limits. RLUIPA protects religion through the Spending and Commerce Clause
and did not rely, as did RFRA, on the Free Exercise Clause.
The Act reestablished the pre-Smith standard of demonstrating a burden by
specifically reinstating the two-part analysis. The Act states:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person,
including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or
institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.273
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RLUIPA clearly allows for a wide range of applicants and reinforces the protection of
religious entities by bolstering the arsenals of religious organizations and solidifying their
chances when disputing zoning and landmarking laws. The law defined land use regulation
as a “zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a
claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant
has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated
land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.”274 Specifically, RLUIPA defined
religious exercise as including “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.”275 RLUIPA also specified what the use or building
meant. “The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or
intends to use the property for that purpose.”276 A religious institution utilizing RLUIPA as a
defense would still be required to initially prove that a burden exists. The burden of proof
next shifts to the government that initiated the law and must prove that the burden furthers
the government interest by the least restrictive means.
RLUIPA, as described in the text, addressed its broad construction but also
delineated several restrictions. “This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this
chapter and the Constitution.”277 To avoid future claims, RLUIPA’s scope was limited to
cases in which:
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(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or
with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability; or
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use
regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government
makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit
the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for
the property involved.278
RLUIPA draws support from financial assistance under the Spending Clause listed in Part A,
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause in Part B, and §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Part C. RLUIPA is still in its infancy and still very susceptible to invalidation.
The land use cases that have utilized RLUIPA have either validated the constitutionality of
the Act, invalidated its application, or are still pending. The overwhelming majority of its
application, however, has been related to institutionalized persons. “Although to date most
of the litigation under RLUIPA has involved the religious exercise claims of prisoners, the
statute provides a powerful tool for faith-based groups and religious property owners
engaged in land use disputes with local government entities.”279
Between 2002 and 2004, RLUIPA has steadily gained ground. Four federal courts of
appeal have upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA. The cases include Mayweathers v.
Newland,280 Charles v. Verhagen,281 Madison v. Riter,282 and Midrash Sephardi Inc. v. Town of
Surfside.283 In November 2003, however, the consistency and momentum of RLUIPA was
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disrupted by the decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson.284 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held RLUIPA unconstitutional and reversed and remanded the decision
reached by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
Approximately one year later on October 12, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court opinion is still pending.
The 2002 Mayweathers v. Newland285 case was initiated by several California Muslim
state prisoners that claimed that their inability to attend a Friday afternoon religious service,
known as Jumu'ah, violated their rights under RLUIPA. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit agreed. Senior Circuit Judge D. W. Nelson delivered the opinion of a
unanimous Court. He stated that RLUIPA “intends a secular legislative purpose - to protect
the exercise of religion in institutions from unwarranted and substantial infringement.”286
The Court determined that Congress did not exceed its Spending Clause power when
enacting RLUIPA and that its legislative purpose was legitimate and ultimately promoted
general welfare. Nelson stated that “protecting religious worship in institutions from
substantial and illegitimate burdens does promote the general welfare. By ensuring that
governments do not act to burden the exercise of religion in institutions, RLUIPA is clearly
in line with this positive constitutional value. Moreover, by fostering non-discrimination,
RLUIPA follows a long tradition of federal legislation designed to guard against unfair bias
and infringement on fundamental freedoms.”287 The Court upheld RLUIPA. Significantly,
the Court also addressed the Smith ruling:
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RLUIPA does not erroneously review or revise a specific ruling of the
Supreme Court because the statute does not overturn the Court’s
constitutional interpretation in Smith….Rather, RLUIPA provides additional
protection for religious worship, respecting that Smith set only a
constitutional floor—not a ceiling—for the protection of personal liberty.
Smith explicitly left heightened legislative protection for religious worship to
the political branches.288
The Court found that the statute carried out the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First
Amendment’s requirement that religious practices be reasonably accommodated. Examples
of religious practices that prisons have attempted to prevent, and which are protected by
RLUIPA are receiving religious texts, Muslim inmates being forced to handle pork, Catholic
prisoners wearing a crucifix, and Christian prisoners receiving communion wine or Jewish
prisoners maintaining a kosher diet. 289 While the statute affected religious worship, it was
not deemed unconstitutional because it did not provide any corresponding protections to
secular activities or non-religious prisoners.
The next federal appeals court to address RLUIPA was the 2003 Charles v. Verhagen290
case which, incidentally, also involved prisoners. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision reached by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin. The case involved Jerry Charles, a Muslim prisoner at the
Oshkosh Correctional Institution in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. He claimed that his inability to
obtain prayer oils violated his rights under RLUIPA. “According to Muslim practices,
Charles prays five times a day and undergoes ritual cleansing or purification, in part to

288

Ibid.
“Constitutionality of RLUIPA to be Reviewed by the Supreme Court.” Found at
www.rluipa.com/cases/CutterSC.html.
290 Id., Charles v. Verhagen (2003).
289

92

eliminate offensive body odors prior to prayer. This ritual cleansing often involves the
application of fragrant prayer oil.”291
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the finding
of constitutionality in Mayweathers v. Newland.292 Circuit Judge Bauer reaffirmed that it was
within the scope of Congress to create safeguards for prisoners’ religious rights and to
promote the rehabilitation of prisoners. This pursuit was clearly within Congress’ pursuit of
the general welfare under its Spending Clause authority and was not considered an
advancement of religion. “The requirements of RLUIPA cannot fairly be said to amount to
government advancement of religion through the government’s own activities or
influence…The statute does not promote religious indoctrination, nor does it guarantee
prisoners unfettered religious rights, and not every challenge under RLUIPA will be deemed
valid.”293 For the second time, the Court found that RLUIPA did not violate the
Establishment Clause. It was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause
authority.
In 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard Madison v.
Riter.294 Ira Madison, a prisoner at the Virginia's Buckingham Correctional Center, and a
Hebrew Israelite, brought suit claiming that his inability to follow his special religious dietary
needs violated RLUIPA. He claimed that his inability to maintain a kosher diet defined by
the Virginia Department of Corrections as a ‘common fare diet’ violated his rights as a
prisoner. On January 23, 2003, the U.S. District Court Judge James C. Turk held that the
provision had an impermissible effect of advancing religion under the second prong of the
Lemon test. “Because we find that Congress can accommodate religion in section 3 of
291
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RLUIPA without violating the Establishment Clause, we reverse. To hold otherwise and find
an Establishment Clause violation would severely undermine the ability of our society to
accommodate the most basic rights of conscience and belief in neutral yet constructive
ways.”295 Section 3 of RLUIPA was held unconstitutional on the basis that it offered greater
legislative protection for the religious rights of prisoners than for other fundamental rights.
On December 8, 2003, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
unanimously overturned the decision reached by the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia. Circuit Judge Wilkinson, writing the opinion of the Court, again upheld
RLUIPA and specified how it was constitutional under each prong of the Lemon test.
According to Wilkinson, RLUIPA passed the secular purpose prong. “This secular goal of
exempting religious exercise from regulatory burdens in a neutral fashion, as distinguished
from advancing religion in any sense, is indeed permissible under the Establishment Clause.
To be sure, Congress has no constitutional duty to remove or to mitigate the governmentimposed burdens on prisoners’ religious exercise. But the Supreme Court has held that
Congress may choose to reduce government-imposed burdens on specific fundamental
rights when it sees it appropriate.”296 Similarly, RLUIPA was not found to promote an
impermissible effect by enacting a statute that reduces burdens on religious exercise while
not considering other burdens. “There is no requirement that legislative protections for
fundamental rights march in lockstep. The mere fact that RLUIPA seeks to lift government
burdens on a prisoner's religious exercise does not mean that the statute must provide
commensurate protections for other fundamental rights.”297 Finally, RLUIPA was not
determined to create an excessive entanglement. Wilkinson commented that in fact,
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RLUIPA does the opposite. “RLUIPA itself minimizes the likelihood of entanglement
through its carefully crafted enforcement provisions.”298 Madison was the third federal court
of appeal case raising RLUIPA and the third to declare its validity.
In the 1999 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Surfside299 case, Surfside sought to enjoin Midrash
Sephardi and Young Israel of Bal Harbor, two small Orthodox Jewish congregations from
meeting on the second floor of a bank building in Surfside’s B-1 zoned district. In a
unanimous decision on April 21, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit issued a stay of the lower court injunction. In an opinion written by Circuit Judge
Wilson, the Court held that “Surfside improperly targeted religious assemblies and violated
Free Exercise requirements of neutrality and general applicability.”300 The Court warned that
“while merely the mention of church or synagogue in a zoning code does not destroy a
zoning code’s neutrality, we must nevertheless be mindful of the potential for impermissible
‘religious gerrymanders,’ which may render a zoning code operatively non-neutral.”301 The
Court rejected the notion that the Surfside ordinance violated RLUIPA by substantially
burdening congregations and found, instead, that Surfside violated RLUIPA’s equal terms
provision. Surfside’s exclusionary practice that disallowed churches and synagogues from an
area in which it allowed private clubs and lodges was deemed impermissible. The Court also
ruled that RLUIPA was constitutional. “RLUIPA’s core policy is not to regulate the states or
compel their enforcement of a federal regulatory program, but to protect the exercise of
religion, a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, which
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does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment's protection of the principles of federalism.”302
Midrash was the final case that ruled in favor of RLUIPA. The next case, Cutter v.
Wilkinson,303 which was actually heard before Midrash on November 7, 2003, halted
RLUIPA’s momentum and declared it unconstitutional.
The federal courts of appeal track record including the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits seemed steady and positive until the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cutter v.
Wilkinson. The Sixth Circuit consolidated three cases involving the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections including Cutter v. Wilkinson,304 Gerhardt v. Lazaroff,305 and
Miller v. Wilkinson.306 The plaintiffs were prisoners in the Ohio State penitentiary system.
They each practiced what are generally considered unconventional religions including Asatru,
a religion followed by Vikings, Jesus Christ Christian religion, which promoted the
separation of races, and finally Wiccan and Satanism.307 They claimed that their rights under
RLUIPA were violated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections because
they claim that that the prison did not allow them sufficient access to religious literature as
well as the ability to conduct services.
On November 7, 2003, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court ruling and declared that RLUIPA was
unconstitutional. RLUIPA was found to violate the Establishment Clause. Prior to RLUIPA,
prison official restrictions were assessed according to the rational-relationship review which
included “(1) whether there is a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation
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and a legitimate government interest; (2) whether inmates have alternative means of
exercising the right in question; (3) the impact of a requested accommodation of the right
upon guards and other inmates; and (4) the absence of alternatives to the regulation.”308
RLUIPA imposed a strict scrutiny standard that placed the burden on officials to prove that
the restriction or regulation furthered a compelling penological interest and was achieved by
the least restrictive means. “As is well known from the history of constitutional law, the
change that RLUIPA imposes is revolutionary, switching from a scheme of deference to one
of presumptive unconstitutionality.”309 The Court decided that this additional protection
granted specifically to religious rights rather than to other constitutionally protected rights
violated the Establishment Clause. “It imposes strict scrutiny where the Establishment
Clause requires only a rational-relationship review.”310 This highly controversial opinion is
directly opposed to the recent trend that found RLUIPA constitutional in several federal
court of appeals cases.
The Supreme Court heard the calls for action and granted a writ of certiorari. On
October 12, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
docket number 03-9877, in which it will review the constitutionality of RLUIPA. It is a
widely anticipated decision that will confirm whether or not Congress violated the
Establishment Clause when enacting RLUIPA.

308

Id., Cutter v. Wilkinson (2003).
Ibid.
310 Ibid.
309

97

VIII.

The Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause trends further exemplify the inconsistency of the courts.
Beginning in the 1940’s and 1950’s the decisions in Establishment Clause cases have taken
one of two possible routes. These competing interests still invoke passionate debate.
Norman Redlich explains that “these approaches – the wall of separation between church
and state, and the accommodation of religion – continue to dominate the Court’s decisions
today…Virtually all of the Establishment Clause decisions of the modern Court represent
one or the other of these approaches. Often, both concerns occur in the same opinion.”311
Establishment Clause jurisprudence begins with the 1899 Bradfield v. Roberts312 case. A strictseparationist’s nightmare, the Court established that not every form of financial aid, in this
case a federal construction grant, to religious organizations, in this case a hospital owned by
a Roman Catholic order, violates the Religion Clauses.
In 1897 the Commissioners of the District of Columbia made an agreement with
Providence Hospital, owned and operated by the Sisters of Mercy, whereby the District of
Columbia would fund the construction of a new building on the existing hospital grounds to
treat patients with contagious diseases. The plaintiff, Joseph Bradfield, believed that the
contract between Washington D.C. and the Providence Hospital was illegal because the
hospital was owned and operated by a Roman Catholic organization. He felt that as a
taxpayer and a resident of Washington D.C., his First Amendment rights were violated.
Bradfield believed the funding of the hospital and of its patients indirectly through his tax
dollars and directly through the established federal appropriation violated the Establishment
Clause and sued to enjoin the Treasurer of the United States, Ellis H. Roberts, from
311
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allocating the funds. The District Court agreed that the funding was unconstitutional but the
Court of Appeals313 reversed the lower court’s ruling that enjoined the Treasurer of the
United States from paying any money to the Providence Hospital. The Supreme Court voted
8-to-0 to affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling.
The contract agreed upon between the Commissioners of the District of Columbia
and the Directors of Providence Hospital signed on August 16 1897, provided that the “said
building or ward [was] to be erected without expense to said hospital” and that “when [the]
said building or ward is fully completed, it shall be turned over to the officers of Providence
hospital.”314 The turn-over stipulated that two thirds of the beds were to be reserved
specifically for citizens of the District of Columbia. The contract also directed the District of
Columbia to pay for the use of the beds through the budget dictated and approved by
Congress. “For each such patient, said Commissioners and their successors in office are to
pay at the rate of two hundred and fifty dollars per annum, for such a time as such patient
may be in the hospital, subject to annual appropriations by Congress.”315 The second
condition was that those patients who had the means to pay for their treatment were allowed
to seek treatment and pay the Hospital directly for its services. “Such persons will pay to said
Providence hospital reasonable compensation for such treatment, to be fixed by the hospital
authorities.”316
The authority to create the contract was contained in the General Appropriation Act
for the expenses of the District of Columbia and was approved March 3, 1897 under the
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general heading of “Health Department.”317 This authority was granted specifically to fulfill a
need that the City previously tried unsuccessfully to account for. The Act states, in part, that:
It is a matter of common knowledge that there is no hospital in the District
for the isolation and proper care of persons suffering from even the ‘minor
contagious diseases,’ so called in the contract aforesaid; and that all attempts
heretofore made to meet the imperative demand therefore, through the
erection of a suitable building by the District itself, have been thwarted by
the opposition of residents and property owners who feared injury to person
and property from its location in their neighborhood.318
The District of Columbia’s need for the Hospital outweighed any attempts the citizens made
to thwart the construction in their neighborhood. The City thus ensured that the General
Appropriation Act assumed the responsibility for the members of society that could not
necessarily afford treatment for their diseases. The solution was the agreement with
Providence Hospital.
The issue Joseph Bradfield had with the Providence Hospital was that it was a
“private eleemosynary corporation.”319 It was owned and operated by the Sisters of Charity
of Emmettsburg, Maryland. It was part of the Roman Catholic Church and was incorporated
by a special Act of Congress approved April 8, 1864. It was “invested specially with full
power and all the rights of opening and keeping a hospital in the city of Washington for the
care of such sick and invalid persons as may place themselves under the treatment and care
of said corporation.”320 Bradfield believed that the exchange of services for money between
this religious organization and the City “becomes a grant by law in aid of an establishment of
religion, and is therefore within the prohibition of the First Amendment.”321
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Justice Shepard, delivering the opinion of the Court for the Court of Appeals, held
that the contract and exchange of services for money was constitutional. He stated that “in
respect, then, of its creation, organization, management and ownership of property, it is an
ordinary private corporation, whose rights are determinable by the law of the land, and the
religious opinions of whose members are not subjects of inquiry.”322 In other words,
compensation for the services rendered should be paid. The Court reversed the lower court’s
ruling and deemed that the payment for the services were legitimate. Shepard asked two very
important questions that explain the position of the Providence Hospital as well the Court’s
accommodation of the religious organization.
If the United States were engaged in war, would they be denied the power,
no matter how advantageous or necessary it might be in some instances, to
contract with religious societies or associations for hospital supplies, or for
nursing their sick and wounded soldiers in their own or in private hospitals?
If a church or religious establishment were the lowest bidder on a
proposition by the United States for the lease or sale of a building for any
legitimate government use or purpose, would the power be denied to
authorize the lease or purchase because of the character of the ownership of
the offered property?323
These two questions place the relationship between the Hospital and the City in context.
Jefferson’s stiff wall melts when the reality of church and state relations is examined. The
Court of Appeals’ opinion and ultimate decision struck a chord with Supreme Court.
Though the decisions in cases are often contradictory, the Supreme Court’s ultimate
accommodation of religious organizations is indicative of the cases to come.
Justice Peckham delivered the Supreme Court’s reasoning for rejecting the
Establishment Clause challenge. The Court did not find the fact that the Providence Hotel
was owned and operated by a religious organization alarming. He stated that “nothing is said
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about religion or about the religious faith of the incorporators of this institution in the act of
incorporation. It is simply the ordinary case of the incorporation of a hospital for the
purposes for which such an institution is generally conducted.”324 The court ignored the
owner of the building and instead highlighted the purpose of the building. The function of
the hospital e.g., taking care of sick people with contagious diseases, rendered the appellant’s
argument void. Peckham stated that:
The above-mentioned allegations in the complainant's bill do not change the
legal character of the corporation or render it on that account a religious or
sectarian body. Whether the individuals who compose the corporation under
its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or
Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other religious organization,
or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest consequence with reference
to the law of its incorporation….325
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment reached by the Court of Appeals and
deemed the contract between the Providence Hospital and the City constitutional.
The Court’s first probe into the Establishment Clause boundaries as exemplified in
Bradfield v. Roberts is usually dismissed by academia and written off as perfunctory in nature.
The case is considered cursory since it lacks an in-depth inquiry into the scope of the
Establishment Clause. Though it is inadequate in that sense, the case at the same time
illuminates the playing field and allows for the first glimpse of what will develop into a
strong accommodationist spirit. The next case, Quick Bear v. Leupp,326 demonstrates that the
Court picked up just where it had left off nine years earlier – the torch of accommodation
was raised again.
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The United States established annual contracts with various denominational schools
for the purpose of educating Native Americans. In the 1908 Quick Bear v. Leupp327 case, F. E.
Leupp, the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, contracted with the Saint Francis
Mission School to educate the Sioux Indian children on the Rosebud reservation. The case
established that American Indians could use the monies provided them by the federal
government for all future funding of schools like Saint Francis.
The Saint Francis Mission School was administered by the Bureau of Catholic Indian
Missions, a Maryland corporation. In 1905, the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions reapplied
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an annual contract to educate approximately 200
Sioux children. The contract specified that the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions was
charged with the “care, maintenance, and education during the year 1906…at the cost of
$27,000.”328 The Secretary of the Interior approved the contract and specified that the
funding in the amount of $24,000 would be derived from the ‘Sioux Treaty Fund,’ and
$3,000 would be from the ‘Sioux Trust Fund.’”329 The Sioux Indians, represented by Reuben
Quick Bear, found issue with the derivation of the funds. The lower court ruled in favor of
an injunction against the expenditure of the $24,000 from the Treaty Fund, and allowed the
$3,000 expenditure from the Trust Fund.330
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia331, however, saw the matter in a
different light in 1907 and reversed the lower court’s decision. Justice Wright explained why
the Court approved the injunction of the $24,000 and disagreed with the allowance of the
$3,000. The Court of Appeals and the impending United States Supreme Court decision
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depended on the definition as well as intention of the term “funds.” This pivotal term
allowed for a clear explanation as to why government funded sectarian schools on Indian
land was not considered an establishment of religion and thus not in violation of the First
Amendment.
The Sioux Treaty Fund was established by the Sioux Treaty of 1868.332 This treaty
established government funded education for Indian children for a term of twenty years
between 1868 and 1888. Specifically, it stated that the United States “would provide for
every thirty children of the Sioux tribe a house and a teacher competent to teach the
elementary branches of an English education.”333 Two years later, an amendment was added
that increased the type of education and established an additional amount of money to fund
the added expense.

Specifically, the provision stated that “entirely aside from treaty

obligations, was appropriated $100,000 ‘for the support of industrial and other schools
among the Indian tribes not otherwise provided for, to be expended under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior.’”334 Nearly half way into the agreed upon 20-year term, the
United States again amended the treaty to further increase Sioux educational support granted
under the terms of the treaty. In 1877 the treaty was modified to read "schools and
instruction in mechanical and agricultural arts."335 At the end of the 20-year term, on March
2, 1889, the treaty was renewed for another 20-year term.336 The accretion of funding and
general provisions of the second 20-year term also continued. Nearly at the end of this
second 20-year term, the Indian Appropriation Act of 1905337 referred back to the 1877
change and allotted $700,000 to fulfill the need of “for subsistence of the Sioux, and for
332
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purposes of their civilization.”338 The Appropriation Act also referred to the initial 1868
agreement and allotted a sum of $225,000 “for support and maintenance of day and
industrial schools, including erection and repairs of school buildings.”339 The distinction
between the establishment, intent, and timing of the Sioux Treaty Fund and the Sioux Trust
Fund rendered the funding constitutional.
The establishment of education and the Sioux Treaty Fund was followed by the
Sioux Trust Fund which entailed land acquisition. The funding as well as intent of the Trust
Fund was completely separate from all earlier agreements. In 1889, just as the initial 20-year
term ended and the second 20-year term for education was passed, the United States entered
into another agreement with the Sioux Indians. The arrangement entailed land acquisition in
the sum of $3 million. The Sioux Trust Fund was:
in consideration of the relinquishment of the Indian title to lands in
Dakota…Congress provided ‘there shall be set apart, out of any money in
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated…which said sum shall be deposited
in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Sioux Nation of
Indians as a permanent fund, the interest of which, at five per centum per
annum, shall be appropriated, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Interior, to the use of the Indians, etc.’”340
The Trust Fund and the Treaty Fund were separate but were both relied upon to provide for
the education of the Sioux Indians.
Justice Wright explained that “under the existing legislation the position of the
United States with respect to the Indian ‘funds’ is practically that of a trustee; with respect to
the gratuitous appropriations for ‘Support of Schools,’ that of a voluntary donor; so that it
may well be that a limitation can attach to the use of the gift of money without attaching to
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the trust money.”341 Wright’s view that the United States was a trustee of the Indian funds
with regards to the Treaty Funds and a donor with regards to the Trust Funds was
supported by the fact that Congress historically funded for them separately even though they
both supported the same goal, education. The problem arose when the aid of public funds
was regularly diminished in the 1896 treaty requiring that only 80% of the 1895 funds be
allowed and then eliminated in 1899 due to concerns of impingement on First Amendment
rights. “It is likely that a restriction attached to the disposition of the gratuity, found only in
juxtaposition with the very words creating the gratuity, was intended to apply only to the
gratuity.”342
On May 18, 1908, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decree of the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.343 The Court reaffirmed that the diminution
of funds pertained to the public funds and not to the Treaty Funds. The Court determined
that the use of those monies was at the total bequest of the Sioux Indians - the money
belonged to the Sioux and could be used in any manner they chose. The appropriation of the
monies to further the educational needs of their children was a legitimate use regardless of
the fact that the money came from a government fund and that the schooling was sectarian.
Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated that “there is no injustice
in permitting an Indian to select a school for his children under the auspices of the church to
which he is attached, and allowing on that account a portion of the tribal funds or a
portion of the annuities or rations to be applied.”344
Fuller made it clear that withholding the Indian monies was unjust and furthermore,
the fact that the funds were used for religious education was determined to be valid. “It
341
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would be unjust to withhold from an Indian or community of Indians the right…to choose
their own school and to choose it frankly because the education therein is under the
influence of the religious faith….” He concluded that a differing opinion would “pervert the
supposed general spirit of the constitutional provision into a means of prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.”345 Fuller’s point elucidated the narrow path between the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses – a path that has ultimately plagued future courts.
Although the Supreme Court had already decided Bradfield v. Roberts and Quick Bear v.
Leupp, both involving the Establishment Clause, most scholars look to the 1947 5-to-4
decision in Everson v. Board of Education346 as the true starting point of modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Scholars tend to believe that “First Amendment law is essentially a
product of the twentieth century.”347 This historical case is highly regarded for certain
precedents it set as well as for its comprehensive analysis regarding the meaning and
application of the Establishment Clause.
Everson v. Board of Education effectively incorporated the Establishment Clause into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As ratified in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment reads, in part, as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.348
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The Amendment was intended to protected citizens from any state encroachment onto their
liberties and fundamental rights. It established that each citizen was warranted at least due
process of law and equal protection under the law. The citizens were finally afforded
protection against any governmental encroachment on their religious rights when the
Religion Clauses were incorporated into the Amendment.
The conflict in this case began when Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer and resident of
Ewing Township, New Jersey challenged a New Jersey statute that reimbursed parents for
the cost of busing their children to schools. He brought suit against the Board of Education
on the grounds that it violated the Establishment Clause. Everson claimed that as a taxpayer,
his taxes should not be spent to reimburse the transportation costs of parents busing their
children to parochial schools.
Ewing Township lacked schools beyond the eighth grade. The Township solved
their educational predicament by busing children to nearby jurisdictions, mainly to Trenton
and Pennington schools, and reimbursed parents for any out of pocket transportation
expenses. As determined by the Board of Education, Ewing Township contracted out their
transportation needs, pursuant to R.S. 18:14-8 (1903) and as amended in 1941 to read:
When any school district provides any transportation for public school
children to and from school, transportation from any point in such
established school route to any other point in such established school route
shall be supplied to school children residing in such school district in going
to and from school other than a public school, except such school as is
operated for profit in whole or in part.349
The township of Ewing did not intend the reimbursement statute to further religion. The
fact that Ewing bused children to a parochial school was incidental to the intent of the
statute.
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The case was initially heard by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on October 5,
1943.350 Three judges heard the case and two declared that this additional paragraph was not
legally valid and thus the New Jersey state legislature did not have the right to authorize
reimbursement under the state constitution. Justice Parker explained that the outcome of the
statute was to “provide for free transportation of children at the expense of the home
municipality and of the state school fund to and from any school, other than a public school,
which is not operated for profit.”351
In reality, the free transportation Parker cites amounted to $859.80. This amount is
detailed in the opinion of a later case as delivered by Chancellor Campbell:
Pursuant to such resolution the appellant on February 15th, 1943, authorized
the payment of $8,034.95 for transportation. Of this sum $357.74 was paid to
the parents of twenty-one pupils who were transported to parochial schools
in Trenton, five to elementary schools and sixteen to high schools. The
transportation was by public carrier bus. The payments to parents were in
satisfaction of advancements made by them; and the amount was fixed upon
the basis of the actual number of days’ attendance as indicated upon each
pupil's report card.352
Justices Parker and Perskie agreed with Everson and declared that the resolution must be set
aside due to the 1941 amendment’s violation of paragraph 6 of section 7 of article IV of the
state constitution that specifically states the support of public free schools.
Justice Heher, however, disagreed that the Ewing Township Board of Education
erred in appropriating the transportation funds to and from parochial schools. He believed
that the Board’s action should not be looked at as unconstitutional, but rather as furthering
the Child Benefit Theory. Heher’s views become central in the future Appeal where Justice
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Hugo Black agreed and further developed the idea. Heher asserted that giving a gift
comprised of public funds to a parochial school would be unconstitutional but believed that
the Board’s actions do not constitute a gift of public funds. He explained that “such
transportation is a service to the children and their parents rather than to the schools, for
otherwise the parents would be obliged to provide the conveyance or incur the traffic
hazards incident to the journey, for which children are generally so ill-equipped.”353 Heher
believed that the act furthered the execution of compulsory education statues and believed
that if taken separately and considered an aid to parents, thus removing the institution, that it
served an essential public interest and in effect the “constitutional doubts lose their force.”354
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed two years later on October
15, 1945 in a 6-to-3 verdict holding that neither the resolution nor the statutes are
unconstitutional.355 Chancellor Campbell dissected the intent of the 1941 amendment and
explained that the decision to bus children to parochial schools was only incidental since the
language of the amendment reads “children attending schools could be furnished
transportation by any school district from any point on an already established school route to any
other point on such established school route.”356 He explained that “payment of such expense out
of local taxes is the payment of "incidental expenses" or "transportation of pupils"
authorized by R.S. 18:7-78.”357
Finally, on February 10, 1947, in a narrow 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court
agreed.358 Justice Hugo L. Black explained in detail the two arguments on the basis of which
the reimbursements to the parents of the children are thought to have violated the Federal
353
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Constitution and then explained why the Court rejected them both. The first argument was
that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by authorizing the
State to tax the private property of citizens and then use the money for a specific private
purpose. Black rejected this by maintaining that “the fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a
public need, coincides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is
certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the
public need.”359 He believed that it was incorrect to assume that the reimbursement violated
the due process clause and made clear that the fact that something is subsidized by law does
not establish that the law has a private instead of a public purpose. As examples, he stated
that “subsidies and loans to individuals such as farmers and home-owners, and to privately
owned transportation systems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have been
commonplace practices in our state and national history.”360
The second argument was that it violated the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause by forcing the citizens to pay taxes to support religious education at Catholic schools.
The Establishment Clause was violated, so the argument went, because the Fourteenth
Amendment applied the Religion Clauses to the states. After a lengthy exploration into the
history and circumstances surrounding the Constitution and the intent of the Framers, Black
equated providing transportation to children to providing fire and police protection. He
stated that:
Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and
from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic, would serve much
the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions
intended to guarantee free transportation of a kind which the state deems to
be best for the school children's welfare.361
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Black’s position was that the provision of transportation benefited all involved and thus
should not be rejected to some because of their religious affiliations. Black explained that the
First Amendment’s purpose was to be neutral and thus a law could not be enacted to aid one
particular religion. He affirmed that “state power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.”362 The fact that the reimbursement might have influenced
some parents to send their children to a parochial school was cast aside by the Court and
acknowledged as merely incidental. It was deemed a general provision that reimbursed all
schools, both public and private, and thus valid.
Black affirmed his position of separation with his famous words: “the First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable.”363 His words delineate a separationist attitude but his actions remain far from
implementing it. The separationist rhetoric that was employed by Black and supported in his
opinion by the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison did little to bolster
separationism. In fact, Black bolstered the accommodation of religious groups by
interpreting the beneficiaries of the reimbursement as the children and thus substantiated
that the aid was secular in nature. Black followed the child benefit theory as did Justice
Heher in the earlier New Jersey Supreme Court case of 1943.
Dissents by Justices Jackson and Rutledge are important because they also reinforce
Jefferson’s wall of separation but however do not look away from where the underlying
benefit actually resides. They state that the reimbursement is a form of aid. The children may
indeed benefit but the bottom line is that the religious education of children is the backbone
of the Church. “Its growth and cohesion, discipline and loyalty, spring from its schools.
362
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Catholic education is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to render tax aid to its
Church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the same aid to the Church
itself.”364 Jackson and Rutledge felt that the reimbursement of transportation was equated to
and indistinguishable from direct aid to the church. They dismissed the child safety argument
outright. “This expenditure of tax funds has no possible effect on the child's safety or
expedition in transit. As passengers on the public buses they travel as fast and no faster, and
are as safe and no safer, since their parents are reimbursed as before.”365
Justices Jackson and Rutledge made a dignified effort to reinforce Jefferson’s wall of
separation. These next two arguments placed forward, however valiant, fall on deaf ears. The
first, states that:
“The state cannot maintain a Church and it can no more tax its citizens to
furnish free carriage to those who attend a Church. The prohibition against
establishment of religion cannot be circumvented by a subsidy, bonus or
reimbursement of expense to individuals for receiving religious instruction
and indoctrination.” 366
The second states that:
“But we cannot have it both ways. Religious teaching cannot be a private
affair when the state seeks to impose regulations which infringe on it
indirectly, and a public affair when it comes to taxing citizens of one faith to
aid another, or those of no faith to aid all. If these principles seem harsh in
prohibiting aid to Catholic education, it must not be forgotten that it is the
same Constitution that alone assures Catholics the right to maintain these
schools at all when predominant local sentiment would forbid them.” 367
These two arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court Justices and the Court thus
rejected a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The Court established that
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public money may be spent on general public services for religious organization just as any
other secular organization. The Court reiterated however that public money may not be
directed to support the religious aspects of a religious organization. It “construed the
Establishment Clause to require a complete separation of church and state.”368 Since Everson
the tension between the separation of church and state and the accommodation of religion
has taken center stage. “Establishment decisions subsequent to Everson more clearly have
turned on whether the Court favored protecting freedom of religion by accommodating free
exercise or by maintaining a strict wall of separation.”369
Twenty-three years after Everson, Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York370
explored the meaning of the Establishment Clause and in a vote of 7-to-1 reaffirmed the taxexempt position of religious organizations. Redlich explains that “many of the Court’s
attempts to reconcile the values embodied in free exercise and establishment have been in
circumstances where the government has provided some form of aid to religious institutions.
Often, such cases require the Court to choose, in some measure, between burdening free
exercise or promoting establishment.”371 Walz is the classic example most scholars cite.
Frederick Walz, a Christian New York state property owner filed suit seeking an
injunction against the New York City Tax Commission. Walz challenged the
constitutionality of property tax exemptions that were granted to properties owned by
religious organizations used solely for religious purposes. He felt that as a citizen of the state
of New York and a taxpayer, he indirectly contributed to those religious organizations –
effectively violating the Establishment Clause. This case significantly narrowed the poorly
demarcated no man’s land between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
368
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On May 4, 1970, in a 7-to-1 decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the taxexempt status of religious organizations was not in violation of the First Amendment. This
decision was based in part on the fact that historically, exemptions had been granted to all
religious organizations. The New York Constitution granted the New York City Tax
Commission statutory authority to grant property tax exemptions to religious organizations
for religious properties. Tax exemptions were implemented by the New York Real Property
Tax Law which stated that:
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively
for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious,
bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary,
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical
society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes . . . and used
exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes . . . shall
be exempt from taxation as provided in this section.372

The Court recognized that the intention of the exemption was not designed to support one
religion in particular. The Court concluded that in fact, exemptions themselves, if compared
to the alternative of taxation, created a smaller interaction between church and state and thus
were not considered to be an excessive entanglement.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Burger explained
the Court’s conclusion by first admitting that the decision was problematical due to the
vagueness of the First Amendment. The issue of the First Amendment’s vagueness bears
witness to both its beauty as well as its inherent complicated nature. The First Amendment is
not a statute that was intended to delineate proper action on a case by case basis. The First
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Amendment, as Burger explains, is an idea that was intended to be applied when deciding
cases.
The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have
been calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a
statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the
Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general
principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in
the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been
too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in
relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.373

The First Amendment as an objective, rather than a statute, is further complicated by the
interaction between the Clauses. Burger explained that this interaction demonstrated the
difficulty of operating in this zone. “The Court has struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”374 The Walz
decision added to the process of clarifying the indistinct zone between the Clauses and
bolstered future Supreme Court cases.
Burger explained an additional conundrum. The absolute neutrality was unattainable
since the existence of the Clauses connoted involvement and that absolute neutrality would
in effect defeat its basic purpose. It was unambiguous that the “‘establishment’ of a religion
connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.”375 Burger chose instead to advocate a benevolent neutrality which was a
realistic, and more importantly, achievable intention. He stated that “there is room for play
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
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without sponsorship and without interference.”376 He believed that this benevolent
neutrality, which was derived from the accommodation of both the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, was the key to what prevented the inappropriate government involvement
and control of churches and religious practices.
Burger tipped his hat to Mr. Jackson’s logical analysis in Everson but agreed with the
Court’s ultimate practical decision. He found the decision to be “eminently sensible and
realistic [in] application of the language of the Establishment Clause.”377 By rejecting the
possible narrow and ultimately harmful interpretation, Burger believed that the Court in
Everson was able to successfully walk what he called the tight-rope between the clauses.
“With all the risks inherent in programs that bring about administrative relationships
between public education bodies and church-sponsored schools, we have been able to chart
a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any
semblance of established religion.”378 Burger asserted that this balance had been the key to
the Court’s success.
The first issue raised in Walz was the customary tax-exempt status of religious
organizations. Burger established that religious groups could be included in the general
category of eleemosynary organizations and could thus benefit from these general
exemptions. He explained that the “State has an affirmative policy that considers these
groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification
useful, desirable, and in the public interest.”379 Religious organizations were deemed
charitable due to their programs that help society and that would have been done by the
government if not otherwise completed by religious organizations.
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Burger made clear that property tax deductions were not created to bolster religious
groups. Instead, he asserted that the tax exemption was neither to advance nor to inhibit
religion but was a way to prevent possible abuse of power. He explained that:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does
not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from
demanding that the church support the state. No one has ever suggested that
tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of
the state or put employees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine nexus
between tax exemption and establishment of religion. As Mr. Justice Holmes
commented in a related context "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic."380

Exemption from taxation was the lesser of the two evils in that exemption consisted of a
comparatively limited involvement. The implementation of taxes would actually increase the
nexus of interaction between government and religion. Burger stated that “elimination of
exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax
valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and
conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.”381 The characterization of a benefit
becomes a crucial recurring theme that become clear in Lemon.382 Burger firmly established
that the purpose of exemption was neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion
and next turned to what he felt was crucial in the evaluation – the actual effect, whether
intentional or incidental.
Burger remained firm in his beliefs on the necessity of religious tax exemption and
asserted that “it is hardly useful to suggest that tax exemption is but the ‘foot in the door’ or
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the ‘nose of the camel in the tent’ leading to an established church.”383 He did, however,
believe that the effect of tax exemptions, even incidental effects, should be calculated. He
stated that “we must be sure that the end result -- the effect -- is not an excessive
government entanglement with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree.”384 These
three words “excessive government entanglement” became significant a year later in Lemon v.
Kurtzman385 when it became the third prong of the three-part test that determined whether or
not an action violated the Establishment Clause.
Justice Brennan, concurring, made an interesting historical point that became central
an upcoming Supreme Court case. James Madison, an advocate for religious tax exemptions
had later in life, changed his mind and argued against tax exemptions for churches among
other things. Specifically, he argued for the removal of religious vestiges from the
government. Madison argued against:
tax exemptions for churches, the incorporation of ecclesiastical bodies with
the power of acquiring and holding property in perpetuity, the right of the
Houses of Congress to choose chaplains who are paid out of public funds,
the provision of chaplains in the Army and Navy, and presidential
proclamations of days of thanksgiving or prayer.386

Though the issue of Madison’s late-life change of heart was not approached again, it further
complicated the issue. The proper course of action was further blurred by yet another
interpretation of the original intention. The dissent by Justice Douglas also revealed an
interesting personal admission that followed in the footsteps of Madison’s change of heart.
He stated that “the Everson decision was five to four and, though one of the five, I have since
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had grave doubts about it, because I have become convinced that grants to institutions
teaching a sectarian creed violate the Establishment Clause.”387 This candid statement shed
light on his opinion that a tax exemption was a subsidy and placed the accommodation of
religion decided in the last four Supreme Court cases on questionable ground. “From that
perspective, free exercise concerns were not implicated, and the benefit derived was more
clearly in violation of the mandated separation and neutrality.”388The basic contention
between Justices Burger and Douglas was the issue of effect. “The importance of how a
benefit is characterized is a recurring theme in religion clause decisions. Its importance
would become clear the next year in Lemon v. Kurtzman, a case involving government aid to
religious schools, where Chief Justice Burger would apply essentially the same standards with
opposite results.”389
In 1971, the 5-to-4 decision in Tilton v. Richardson390 continued the trend of religious
accommodation and laid steadier ground for the Supreme Court. Tilton reaffirmed the 1899
Bradfield391 decision that determined that not all government aid to organizations owned and
operated by religious groups was unconstitutional. Tilton established that government
construction grants for non-religious academic facilities built on religious university
campuses were constitutional.
Eleanor Taft Tilton, representing a group of Connecticut taxpayers, sued Robert H.
Finch, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare and
then Elliot Lee Richardson, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare alleging that the
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Higher Education Facilities Act392 of 1963 violated the First Amendment. Tilton alleged that
the allocation of federal construction grants paid out under Title I to four institutions of
higher education in Connecticut amounted to nothing less than the establishment of religion.
Five projects were constructed including a library building at Sacred Heart University; a
music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; science and library buildings at Fairfield
University; and a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College. The four institutions were
administered by Catholic religious organizations and had predominantly Catholic student
bodies. While the universities did not require students to attend religious services, theology
courses were required. The universities maintained that religious indoctrination, however,
was not at any time or in any form part of the curriculum.
Title 1 of the Act gave grants and loans for up to 50% of the construction costs to
colleges and universities for the building costs of academic facilities. Eligibility for the federal
aid was determined if a university proved that it:
urgently needed [a] substantial expansion of the institution's student
enrollment capacity, capacity to provide needed health care to students or
personnel of the institution, or capacity to carry out extension and continuing
education programs on the campus of such institution.393
The Act also expressly excluded facilities intended for religious worship or instruction.
Specifically, it excluded “any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place
for religious worship, or . . . any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity.”394 To ensure
that the new facility was indeed religion-neutral, the government retained an interest in the
property for twenty years and maintained the right to unannounced spot-checks. If these on-
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site inspections revealed a prohibited sectarian association, then the government was to
recover a portion of the grant.
In 1970, the District Court of Connecticut heard the case and upheld the
constitutionality of the Higher Education Facilities Act.395 District Judge Timbers explained
that the Court found that in intent as well as effect, the Act was constitutional. The Supreme
Court however, only partially agreed. In 1971, Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of
the Court. He began by explaining that over time, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Establishment Clause to protect against sponsorship, financial support, and direct
involvement. Burger believed that the analysis and ultimate finding that any of these have
been violated are difficult to assess. He stated:
Every analysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no
single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to
which these three factors are present or absent. Instead, our analysis in this
area must begin with a consideration of the cumulative criteria developed
over many years and applying to a wide range of governmental action
challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause.396
Without definitive tests, Burger explained, the Court therefore must rely on guidelines
deduced from history mainly: whether the Act reflected a secular legislative purpose,
whether the primary effect of the Act was to advance or inhibit religion, whether the
administration of the Act created an excessive government entanglement with religion, and
whether the Act in effect violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Regarding the first guideline, the Act clearly served the legitimate secular objective of
education. Also, the newly constructed buildings were non-religious in appearance. Burger
asserted that “these buildings are indistinguishable from a typical state university facility.”397
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The function of the five buildings was also non-religious in nature. Two were libraries, one
was a language laboratory, one was a science building and one is a music, drama, and arts
building. “There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities.”398
The Act would have been deemed invalid if religion was taught in any of these buildings.
The Court found problems with respect to the second consideration, whether the
Act established an excessive government entanglement. In fact, the Court was unanimous in
its opinion regarding the 20-year time limitation and the specified necessary surveillance. The
Court deemed the 20-year period allotted for the government interest unacceptable. The
dispute was that after the time period elapsed, the religious organization could convert the
building to whatever it deemed necessary. This conversion could directly augment its agenda
and therefore work to advance religion. Burger illustrated the potential harm this conversion
could have. “If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of
advancing religion. To this extent the Act therefore trespasses on the Religion Clauses.”399
Burger clarified that though a part of the Act was in violation of the Religion Clauses
that this did not necessitate the invalidation of the remainder of the Act. He rested his
opinion on a general principle expressed in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation that
“the cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.”"
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invalidation of the Act also did not hinge on the retention of the 20-year period. Burger
explained that:
In view of the broad and important goals that Congress intended this
legislation to serve, there is no basis for assuming that the Act would have
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failed of passage without this provision; nor will its excision impair either the
operation or administration of the Act in any significant respect.401
The Court thus allowed the remaining part of the Act to stand as valid.
The third guideline of entanglement was addressed by evaluating the potential for
entanglement. The potential was determined to be much less at an institution of higher
learning than at an elementary or secondary school. “There is substance to the contention
that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination.”402 The court determined that the entanglement of government with religion
was lessened because the substance of the education was not religious, the facilities were
religiously neutral, and thirdly that government supervision was minimal. The issue of
entanglement was further reduced by the fact that the aid was given one time and in one
lump sum only. Burger explained that:
The Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpose construction grant.
There are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual
audits, and no government analysis of an institution’s expenditures on secular
as distinguished from religious activities. Inspection as to use is a minimal
contact.403
Burger further explained that taken together, these reasons prove that the interaction
between government and religion did not constitute excessive government entanglement. He
stated that the relationship was found to have “less potential for realizing the substantive
evils against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect.”404
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, had some harsh words. He agreed with the
Justices that the 20-year stipulation was unconstitutional but he maintained that the Act
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amounted to an “outright grant.”405 Douglas believed that the payment of the money all at
once instead of over several years did not detract from what was essentially a block grant. He
stated that “thus it is hardly impressive that rather than giving a smaller amount of money
annually over a long period of years, Congress instead gives a large amount all at once. I
cannot agree with such sophistry.”406 Douglas also believed that the Court’s decision
departed drastically from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance:
I dissent not because of any lack of respect for parochial schools but out of
a feeling of despair that the respect which through history has been accorded
the First Amendment is this day lost. The million-dollar grants sustained
today put Madison's miserable "three pence" to shame. But he even thought,
as I do, that even a small amount coming out of the pocket of taxpayers and
going into the coffers of a church was not in keeping with our constitutional
ideal.407
Douglas found support in three other Justices but the hairline 5-to-4 ruling was not in their
favor. The decision was different, however, in Lemon v. Kurtzman408 which was ruled on
essentially the same subject but held the statute unconstitutional due to the receipt of the
federal monies.
In 1971, during the same year as the Tilton v. Richardson ruling, the Supreme Court
also ruled on Lemon v. Kurtzman.409 The Acts at issue included Pennsylvania’s 1968 Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act and Rhode Island’s 1969 Salary Supplement Act.
In 1969, the District Court found that neither the Establishment nor the Free Exercise
Clauses were violated. The District Court held that “as long as the purpose and primary
effect of the statute neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion, the constitutional standard

405

Ibid.
Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
409 Id., Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).
406

125

[was] satisfied.”410 The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the findings and
reversed. Lemon v. Kurtzman is significant for establishing three criteria for determining First
Amendment cases. The Lemon test deemed that government action was unconstitutional if
it established that it did not promote a secular purpose, if its primary effect is deemed to
advance or inhibit religion, or if the action fostered an excessive entanglement between
church and state. The invalidation of any one of these three prongs invalidated the action
and rendered it unconstitutional. The Lemon test was a framework that will be applied
consistently and with few modifications throughout the 20th and into the 21st centuries,
although several Justices such as Justice Scalia have indicated dissatisfaction with it.
Alton J. Lemon brought suit against David H Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public
Instruction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in charge of administering funds under
the Pennsylvania Education Act, Grace Sloan, State Treasurer of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, who allocated the approved funds, and seven sectarian elementary and
secondary schools who contracted with the Commonwealth for the purchase of secular
educational services under the Education Act. Lemon represented a group of citizens that
advocated the separation of church and state and were opposed to the “‘use of public funds
for the support in whole or in part of sectarian schools, or other private schools whose
policies and practices, by purpose or effect, exclude or otherwise discriminate against
persons by reason of race or religion.’"411

Lemon, an African American citizen, a

Pennsylvania taxpayer, and the father of a public school student alleged that the Act violated
the Constitution. He based his claim of standing by alleging that unbeknownst to him, his
purchase of a race track ticket supported the Act.
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The Legislature passed the Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1968 to meet the existing crisis in Pennsylvania’s nonpublic schools. The Act provided funds
to contract out some of the secular services of nonpublic schools. The nature of this
arrangement was perceived as non-threatening because nonpublic elementary and secondary
education were deemed to have a “public welfare purpose and that nonpublic education, by
providing instruction in secular subjects, contributes significantly to the achievement of this
public purpose.”412 Kurtzman was empowered to allocate funds for services such as teacher
expenses and various instructional materials to nonpublic schools. The State would then
reimburse the nonpublic schools for any approved spending. “Under the ‘contracts’
authorized by the statute, the State directly reimburse[d] nonpublic schools solely for their
actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials.”413 The
reimbursement had several stipulations including one that required that secular and nonsecular expenses be kept separate and absolutely accounted for subject to audit.
Reimbursements were made only for secular public school subjects and were limited to
mathematics, foreign languages physical science and physical education and specifically not
for “any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of
any sect.”414
The funding for Pennsylvania’s 1968 Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary
Education Act was originally subsidized by a tax on horse and harness racing but was
replaced by the state cigarette tax. In total, the revenue allowed for a total of $5 million to be
reimbursed annually. At the time of the suit, Pennsylvania had entered into contracts with
“1,181 nonpublic elementary and secondary schools with a student population of some
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535,215 pupils -- more than 20% of the total number of students in the State. More than
96% of these pupils attend church-related schools, and most of these schools are affiliated
with the Roman Catholic Church.”415
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that
the Act did not violate the Religion Clauses.416 United States District Judge Alfred L. Luongo
delivered the opinion of the Court and stated that the Act was constitutional. “Admittedly,
the line is not an easy one to draw. However, we believe the Education Act is consistent
with neutrality towards religion and comes within the permissible limits and spirit of the
non-establishment principle.” 417 On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States,
however, reversed and remanded.
Chief Justice Burger concluded that “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship
arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government
and religion.”418 Burger found issue with Pennsylvania’s surveillance stipulations. He believed
that this produced a relationship of excessive entanglement. “As we noted earlier, the very
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological
role give rise to entanglements between church and state.”419 Burger also noted a difference
between the reimbursements in this case and the reimbursement scheme in Everson that was
deemed constitutional. “The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of
providing state financial aid directly to the church-related school. This factor distinguishes
both Everson and Allen, for in both those cases the Court was careful to point out that state
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aid was provided to the student and his parents -- not to the church-related school.”420
Burger equated this relationship to the typical cash subsidy requirement of control. “In
particular the government’s post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related
school's financial records and to determine which expenditures are religious and which are
secular creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.”421 It
seems that the accommodative tome displayed by Burger in Walz was absent.422
The second controversy the Lemon Court ruled on was Rhode Island’s 1969 Salary
Supplement Act.423 The Act was initially contested in the District Court of Rhode Island in
the 1970 DiCenso v. Robinson424 case where Joan DiCenso, a Rhode Island resident and
taxpayer filed suit against William P. Robinson and John R. Earley alleging that the Act
violated the First Amendment. They claimed that the primary beneficiaries of the Act were
Catholic schools and the approximately 250 teachers that were paid and thus the Act’s
purpose and effect was the advancement of the Catholic religion. DiCenso also claimed that
she indirectly had to fund the Act through her tax money, thus violating the Free Exercise
clause. On June 15, 1970, Circuit Judge Coffin delivered the opinion of the Court which
held the Act unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation.
The Salary Supplement Act compensated the teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. “To accomplish this objective, the legislature appropriated
$375,000 to pay up to 15 per cent of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in non-public
elementary schools.” 425 The stipulation detailed that in order to be a recipient of the aid, a
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teacher had to teach subject matter and textbooks similar to that approved by public schools,
proper certification, and must assure that religious indoctrination did not occur.
The Act was intended to solve the financial crisis of non-public schools. Circuit
Judge Coffin explained that the state-wide crisis began when nuns stopped teaching and lay
teachers took their place.
As recently as ten years ago, the Archdiocese of Providence relied almost
exclusively on nuns to staff its school system. Lay teachers filled only 4 or 5
per cent of the system's 1200 teaching positions. By 1969, lay teachers
constituted one third of the teaching force. Each shift from a teaching sister
to a lay teacher represents a threefold increase in salary expense (i.e., a shift
from approximately $1800 to $5500 at present levels).426
The Court found the Salary Supplement Act unconstitutional based on the deep
entanglement it produced between church and state. The necessary surveillance needed to
ensure proper use of money was excessive. The Court determined that the Act was in
violation “not only [in] substantial support for a religious enterprise, but also the kind of
reciprocal embroilments of government and religion which the First Amendment was meant
to avoid.”427
On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case. Chief
Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Regarding the Rhode Island Act, the
Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the Act was unconstitutional. Burger
explained that providing direct aid to teachers was much different from previous
accommodations the Court had made in the past.
Our decisions from Everson to Allen have permitted the States to provide
church-related schools with secular, neutral, or nonideological services,
facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school lunches, public health
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services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students were not
thought to offend the Establishment Clause.428
But the aid that the Rhode Island Act provided was not in the previously permitted forms
but instead was for teachers. The Court did not believe that a sectarian teacher could remain
religiously neutral at all times. The energy expended to inspect the teacher and assess the
neutrality, though preventive in nature, was deemed an unacceptable entanglement. Burger
explained that “these prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church.”429 The chance that the relationship would traverse a path not
sanctioned by the Constitution was deemed too great. Burger explained that “it is a
relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools and
hence of churches.”430
Burger advised the Court that it needed to be very cautious in these types of cases. The
probable yearly increased funding as well as the underlying political connotations were
pitfalls the Court needed to be aware of. He also admitted that the path blazed by this case
was a new one necessitated by the uncertain nature of First Amendment case law. “Candor
compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.”431 A new path was
indeed blazed. The decision was highly regarded for it outlined what became known as the
Lemon test which was intended to guide legislation that raised such concerns. The three
prongs included:
1. The government’s action must have a legitimate secular purpose;
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2. The government’s action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or
inhibiting religion; and
3. The government’s action must not result in an ‘excessive entanglement’ of the
government and religion.

Together, the prongs established guidelines of appropriate legislation. If any of the three
prongs were not satisfied, the statute was deemed unconstitutional.
The 1973 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,432 case decided
the constitutionality of reimbursements to parents of nonpublic school children. Past cases
had ruled on the constitutionality of government aided textbooks and busing and passed
constitutional muster because of the indirect nature of the funding as well as having been
deemed beneficial to the children instead of the parents or the school. This case was
distinguished from past cases due to its direct reimbursements which were deemed to benefit
the schools. Nyquist is known as the decision at the center of the controversy over school
vouchers because the case involved grants and tuition tax credits for the benefit of parents
whose children attended private schools. The state calculated the amount of these grants on
a per pupil basis, established a maximum amount based on comparable expenditures in the
public school system, and most significantly did not impose any ‘secular use’ restriction on
the grants.
In 1972, the Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty (PEARL), an
unincorporated association of New York State residents, sued Ewald B. Nyquist, the
Commissioner of Education of New York. PEARL claimed that amendment to the State’s
Education and Tax Laws specifically Chapter 414 of the New York Laws of 1972 violated
the Establishment Clause. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
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agreed and enjoined §1 and §2 but allowed §§3, 4, and 5.433 A year later, on June 25, 1973, in
a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling regarding §§1 and 2 and reversed
the ruling on §§3, 4, and 5434.
The suit contested only three of the five parts of the amendment. The first section
provided direct money grants from the State Treasury to nonpublic schools for maintenance
and repair. Nonpublic schools were eligible for the grants if they demonstrated that they
“serv[ed] a high concentration of pupils from low-income families for purposes of Title IV
of the Federal Higher Education Act of 1965.”435 The qualifying schools constructed within
the last 25 years received $30 per pupil and, if constructed more than 25 years ago, the grant
increased to $40 per pupil. Reimbursements were made for the previous year’s maintenance
and repairs. Maintenance and repair was defined as:
‘the provision of heat, light, water, ventilation and sanitary facilities, cleaning,
janitorial and custodial services; snow removal; necessary upkeep and
renovation of buildings, grounds and equipment; fire and accident
protection; and such other items as the commissioner may deem necessary to
ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils.’ 436
The ‘maintenance and repair’ description above was defined under the heading of Health
and Safety Grants for Nonpublic School Children. This section of the Law required that the
state assume responsibility for the health, welfare, and safety of children. Specifically, the Act
delineated these responsibilities to the State due to the fact that the “[financial] resources
necessary to properly maintain and repair [deteriorating] buildings are beyond the capabilities
of low-income people whose children attend nonpublic schools.” 437 The Act specified that
in order to assume responsibility for the health, welfare, and safety, “the state ha[d] the right
433
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to make grants for maintenance and repair expenditures which are clearly secular, neutral
and non-ideological in nature.”

In exchange for the funds, the school assumed the

responsibility of providing the Commissioner of Education a statement of expenses
pertaining to maintenance and repair. The other stipulation was that the payment of grants
was limited to 50% of the average maintenance and repair per pupil cost of public school
students.
In addition to the funds required for maintenance and repair, the second section of
the Act entitled the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program to provide
grants directly from the State Treasury to low-income parents of school children attending
nonpublic schools. Families with incomes of less than $5,000 would receive a grant of $50
per year for a child in grade school and $100 per child in high school. The Act detailed that
the grants could not exceed 50% of the sum the parents originally paid. Some parents did
not qualify for these grants so parents who had paid at least $50 in tuition and had a child in
grades 1 through 12 and have an adjusted gross income of $5,000 to $25,000 were given a
state income tax deduction. A set maximum value of $1,000 per child was predetermined.
The purpose of the funding was to bolster the competitive nature of nonpublic
schools which had been experiencing a systematic decline in New York. The goal was to
keep attendance high at nonpublic schools to ensure that public schools were not
encumbered by a large influx of nonpublic school students. The New York State Legislature
feared that “any precipitous decline in the number of nonpublic school pupils would cause a
massive increase in public school enrolment and costs which would seriously jeopardize
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quality education for all children and aggravate an already serious fiscal crisis in public
education.”438
District Court Judge Gurfein delivered the opinion of the Court. He agreed with the
legislative findings that it was imperative to allow for a maximum choice in schools. Gurfein
stated that the “vitality of our pluralistic society is, in part, dependent upon the capacity of
individual parents to select a school, other than public, for the education of their
children.”439 He continued that this right to a multitude of choices was diminished for poor
families. The “‘right’ is diminished or denied to children of poor families whose parents have
the least options in determining where their children are to be educated.”440

Gurfein

concluded that the state law had a legitimate purpose “to partially relieve the financial
burdens of parents who provide a nonpublic education for their children.” 441
As to the first section of the Act, Gurfein stated the Court’s “reluctant
conclusion.”442 The Court declared that the direct public subsidy for “maintenance and
repair” was unconstitutional even though the Court sympathized with what it deemed an
essentially secular intention but regrettably, in effect, advanced religion and created an
excessive entanglement. The Court ordered the injunction of the §1 maintenance and repair
grants. The Court determined that §2, the tuition reimbursement grants, was
unconstitutional. The only part that passed constitutional muster was the income tax
provisions of §§ 3, 4, and 5.
One year later, on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the
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Court by commenting on the difficulty in reaching conclusions regarding permissible and
impermissible actions. “For it is evident from the numerous opinions of the Court, and of
Justices in concurrence and dissent in the leading cases applying the Establishment Clause,
that no ‘bright line’ guidance is afforded.”443 These cases were complicated by the numerous
interpretations of the First Amendment’s original intent. Powell stated that “despite
Madison’s admonition and the ‘sweep of the absolute prohibitions’ of the Clauses, this
Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State.
It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation,
and as a consequence cases arising under these Clauses have presented some of the most
perplexing questions to come before this Court.”444
The Court found fault with three of the five sections of the amendment. Powell
deemed the maintenance and repair grants were unconstitutional because of the possibility
that the reimbursements would not be confined to the actual maintenance and repair
expenses. Powell stated that “nothing in the statute…bars a qualifying school from paying
out of state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel, or the cost of
renovating classrooms in which religion is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those
same facilities.”445 The Act was not restrictive enough and was therefore deemed
unconstitutional. Powell reasoned that “in the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing
that the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is
invalid.”446
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The Court determined that the maintenance and repair section as well as the tuition
reimbursement section failed Lemon’s effect test. The maintenance and repair provisions
violated the Establishment Clause because their effect was to advance the religious mission
of sectarian schools. The Court also concluded that all three sections including the
maintenance and repair grants, the tuition grants, and the tax deductions, all had the primary
effect of advancing religion. Approximately 20% of New York students or 750,000 students
attend New York nonpublic schools. Of these nonpublic school children, 85% were church
affiliated. In all, 280 low income schools were deemed to qualify for the aid.
The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction of the first two sections but reversed the
decision regarding the third, fourth and fifth sections. The Supreme Court found fault with
each section and deemed them unconstitutional. Powell explained “whether the grant is
labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the
same.”447 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist effectively stopped the New York state law
that authorized reimbursement to low income families of parochial school students,
prohibited tax deductions for such families, and disallowed direct grants to such families.
The Act passed the first prong of the Lemon test - all three were determined to have a
secular purpose but all three, however, failed the second prong in that they furthered
religion.
The next case that utilized the Lemon test was the 1973 Hunt v. McNair.448 In the
same year that the Supreme Court struck down maintenance and repair grants, tuition
reimbursements, and tax deductions for parochial students, it upheld issuance of
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government revenue bonds for religious colleges that utilized the bond proceeds to build oncampus facilities.
Richard W. Hunt, a resident and taxpayer of South Carolina, sued Robert E. McNair,
the Governor of South Carolina, for declaratory and injunctive relief against the South
Carolina Educational Facilities Act.449 The Education Facilities Act created the Education
Facilities Authority to approve proceeds from a South Carolina state bond that was lent to a
Baptist College in Charleston, a South Carolina eleemosynary corporation, for the
construction of an on-campus building until such time the college repaid the loan.
The issued revenue bonds were intended to assist “higher educational institutions in
constructing and financing projects, such as buildings, facilities, and site preparation, but not
including any facility for sectarian instruction or religious worship.”450 Specifically, the bond
proceeds could not be used to finance “any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any facility which is used or to be used
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity
for any religious denomination.”451 While the loan was repaid, the the Baptist College at
Charleston conveyed 400 acres of its land to the state-created Educational Facilities
Authority which was leased to the college until debt repayment was completed. A stipulation
required that if the repayment was not completed, the government could foreclose on the
land. Hunt believed that the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act violated the
Establishment Clause in that the proceeds of the state issued bonds would directly benefit a
Baptist College.
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The college initially requested a loan amount of $3,500,000 from the Authority for
the purposes of:
(a) paying off outstanding indebtedness of the Baptist Foundation incurred
for the purpose of acquiring certain equipment and trailers utilized as a part
of the College's educational plant in the amount of approximately $275,000;
(b) reimbursing in part the College's Current Fund for moneys advanced to
the College's Plant Fund used to purchase school equipment and other
capital improvements and for the payment of the aforesaid obligation of the
Baptist College Foundation; and (c) refunding an outstanding indebtedness
of the College in the amount of approximately $2,500,000 represented by the
College's first mortgage serial bonds dated July 1, 1966.452
After this initial request, the college received a bank loan in the amount of $2,500,000 and
altered its requested amount as well as purpose. The college requested $1,250,000 in revenue
bonds this time to be used for the purposes of:
(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance (approximately
$250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to refund
outstanding short-term loans in the amount of $800,000 whose proceeds
were to pay off indebtedness incurred for capital improvements, and (iii) to
finance the completion of the dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately
$200,000.453
The legislative intent of the Act was clearly secular in nature and passed the first prong of
the Lemon test. The Act was created for the benefit of the people:
The purpose of this section [is] to provide a measure of assistance and an
alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to
provide the facilities and structures which are sorely needed to accomplish
the purposes of this act, all to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein.454
The creators of the Act were well aware of the turmoil that could arise and went to great
lengths to ensure that the Act would be devoid of any section that may eventually be deemed
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in violation of the Religion Clauses. Besides ensuring the secular nature of the Act, the State
removed itself from connection with the project and thus any implications its participation
may have. “Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed
to constitute a debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge
of the faith and credit of the State or of any such political subdivision, but shall be payable
solely from the funds herein provided therefore from revenues.”455 The State made clear that
the revenues were not expended from State coffers but from the revenues of the Authority.
The bonds were very attractive due to the exceptional interest rate. “The incometax-exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as an instrumentality of the State, to
market the bonds at a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution
would be forced to pay if it borrowed the money by conventional private financing.”456 The
College was also pleased with the repayment plan. The plan constituted for a contingency
plan. “The Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a foreclosable mortgage lien on the Project
property including a mortgage on the right, title and interest of the Authority in and to the
Lease Agreement.”457
The deal was premised on the assurance that the Baptist College at Charleston would
not provide any sectarian use of the new building:
The Deed of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be
made subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary
grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises, or any part thereof,
that no facility thereon, financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of the
bonds, shall be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or used in connection with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity of any religious denomination.458
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The creators of the Act truly covered all possible weaknesses inherent in this type of
religion-state nexus. The foresight and thoroughness paid off at the Supreme Court of South
Carolina as well as the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States followed the principles previously
established in Lemon “with full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we
consider the present statute and the proposed transaction in terms of the three ‘tests’:
purpose, effect, and entanglement.”459 In a vote of 6-to-3, after applying the Lemon-test, the
Supreme Court found the loan constitutional and upheld the issuance of revenue bonds for
religious colleges. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, deemed the plan secular in nature
as well as clever in that it was available to all colleges and thus potentially beneficial to many
institutions. “The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions of higher education in
South Carolina, whether or not having a religious affiliation.”460 Since the new building was
not used for sectarian purposes the plan was deemed to neither advanced nor inhibited
religion.
The Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other
resources on religious ends. Aid normally may be thought to have a primary
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an
otherwise substantially secular setting.461
But the Baptist College at Charleston was not deemed to be so pervasive even though it was
administered by the College Board of Trustees which was elected by the South Carolina
Baptist Convention and that 60% of the College student body was Baptist. The college made
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it clear that religious qualifications for faculty and student body were not sanctioned. “On
the record in this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's operations are oriented
significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education.”462 Even if they were
sanctioned, Tilton established that dealings with an institution even if religious in nature were
not inherently unconstitutional. In addition, the Court found than an excessive entanglement
did not exist. “Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free from ambiguity,
the burden rests on appellant to show the extent to which the College is church
related…and he has failed to show more than a formalistic church relationship.”463
It is interesting that Hunt v. McNair came to the same conclusion before the Lemon
test was invoked as well as after. The trial court denied relief and the Supreme Court of
South Carolina affirmed even after the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the ruling in Lemon. The conclusion
reached was the same but significantly, it added to the First Amendment case law that
invoked the decision in Lemon.
Eight years later, the Widmar v. Vincent464 case involved a ruling by the University of
Missouri at Kansas City that prohibited the use of its facilities by a student led religious
organization. The school believed that its refusal to allow the on-campus meetings was
required by the United States Constitution to ensure that the University was not in violation
of the Establishment Clause. Eleven members of Cornerstone, the student religious group
that had previously been permitted to use the facilities to hold prayers and Bible studies sued
the school on October 13, 1977 after being informed of the change in policy. Clark Vincent
and Florian Chess representing the students that initiated that action filed suit agianst Gary
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Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, claiming that their First Amendment rights of
religious free exercise and free speech were violated.
The issue in this case was whether the University of Missouri at Kansas City could
deny access of one of its facilities to Cornerstone, a group which intended to use the facility
for religious worship. Cornerstone consisted of various denominational evangelical Christian
students. “Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms and in the student center.
These meetings were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical
Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious
views and experiences.”465 The use of the University grounds was deemed easier than
traveling off-campus since the nearest University chapel was at the University’s Columbia
campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.466
UMKC openly advocated student organization. “The University officially recognizes
over 100 student groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the meetings of
registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help
defray the costs to the University.”467 Cornerstone had for four years during 1973 and 1977
been a registered group and paid the activity fee. The purpose of Cornerstone, as stated on
the University’s request form, was to “promote a knowledge of Jesus Christ among
students” and stated that the meetings and events would be open to the public, no
University funds would be used, no admission would be charged, and no donations would
be solicited.468
In 1977, however, the University informed Cornerstone that as per a 1972 Board of
Curators regulation, the group could no longer use the facilities. The regulation that had not
465
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yet been enforced prohibited the use of University buildings and grounds “for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching."469 The first of a two-part regulation adopted by the
Curators in 1972 stated that:
No University buildings or grounds …may be used for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups.
Student congregations of local churches…may use the facilities, commonly
referred to as the student union or center or commons…. The general
prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious
worship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The
Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open
to any other construction.470
The second part of the two-part regulation, stated that “Regular chapels established on
University grounds may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring services
of any groups. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious
group.”471
On December 11, 1979, the United Stated District Court for the Western District of
Missouri heard the case. 472 The Court upheld the University’s regulation and agreed that the
state could not allow religious use of the building without directly supporting that religion.
The Court also ruled that religious speech could be jeopardized to ensure that a prohibitive
support to a religion was not created. District Court Justice Collinson explained the decision
of the Court. Collinson justified the decision by comparing it to the circumstances and
decision in Tilton v. Richardson.473 “This Court finds that a university policy permitting regular
religious services in university-owned buildings would have the primary effect of advancing
religion. This Court holds, therefore, that the university's present ban on religious services in
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its buildings is required by the establishment clause.”474 The Court also found that religious
speech was entitled to less protection than other types of expression even if that meant the
subversion of some freedoms in the name of others. Collinson explained that “the State of
Missouri's interest in maintaining a strict separation of church and state is a sufficiently
compelling interest to overbalance plaintiffs' claims to free exercise of religion.”475
Unsatisfied with the ruling, the plaintiffs challenged the District’s Court’s decree on
August 4, 1980 in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.476 The Court of
Appeals found UMKC’s refusal to allow Cornerstone access to University facilities
unconstitutional. The Court found that a religious group could not be excluded based on the
content of their meetings. Circuit Judge Heaney explained what he considered to be the
compelling argument of content-based discrimination. “According to the Court of Appeals,
the ‘primary effect’ of such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to further
the neutral purpose of developing students’ ‘social and cultural awareness as well as [their]
intellectual curiosity.’”477 The primary effect of would not be to advance religion but to
advance the University’s purpose. Circuit Judge Heaney stated that “neutral accommodation
of the many student groups active at UMKC would not constitute an establishment of
religion even though some student groups may use the University’s facilities for religious
worship or religious teaching.”478 The regulation was determined to violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision.
In 1981, in an 8-to-1 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
of the Court of Appeals. The Court found that the Establishment Clause did not require
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state universities to limit access to their facilities by religious organizations. Because the
university had generally permitted its facilities to be used by student organizations, it had to
demonstrate that its restrictions were constitutionally permitted. It was determined that an
equal access policy would not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. The threepronged Lemon Test would not be violated by allowing religious groups to meet on campus.
The legislative purpose was clearly secular and did not foster excessive government
entanglement. The University’s claim that the policy’s primary effect would be to advance
religion was rejected. But as Justice Powell explained, “...this Court has explained that a
religious organization’s enjoyment of merely ‘incidental’ benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the ‘primary advancement’ of religion.” It was determined that any such
benefits at UMKC would be incidental.
The Supreme Court decision ensured religious organization access to public facilities.
This access was endorsed with the understanding that the University, in this case, was not in
support of the messages that were communicated in their facilities. The Court also
concluded that the University policy was found to discriminate against religious groups and
that this discrimination was not allowed because the rights to Free Exercise outweighed any
Establishment concerns. Clearly, equal access was not incompatible with the Establishment
Clause but if, however, the university had not created the public forum it would not have
been required to furnish facilities for use by religious groups.479 The Court expressly
prohibited the University from instituting a greater degree of separation. The Clauses
worked in tandem to define permissible action. The degree of greater separation intended by
the state was not allowed and was limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the
Free Speech Clause as well.
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In hindsight, the decision in Wallace v. Jaffree480 is devoid of any difficult
contemplation. At the time, however, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama had difficulty finding an error in a law that in effect established religion.
In 1983, Ishmael Jaffree, a resident of Mobile County, filed suit on behalf of his three
children to enjoin three statutes regarding school prayer and moment of silence. Chief Judge
Hand delivered the opinion if the Court ruling in favor of Wallace, the governor of Alabama.
The Court found the Act constitutional because a State had the right to establish a state
religion.481
Jaffree’s three minor children, Jamael Aakki Jaffree, Makeba Green, and Chioke
Saleem Jaffree attended public school in Mobile County, Alabama. The defendants were
teachers or principals at the public schools. The complaint alleged that at each of the schools
attended by the Jaffree children, different prayers were led by the teachers. At E.R. Dickson
School, for example the teacher led the class in singing: “God is great, God is good, Let us
thank him for our food, bow our heads we all are fed, Give us Lord our daily bread.
Amen!”482 In another classroom, the teacher led the students in the Lord’s Prayer: “Our
Father, which art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done
on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we
forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the
kingdom and the power and the glory forever. Amen.”483Jaffree, an agnostic, informed the
school on several occasions that he did not want his children to participate in any type of
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religious activity at school and warned that if the activity continued, he would take legal
action.
Jaffree’s complaints did not alter the actions of the teacher who claimed that the
prayers were conducted voluntarily. The prayers continued even though the school policy
adopted by the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County stated that:
Schools shall comply with all existing state and federal laws as these laws
pertain to religious practices and the teaching of religion. This policy shall
not be interpreted to prohibit teaching about the various religions of the
world, the influence of the Judeo-Christian faith on our society, and the
values and ideals of the American way of life.484
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama decision began
predictably by stating that in Alabama, prayer in public schools is per se unconstitutional.
“Prayer is an address of entreaty, supplication, praise, or thanksgiving directed to some
sacred or divine spirit, being, or object. That it may contemplate some wholly secular
objective cannot alter the inherently religious character of the exercise.”485 The prayers held
in public schools were thus deemed to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. The
Court reiterated the importance of the neutrality principle. “Although a given prayer or
practice may not favor any one sect, the principle of neutrality in religious matters is violated
under these decisions by any program which places tacit government approval upon religious
views or practices.”486 The Court thus established the prayers unconstitutional but took an
incredible leap and concluded that the U.S. Constitution intended to prohibit only the
federal government from establishing a national religion. Quoting Professor Charles
Fairman, Hand stated that the “mountain of evidence has become so high, one may have
lost sight of the few stones and pebbles that made up the theory that the Fourteenth
484
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Amendment incorporated Amendments I to VIII.”487 Hand concluded that “suffice it to say
that the few stones and pebbles provide precious little historical support for the view that
the states were prohibited by the establishment clause of the first amendment from
establishing a religion.”488 In effect, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Alabama concluded that based on their independent historical review, the United States
Supreme Court had erred in its interpretation of original intent. In a stunning decision based
on this analysis, the Court decided that “because the establishment clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a
religion, the prayers offered by the teachers in this case are not unconstitutional.” The Court
went on to denigrate the historical pattern of Religion Clause application:
Consistency no longer exists. Where you cannot recite the Lord's Prayer, you
may sing his praises in God Bless America. Where you cannot post the Ten
Commandments on the wall for those to read if they do choose, you can
require the Pledge of Allegience. Where you cannot acknowledge the
authority of the Almighty in the Regent's prayer, you can acknowledge the
existence of the Almighty in singing the verses of America and Battle Hymn
of the Republic. It is no wonder that the people perceive that justice is
myoptic, obtuse, and janus-like.489
This decision concluded the first part of the case. It concerned the part of the statute that
authorized teachers to lead students in voluntary prayer.
The court separated the cases into two, one deciding on the prayer in school and the
other, in an amended action, the constitutionality of two laws known as the Alabama school
prayer statutes.490 Section 16-1-20.1 allowed for a moment of silence for grades 1-6. It stated
that:
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At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public
schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in.
Section 16-1-20.2 allowed for a moment of silence and voluntary prayer for all grades. It
stated that:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational
institution within the State of Alabama… may lead the willing students in
the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator
and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your
peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of
our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our
schools. In the name of our Lord. Amen.
Jaffree v. James,491 the case that dealt with the statutes ordered a preliminary injunction against
the implementation of the statutes but after the trial, the district court dismissed both actions
effectively dissolving the preliminary injunction.
On May 12, 1983, The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part.492 The Act was considered an establishment of a
religion and thus unconstitutional. Circuit Judge Hatchett delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court affirmed the previous ruling on Ala.Code §16-1-20.1 and Ala.Code §16-1-20.2.
The statutes were held to be clearly in violation of the Establishment Clause. Regarding the
payer in schools, the Appeals Court recognized that disregarding approval or disapproval,
the Court followed the decisions of the Supreme Court as “the final arbiter of constitutional
disputes.”493 The Court of Appelas stated that based on precedent, specifically Lemon,
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Nyquist, Engel, and Everson, the prayers conducted in school were unconstitutional. The
Appeals Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the prayer case and remanded the
case to the District Court.
On June 4, 1985, on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court of the United States decided together with Smith v. Jaffree, also on appeal from the
same court, affirmed in a 6-to-3 decision.494 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the
Court. In acknowledging the District Court’s ruling, he sympathized but also admonished
the Court in looking away from the Establishment Clause jurisprudence that the Courts had
established since 1899. “This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights
does not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public
education. When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must employ both history
and reason in our analysis.”495
Stevens relied on Lemon for guidance. The central issue was the actual intent of the
law. The Lemon test required that a statute must be invalidated if its intent is established as
the advancement of religion. The District Court heard evidence of such an intent. State
Senator Donald G. Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that was enacted in 1981 as §16-1-20.1,
stated that he endorsed the bill in an “effort to return voluntary prayer to our public
schools.”496 In addressing the Court, he stated:
By passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in this state
will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and
this country. The United States as well as the State of Alabama was founded
by people who believe in God. I believe this effort to return voluntary prayer
to our public schools for its return to us to the original position of the
writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies and beliefs hundreds of
Alabamians have urged my continuous support for permitting school prayer.
Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have worked hard on this legislation
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to accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our public schools and return
to the basic moral fiber.497
Stevens commented on the past accommodation of religion by the Courts. He supported the
solutions of the Court in that they provided some palpable boundaries to the Religion
Clauses. “The solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in ‘neutrality,’
but rather in identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free
exercise of religion.”498 The intent of the statute as revealed by the key sponsor, however,
made the statute unconstitutional. In this case, the hands of the Court were tied and an
accommodation could not be reached.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the moment of silence clause was
constitutional but six of the justices held that the voluntary prayer clause unconstitutional.
Stevens stated that “Alabama has intentionally crossed the line between creating a quiet
moment during which those so inclined may pray, and affirmatively endorsing the particular
religious practice of prayer.”499 The accommodation of religion was not permitted here –
rendering Wallace one of those rare cases where the Court invalidated legislation because the
legislature was motivated solely by a religious purpose.500 “Even if the Court in the future
abandons the ‘Lemon tests’ (the formal three part tests: purpose-effect-entanglement), the
Court is unlikely to overrule its decisions finding that officially authorized prayers, or
readings from religious texts, in government grade schools and high schools violate the
establishment clause.”501
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In 1985, the same year during which Wallace v. Jaffree was decided, the Court again
applied the Lemon test to decide Aguilar v. Felton.502 The dispute began in 1978 when six
New York City residents and taxpayers, represented by Betty-Louise Felton, brought suit
against Yolanda Aguilar in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York alleging that Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965503 violated
the Establishment Clause. The taxpayers alleged their First Amendment rights were violated
and sued to enjoin any further funds from going to parochial schools.
Title I of the New York City Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965504
enabled federal funds to pay the salaries of public school teachers who also taught at
parochial schools. The teachers provided special educational services to poor children in
parochial schools. To ensure that proper subject matter was being taught, monthly
unannounced checks were undertaken. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 empowered the Secretary of Education to grant aid to local institutions that
served low-income families.
Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide
financial assistance… to local educational agencies serving areas with
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve
their educational programs by various means …which contribute particularly
to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.505
Title I was also made eligible to students attending parochial schools. “To the extent
consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the
local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such
agency shall make provisions for including special educational services and arrangements . . .
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in which such children can participate.”506 To qualify for such aid, the school had to
specifically demonstrate that the students must be educationally deprived507, the children
must reside in areas comprising a high concentration of low-income families,508 and that the
programs must be in addition to not instead of programs that exist.509
The Act provided for annual Congressional appropriations contingent on several
criteria. Title I funding was eligible only if the two criteria were met including educational
deprivation “defined as below age-level performance”510 and “residence in an area designated
by the Local Educational Agency, in accordance with Title I regulations, as having a high
concentration of children from low-income families.”511 Title I was replaced on October 1,
1982 with Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981.512 This
Act also enabled parochial schools to receive aid but required an application that specified a
description of what the funds would be used for. Title I was in use since 1966. “Of those
students eligible to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in private schools. Of
that group, 84% were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn and 8% were enrolled in Hebrew day schools.”513
The Court referred to Wheeler v. Barrera,514 another case concurrent with Aguilar that
also attacked the validity of Title 1. Wheeler held that “Title I mandated that private school
students receive services comparable to, but not identical to, the Title I services received by
public school students. Therefore, the statute would permit, but not require, that on-site
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services be provided in the parochial schools.”515 Wheeler did not speak to the
Constitutionality of the Act but did allow parochial schools to receive funds for “programs
and projects” that included: “the acquisition of equipment and, where necessary, the
construction of school facilities which are designed to meet the special educational needs of
educationally deprived children.”516
Judge Edward R. Neaher and the District Court disagreed with Felton and granted a
motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant city, ruling that Title 1 was
constitutional. Six years later, on July 9, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit heard Aguilar v. Felton.517 Circuit Judge Friendly gave the unanimous opinion
of the Court. The Court reversed on the grounds that the funding violated the
Establishment Clause. It was determined that the Establishment Clause “as it ha[d] been
interpreted by the Supreme Court… constitute[d] an insurmountable barrier to the use of
federal funds to send public school teachers and other professionals into religious schools to
carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise, or to provide clinical and guidance services of
the sort at issue here.”518 The Court followed the ruling in School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball519 and concluded that though the Court in Grand Rapids found the Shared Time program
unconstitutional, the District Court found Title I unconstitutional on the grounds that
Aguilar contained a monitoring system. This distinguishing feature obliged the Court to
conclude that Title I was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the original
decision based on their analysis and found that the intended preventative nature of the
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monthly inspections created an entanglement that was too deep. It was deemed
unconstitutional even if the aid to parochial schools was not found to advance religion.
The next year, in 1985, the Supreme Court of the United States heard Aguilar v.
Felton520 and affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling in a 5-to-4 decision. The Court deemed
that the necessary inspections created an unacceptable excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court
determined that an excessive entanglement occurred. “Even where state aid to parochial
institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid
may nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of
church and state in the administration of that aid.”521 The Court applied the Lemon test to
determine whether the regulation passed constitutional muster and was deemed
unconstitutional based on the determination that it produced an excessive entanglement. “In
short, the scope and duration of New York City's Title I program would require a permanent
and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.”522Like Lemon v.
Kurtzman,523 the unannounced checks were deemed to be an excessive entanglement unlike
other cases that did pass muster including Tilton v Richardson524 and Hunt v. McNair.525 The
Court concluded that “despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York,
the program remains constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution
receiving the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate.”526
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Two years later, Edwards v. Aguillard527determined the constitutionality of a Louisiana
Act528 that required that the teaching of evolution be accompanied by the teaching of
creationism. The conflict originated on January 10, 1985, when the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana decided the constitutionality of the statute in
Aguillard v. Treen.529 Don Aguillard, a resident and taxpayer of Louisiana, representing
numerous Louisiana taxpayers, educators, and parents of school-aged children, sued David
C. Treen, Governor of Louisiana, to enjoin the “Balanced Treatment” portion of the Act.
The District Court determined that the statute was unconstitutional.
In 1981, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Louisiana’s “General School Law”
entitled “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School
Instruction.”530 The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in
Public School Instruction was an amendment to Part III of Chapter I of Title 17 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950. The amendment included seven new parts including
§§286.1 through 286.7. The amendment was intended to provide a more balanced treatment
of creation-science and evolution-science in public schools. The purpose, as established in
§286.2 was to “protect academic freedom”531 but in reality, the Act specified that “when
creation or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as proven
scientific fact.”532
The plaintiffs allege that the amendment violated the Establishment Clause. District
Judge Adrian G. Duplantier gave the opinion of the Court after first deliberating on the
utilization of the three pronged Lemon test. He quoted from the 1984 Lynch v. Donnelly case
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to demonstrate that the Court has not necessarily in the past adhered to the Lemon test nor
appreciated being confined to the application of only one constitutional caliper. “We have
repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area.”533 He went on to encapsulate the historical trends of the Supreme Court
rulings. “The First Amendment does not prohibit governmental activity of a religious nature
so long as the activity is neutral to all religions. One conclusion seems clear - the meaning of
the First Amendment is not set in constitutional stone. The Constitution guarantees freedom
of religion, but should not be construed to guarantee freedom from religion."534
The Court was hesitant to outright apply the Lemon test. The Court did agree,
however, that whichever “test” was applied, the outcome of its application would be the
same - the Louisiana statute violated the Establishment Clause. Duplantier stated that
“because it promote[d] the beliefs of some theistic sects to the detriment of others, the
statute violate[d] the fundamental First Amendment principle that a state must be neutral in
its treatment of religions. The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and EvolutionScience in Public School Instruction Act is a ‘law respecting an establishment of religion.’”535
Unsatisfied with the ruling, the plaintiffs appealed with the new governor, Edwin W.
Edwards, as the named defendant. On July 8, 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit heard Aguilard v. Edwards.536 E. Grady Jolly, the Circuit Judge gave the
opinion of the Court. Grady agreed with the District Court’s ruling and affirmed its decision.
The Court found that the statute’s purpose of guarding academic freedom was completely
inconsistent with the requirement of teaching creation science in tandem with evolution.
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Circuit Judge E. Grady Jolly began the opinion of the Court by expressing the
relative ease in distinguishing the facts of the case. “In truth, notwithstanding the supposed
complexities of religion-versus-state issues and the lively debates they generate, this
particular case is a simple one, subject to a simple disposal: the Act violates the
establishment clause of the first amendment because the purpose of the statute is to
promote a religious belief.”537 Grady acknowledged the sensitive nature of this case:
We cannot divorce ourselves from the historical fact that the controversy
between the proponents of evolution and creationism has religious
overtones. We do not, indeed cannot, say that the theory of creation is to all
people solely and exclusively a religious tenet. We also do not deny that the
underpinnings of creationism may be supported by scientific evidence. It is
equally true, however, that the theory of creation is a theory embraced by
many religions. Nor can we ignore the fact that through the years religious
fundamentalists have publicly scorned the theory of evolution and worked to
discredit it.538
The Court determined that the use of the Supreme Court precedent to determine the
constitutionality of the Act was reasonable. In invoking the Lemon test, Grady deduced, as
had the District Court, that the secular purpose of the Act was nonexistent.
Not only does the Act fail to promote academic freedom, it fails to promote
creation science as a genuine academic interest. If primarily concerned with
the advancement of creation-science, the Act, it certainly appears to us,
would have required its teaching irrespective of whether evolution was
taught. Thus a primary academic interest in creation-science would seem to
be gainsaid because the Act requires the teaching of the creation theory only
if the theory of evolution is taught.539
The Court determined that the Act violated the Establishment Clause in that its intended
effect was to “discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the
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teaching of creationism….The statute therefore is a law respecting a particular religious
belief.”540
On June 19, 1987 Supreme Court of the United States ruled on Edwards v.
Aguillard.541 In an 8-to-1 decision the Supreme Court invalidated the Act and determined that
it was unconstitutional for the third time on the grounds that its intention was to serve and
aid religion. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the Court, deemed that Louisiana’s
“Creationism Act” violated the Establishment Clause on several grounds. The Act was
deemed to promote a religious belief and also did not fulfill its stated goal of promoting
academic freedom. A clear secular purpose was never determined. It was clear that Senator
Bill Keith as the legislative sponsor intended to actually narrow the science curriculum. “The
state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious views should
be included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution
incidentally coincided with what he characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his
own.”542 Justice Brennan affirmed that “the goal of providing a more comprehensive science
curriculum is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the
teaching of creation science.”543
The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not err in granting
summary judgment. Brennan remarked on how essential the Supreme Court has held the
intended meaning of the Establishment Clause when dealing with the education of
elementary and secondary school children.
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not
purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the
540
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private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.544
The assurance of this maintenance was placed in the hands of the states and in upholding
this awesome responsibility, the Court found the Act unconstitutional. It was reaffirmed that
the “public schools, in other words, may not proselytize, but they may teach about religion
when it is appropriate to do so for secular reasons. For example, one cannot understand the
history of the middle ages without knowing something about the teachings of the Catholic
Church, just as one cannot understand ancient Greek history without knowing something
about the ancient Greek gods.”545 The Lemon-test provided the framework and the growing
stare decisis to definitely determine the Act unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has consistently verified that tax exemptions for religious
organizations are constitutional. They have been deemed appropriate or several reasons
including the fact that they were granted under the auspices of general exemptions to an
umbrella group of non-profit groups. On February 21, 1989, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock546
decided the constitutionality of a Texas state sales tax exemption enacted for specific
religious publications. Texas Monthly Incorporated, a nonreligious publisher, sued Bob
Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of State of Texas claiming that tax exemptions
created specifically for religious publications violated the First Amendment.
In 1982, the Texas Tax Code provided an exemption specifically geared towards
religious publications. That section provided:
Periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that
consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books
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that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religion or religious faith are
exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter.547
The state denied any similar tax exemption to other publications. Three years later, in 1984,
the exemption was repealed, and then reinstated on October 1, 1987.548 Throughout 1984
and 1987, periodicals published by religious groups continued to be exempted. Because
Texas Monthly was a general interest magazine, it had to pay sales taxes based on
subscription sales during the three year period in what amounted to $149,107.74. The
District Court of Travis County, Texas agreed with Texas Monthly and found the exemption
unconstitutional based on what the Court deemed to be content based exclusion and
ordered the taxes of Texas Monthly to be returned. “Such an exemption constitutes an
unlawful discrimination based on the content of a publication and thus violates Plaintiff's
rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”549
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Third Supreme Judicial District of Texas did not
agree and reversed in a 2-to-1 vote.550 Justice Shannon delivered the opinion of the Court.
Following the Lemon test, the Court determined that the exemption served the secular
purpose of preserving appropriate separation between church and state. In addition, the
exemption was not determined to advance or inhibit religion, and did not produce
impermissible government entanglement with religion.
The Supreme Court of the United States found issue with the appellate judgment
and reversed and remanded the decision. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court found that
the exemption violated Establishment Clause. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the
Court, determined that a sales tax exemption granted solely to religious literature violated the
547
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Establishment Clause. The secular objective of the exemption was never determined. The
Supreme Court had previously sanctioned exemptions to a wide array of groups. It was
determined that any incidental benefit that affected religious groups was allowed and did not
invalidate the intended secular purpose. “The nonsectarian aims of government and the
interests of religious groups often overlap, and this Court has never required that public
authorities refrain from implementing reasonable measures to advance legitimate secular
goals merely because they would thereby relieve religious groups of costs they would
otherwise incur.”551 The Court gave examples such as Widmar v. Vincent552 in which the Court
sanctioned the use of university facilities by all groups, including religious groups. The Court
also referred to Walz v. Tax Commission of New York

553

that affirmed a property tax

exemption for religious properties. “In all of these cases, however, we emphasized that the
benefits derived by religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups
as well. Indeed, were those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not have
appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion; if that were so, we would not have
hesitated to strike them down for lacking a secular purpose and effect.”554 The issue in Texas
Monthly was that the exemption benefited only a small group – in this case, a sectarian group.
The exemption was not conferred on a multitude of parties and in effect created an
environment where the taxpayers endorsed a religious aim. “Every tax exemption constitutes
a subsidy that affect[ed] nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become ‘indirect and
vicarious donors.’”555 The exemption in effect advanced religion and also created an
entanglement. “It is difficult to view Texas’ narrow exemption as anything but state
550
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sponsorship of religious belief, regardless of whether one adopts the perspective of
beneficiaries or of uncompensated contributors.”556 The exemption was not determined to
be necessary as per the Free Exercise Clause and it was also determined that paying a sales
tax did not have the effect of impeding religion. Brennan stated that “in this case, the State
has adduced no evidence that the payment of a sales tax by subscribers to religious
periodicals or purchasers of religious books would offend their religious beliefs or inhibit
religious activity.”557
The Court reaffirmed that tax exemptions for religious organizations were
constitutional, as deduced in Walz, but prohibited an exemption that was only applicable to
such religious groups. The exemption clearly lacked a secular objective since it only applied
to religious groups. Additionally, the Court deduced that the application of a tax to these
secular groups for publication did not violate either of the clauses.
In the footsteps of Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, Jimmy Swaggart Ministeries v. Board of
Equalization558 determined the constitutionality of California’s Sales and Use Tax on a
religious organization’s publications. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries claimed that the California’s
Sales and Use Tax was unconstitutional both on Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
grounds.
The California Sales and Use Tax Law imposed a six percent tax for all in-state sales
on personal property as well as six percent for all such property purchased outside the state.
It “require[d] retailers to pay a sales tax ‘[for] the privilege of selling tangible personal
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property at retail.’”559 Significantly, the constitution of California did not require religious
organizations to be exempt from the Sales and Use Tax.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious organization incorporated in 1982 as a
Louisiana nonprofit corporation based on its church services administered since 1980 in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The incorporated Ministries’s constitution declared:
That Jimmy Swaggart Ministries is called for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining an evangelistic outreach for the worship of Almighty God…to
assume a proper share of responsibility and privilege of propagating the
gospel of Jesus Christ. This outreach shall…specifically include evangelistic
crusades; missionary endeavors; education…; radio broadcasting…;
television broadcasting; and audio production and reproduction of music;
audio production and reproduction of preaching; audio production and
reproduction of teaching; writing, printing and publishing; and, any and all
other individual or mass media methods that presently exist or may be
devised in the future to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ.560
In 1980, the California Board of Equalization notified Jimmy Swaggart that it needed to
register as a seller to ensure that its profits and subsequent taxes could be calculated. In
California, Jimmy Swaggart had to pay taxes for its religious materials because an exemption
for religious materials did not exist. Jimmy Swaggart did not respond to the request holding
that according to the U.S. Constitution, they were exempt. An audit ensued and concluded
that between April 1, 1974 and December 31, 1981 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries sold tangible
personal property in California in the amount of $1,702,942.00 for mail order sales from and
$240,560.00 for crusade merchandise.561 “These figures represented the sales and use in
California of merchandise with specific religious content -- Bibles, Bible study manuals,
printed sermons and collections of sermons, audiocassette tapes of sermons, religious books
and pamphlets, and religious music in the form of song-books, tapes, and records.”562 The
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sales and use taxes owed amounted to $118,294.54, plus interest of $36,021.11, and a penalty
of $11,829.45, for a total amount due of $166,145.10.563
Jimmy Swaggart paid the amount and filed a petition of redetermination. The
petition failed, the refund was rejected, and Jimmy Swaggart brought suit in State Court. The
State Court found the application of the tax constitutional. In an opinion by Justice P.J.
Kremer on August 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals of California Fourth Appellate District
affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County.564 Two years later on
January 17, 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision and denied a
discretionary review and held the tax constitutional.565
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor explained that the Court found
the tax constitutional based on the fact that the tax was applied to all and equally burdened
all. The tax was not found to specifically burden only Jimmy Swaggart’s religious activity.
“The sales and use tax [was] not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information,
ideas, or beliefs per se; rather, it [was] a tax on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible
personal property and on the storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal
property in California.”566 O’Connor provided a compelling example that “California treats
the sale of a Bible by a religious organization just as it would treat the sale of a Bible by a
bookstore; as long as both are in-state retail sales of tangible personal property, they are both
subject to the tax regardless of the motivation for the sale or the purchase.”567 The Sales and
Use tax was determined to be nondiscriminatory in nature. The claim that the tax burdened
Jimmy Swaggart because it produced a reduction in income was not enough to prove a
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constitutional violation. In addition, the taxation was not deemed to constitute an excessive
entanglement. “Collection and payment of the tax will of course require some contact
between appellant and the State, but we have held that generally applicable administrative
and recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious organization without running
afoul of the Establishment Clause.”568 As in the previous Texas Monthly v. Bullock, neither the
Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clauses were violated.
Texas Monthly v. Bullock and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization enabled
the government to tax religious organizations and not necessarily exclude them based solely
on the religious nature of their organization. The next two cases however, reverse the recent
trends and accommodate religious groups. The Alger v. City of Chicago569 ruling was
detrimental to historic preservationists in that the case decided that a statute allowing
religious properties to resist designation was valid. The 1990 Alger v. City of Chicago570 case
was disheartening for preservationists. In light of the growing population of aging historic
religious properties, preservationists find that the preservation of religious properties
imperative. In an opinion by U.S. District Judge Marvin E. Aspen, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that a Chicago ordinance, Municipal Code
§21-69.1(1987), that enabled religious properties to rebuff Landmark status was
constitutional.
On September 20, 1990, Rebecca A. Alger, representing the Landmarks Preservation
Council of Illinois, and The National Trust for Historic Preservation filed suit to
permanently enjoin the Chicago ordinance. Alger’s objective was to ensure the designation
of Saint Mary of the Angels Church. The plaintiffs claimed that the application of §21-69.1
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was unconstitutional, arguing that it violated the Establishment and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions, and that it unlawfully delegated legislative
power to religious organizations in violation of the Illinois Constitution. The court sided
with Chicago and granted its motion to dismiss.
The case involved a challenge to Chicago’s
landmark

ordinance.

The

ordinance

precluded the designation of religious
buildings as landmarks without the consent
of the building’s owner. “This ordinance,
Municipal Code §§21-62 through 21-95,
sets forth procedures for designating an
Figure 18
Saint Mary of the Angels Church
in Chicago.

‘area, district, place, building, structure,
work of art, or other object’ as a ‘Chicago
landmark.’”571 The designation precluded any

alteration without approval by the Landmark Commission. The designation process was
initiated by a decision from the Landmark Commission based on seven statutory criteria.
After notification, and owner consent, the Commission makes its final decision. The
ordinance had a specific section that dealt with religious properties. The section provided
that in the event that the owner of a religious property did not consent, special rules applied.
“If the property is ‘owned by a religious organization and is used primarily as a place for the
conduct of religious ceremonies,’ the owner’s refusal to consent precludes designation. This
effectively ends the designation proceedings.”572 If §21-69.1 was applied, the hands of
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Historic Preservation were effectively tied. If however §21-69.1 was not applicable, the
Commission could hold public hearings and designate the property anyway.
On November 1, 1989, hearings began to designate Saint Mary’s Church as a
Chicago landmark. Designation was warranted due to the Church’s:
impressive architectural style emphasized by its monumental scale, its
distinctive and firmly established role as a visual and physical centerpiece of
the community, and its value as an example of Chicago's historical and
architectural heritage in its imitation of the grand religious cathedrals of
Europe.573
The Church was inspired by Francis Gordon and designed by Worthmann & Steinbach. It
epitomized the Polish Renaissance style.574 Two days later, the Commission sent a letter to
Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Chicago and the owner of
Saint Mary’s. Cardinal Bernadin declined the designation, which effectively halted the
designation due to the fact that §21-69.1 was applicable.
The Court dismissed the compliant for lack of standing. The plaintiffs were not able
to demonstrate an actual injury. Instead, “they assert that the requirement is met by the
threat to their use, enjoyment, and aesthetic appreciation of St. Mary's that is created by the
existence and enforcement of §21-69.1.”575 The Court found this to be insufficient. “Yet, the
plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which suggest that this is even a vague likelihood. They
do not allege that church officials are presently considering, or have ever considered, the
possibility of altering St. Mary's. They merely allege that as a result of § 21-69.1 there is
nothing to prevent church officials from doing so.”576

573

Ibid.
Found at http://archives.archchicago.org/museum1b.htm.
575 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
574

169

On December 19, 1990, the plaintiffs amended their case and brought suit again.
United States District Judge Marvin E. Aspen again provided the opinion of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.577 Again, the plaintiffs claim was
dismissed. The plaintiffs provided additional evidence that they felt would be able to prove
what the City of Los Angeles v. Lyons578 called “the threat of direct injury must be ‘both real and
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” The amended complaint intended to prove that
the demolition of Stint Mar’s was more than just a possibility. Saint Mary’s Church had
structural problems that placed the members of the parish in danger and thus closed the
Church down in January of 1988.
In light of problem-solving, two yeas later, “the Archdiocese was offered over $1
million in donations from parishioners, neighbors, and other ‘restoration supporters’ to
complete the needed repairs, which it refused to accept stating that it was $150,000 less than
the necessary amount. Soon thereafter, it was offered a $150,000 guarantee to make up the
difference, which it also refused.”579 Based on this refusal as well as the historic demolition
record, the plaintiffs allege that the Church was in great harm. “The Archdiocese has
demolished approximately one third (seventeen of forty-two) of the churches that it has
closed since the early 1950's.”580
The Court found that the new evidence provided no “more than mere speculation
and conjecture that St. Mary's will be altered or demolished.”581 The Court felt that this did
not remedy the problems in the original complaint. The reliance on the historical demolition
trends was dismissed as a statistic. Aspen stated that even if the statistic was applied, it would
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be construed to the benefit of the preservationists. “According to the complaint, a
significant majority (almost two-thirds) of churches that have been closed have not been
demolished. Therefore, under the plaintiff's rationale, it seems most likely that St. Mary's will
remain intact and the plaintiffs' interests, therefore, are not in any ‘real and immediate’
danger.”582
Aspen believed that the alternative of ruling based on the possibility the Church
would be harmed was worse than removing the Church’s ability to act on its own behalf.
Aspen explained that “while we recognize the merits of this argument, the alternative, to
base standing on simple guesses and weak hypotheses about an action the Archdiocese
might someday take, is far less attractive. Standing in federal court to litigate the
constitutionality of legislative action is not a matter of tea leaves and crystal balls.”583 The
Court denied the complaint without prejudice which meant that the plaintiffs could take
action if at sometime later the Church was indeed in actual harm’s way. Incidentally, the
Church was not demolished, but instead due to revitalization efforts, updated and preserved.
The Church was located in the Wicker Park and Bucktown area of Chicago, which at the
time of the case was a blue-collar area. Subsequent to the case, the area has changed due to
the revitalization efforts and is currently described as “overrun by under-30 artists, yuppies
and grunge types.”584 For now, it seems that the Church is safe from the wrecking ball. But
this case exemplifies the difficult time Courts have when walking the tightrope between the
clauses and contributes to inconsistent results.
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The 1997 Agostini v. Felton585 case was part of a trend during the late 1980’s and
1990’s in which the Court applied the Lemon test in slightly different ways when reviewing
aid to students at religiously affiliated schools. This trend was unlike that of the 1970’s and
early 1980’s in which “very few government programs that provided aid to religious schools
or religious school students survived the three part test.”586 Agostini changed long standing
precedent by overruling the ruling in Aguilar v. Felton.587 Agostini modified the Lemon test from
its established tree prongs to what was called the Lemon test redux which ensured that the
focus when determining whether a law violated the Establishment Clause was on the
purpose and the effect of a law. The three prongs of purpose, effect, and entanglement,
effectively used between 1970 and 1997, were not, however, discarded. The Court also
specified that the determination of whether a government action had the primary effect of
establishing religion included an evaluation of government indoctrination, defining the
recipients based on religious affiliation, and excessive entanglement between government
and religion.
In the 5-to-4 decision, Agostini v. Felton,588 decided on June 23, 1997, overturned the
1985 ruling in Aguilar v. Felton589 that held federal funds distributed for the purposes of
paying the salaries of public school teachers working in parochial schools was
unconstitutional. The petitioners, the parties bound by that injunction, brought suit seeking
relief from the injunction twelve years after the ruling. “Petitioners maintain that Aguilar
cannot be squared with our intervening Establishment Clause jurisprudence and ask that we
explicitly recognize what our more recent cases already dictate: Aguilar is no longer good
585
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law.”590 Writing the opinion for the majority of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
representing Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, revisited the case on several
grounds including the fact that since the ruling, certain cases have changed the interpretation
of the Establishment Clause.
Rachel Agostini, representing several parents of parochial school students, brought
suit against Betty-Louise Felton seeking relief from the permanent injunction entered
subsequent to Aguilar. Agostini challenged the ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). Rule 60(b)(5) states: “on motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment [or] order . . . [when] it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application.”591

Agostini felt that the previous

judgment was no longer equitable in light of three changes that have effectively altered the
factual and legal landscape.
First, Agostini claimed that that the costs associated with complying with the District
Court’s injunction were overly burdensome. Second, the plaintiff claimed that significant
legal developments since Aguilar required that the decision be reconsidered in light of some
recent opinions rendered by Justices. Finally, since Aguilar, Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Services for Blind592and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District593 have interpreted the
Constitution differently and subsequently work to undermine Aguilar.
In response to the ruling in Aguilar, Title I was modified to ensure that its goals were
being met constitutionally. This change was accomplished by “revert[ing] to its prior practice
of providing instruction at public school sites, at leased sites, and in mobile instructional
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units (essentially vans converted into classrooms) parked near the sectarian school.”594 The
program incurred great costs as a result of implementing these alternative delivery systems to
ensure compliance with the requirements. “Since the 1986-1987 school year, the Board has
spent over $100 million providing computer-aided instruction, leasing sites and mobile
instructional units, and transporting students to those sites.”595 This expenditure greatly
encumbered the program and in effect reduced the program’s outreach to 20,000
economically disadvantaged children in New York City by 35 percent.
The Court reasoned that the alleged burden incurred by the necessary compliance to
the decision in Aguilar was an anticipated burden and was not sufficient to mandate a
reversal under Rule 60(b)(5). Also under Rule 60(b)(5), the opinions of the Justices in the
previous 1994 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet
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case was also

deemed insufficient to mandate a reversal. O’Connor dismissed the first two contentions for
a lack of significant change in factual conditions as well as the fact that the additional costs
to adjust the programs were known. “That these predictions of additional costs turned out
to be accurate does not constitute a change in factual conditions warranting relief under Rule
60(b)(5).”597 She additionally dismissed the claim that a majority of Justice’s assertions that
Aguilar be revisited warranted review. “We also agree with respondents that the statements
made by five Justices in Kiryas Joel do not, in themselves, furnish a basis for concluding that
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has changed.”598
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O’Connor focused on the cases subsequent to Aguilar that changed the Court’s
interpretation and eroded the logic of Aguilar to the point “it is no longer good law.”599 This
decision was based on previous Supreme Court rulings such as Witters600 which departed
from the assumption that all government aid that assisted the education aspect of religious
schools was invalid. The Court declared that a state grant to a blind man to attend a
Christian college with the goal of becoming a pastor was constitutional. The other significant
ruling was Zobrest601 which rejected the presumption that the presence of public school
teachers in parochial schools implied state-sponsored indoctrination. Zobrest declared that the
Catalina Foothills School District’s decision that enabled a deaf parochial student to attend
classes with his interpreter was constitutional. O’Conner applied the rulings in these cases to
Agostini and concluded that the rulings in Aguilar would be construed differently. The Court
determined that the New York City program that paid public school teachers to provide
remedial education in parochial schools was indeed constitutional. O’Connor stated that
“Zobrest and Witters make clear that, under current law, the Shared Time program in Ball and
New York City's Title I program in Aguilar will not, as a matter of law, be deemed to have
the effect of advancing religion through indoctrination. Indeed, each of the premises upon
which we relied in Ball to reach a contrary conclusion is no longer valid.”602
Given the precedent set by these cases and the reinterpretation of the facts of
Aguilar, the Court found that Aguilar was not in violation of the Lemon test’s excessive
entanglement prong. This conclusion was reached on the grounds that if it was assumed
constitutional for a deaf man, as in Zobrest, to participate in school activities via an interpreter
and presumably not to participate in religious indoctrination, then the logic could also be
599
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applied to a teacher under Title I and likewise does not partake in indoctrination. O’Conner
concluded that “both our precedent and our experience require us to reject respondents’
remarkable argument that we must presume Title I instructors to be ‘uncontrollable and
sometimes very unprofessional.’”603 The court reaffirmed Title I’s constitutionality:
New York City's Title I program does not run afoul of any of three primary
criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of
advancing religion: it does not result in governmental indoctrination; define
its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement.
We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental,
remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not
invalid under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the
premises of sectarian schools by government employees pursuant to a
program containing safeguards such as those present here. The same
considerations that justify this holding require us to conclude that this
carefully constrained program also cannot reasonably be viewed as an
endorsement of religion.604
O’Connor explained that the general principles such as the purpose as well as effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion used to evaluate Establishment cases have not changed.
O’Conner relied on the components of the Lemon test to resolve this Establishment Clause
issue. “Agostini not only affirmed the continued vitality of the Lemon test, it confirmed once
again that the often maligned standard could be used to produce an accommodationist
conclusion.”605 O’Connor concluded that “what has changed since we decided Ball and
Aguilar is our understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect.”606
Interestingly, the reversal of the Aguilar was not upheld by either stare decisis or
“law of the case” doctrine that states that a Court should refrain from opening issues that
have already been decided.
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The doctrine does not apply if the court is ‘convinced that [its prior decision]
is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ In light of our
conclusion that Aguilar would be decided differently under our current
Establishment Clause law, we think adherence to that decision would
undoubtedly work a ‘manifest injustice, such that the law of the case doctrine
does not apply.607
The “significant change” coupled with the “change in law” as described by O’Conner
entitled the petitioners relief under Rule 60(b)(5). O’Conner addressed the statements
regarding upholding stare decisis. She stated that “we do no violence to the doctrine of stare
decisis when we recognize bona fide changes in our decisional law. And in those circumstances,
we do no violence to the legitimacy we derive from reliance on that doctrine.”608
The Court that steadily applied the three-pronged Lemon test for over two decades
applied a modified version to evaluate aid to schools by applying the secular purpose and
primary effect prongs while dismissing the third. The Lemon Test, however, remained intact.
In general, it seems that religious schools that teach at higher levels of education have
successfully traversed the Establishment Clause, while religious schools that teach younger
pupils have failed. “Financial aid to church-related colleges has fared better in the face of
establishment challenges than has aid to elementary and secondary schools. The same threepart test used in the pre-college cases – ‘purpose,’ primary effect,’ and ‘excessive
entanglements’ – has been more easily satisfied in the higher education cases.”609 While
Agostini took the first step to open the door for religiously affiliated schools to gain access to
federal funding, the door was completely blown off three years later in Mitchell v. Helms.
On June 28, 2000, the Court adopted a new interpretation that allowed private
schools, even though religiously affiliated, to receive aid. In a highly contentious 6-to-3 vote,
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Mitchell v. Helms610 allowed local school districts to be eligible for federal funds for education
related equipment intended for distribution to both public and private schools, even those
religious private schools. The Court continued to apply its new interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as established in Agostini and continued to overturn previous rulings.
In finding that Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 was
constitutional, the Court overturned Meek v. Pittenger611 and Wolman v. Walter.612
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana originally
agreed with Helms and held that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion
because the equipment loans were construed a direct aid granted to a pervasively sectarian
institutions and thus unconstitutional. The District Court originally held that the aid violated
the second prong of the Lemon test in that the aid was given directly to pervasively sectarian
schools. The residing judge, however, retired and after the new judge heard Helms v. Cody613
on June 10, 1994, he reversed and held the aid constitutional. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and held Chapter 2 unconstitutional on August 17, 1998 in Helms v.
Picard.614 The United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed the ruling of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Mary Helms, representing a group of Louisiana public school parents, brought suit
claiming that Chapter 2 violated the Establishment Clause on the grounds that the federal
funds were distributed to state agencies which in turn distributed the funds for educational
materials and equipment to public and private religious institutions. The Jefferson Parish
entity that was empowered to the handle the funds doled out 30 percent to private Catholic
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institutions. “For the 1985-1986 fiscal year, 41 private schools participated in Chapter 2. For
the following year, 46 participated….Of these 46, 34 were Roman Catholic; 7 were otherwise
religiously affiliated; and 5 were not religiously affiliated.”615
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),616 created Chapter 2
of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981.617 Chapter 2 was established
to distribute federal funds via state educational agencies (SEA’s) to local educational agencies
(LEA’s). The LEA’s would in turn loan educational materials to local schools. “Among other
things, Chapter 2 provides aid ‘for the acquisition and use of instructional and educational
materials, including library services and materials (including media materials), assessments,
reference materials, computer software and hardware for instructional use, and other
curricular materials.’”618 The establishment of SEA’s and their counterpart LEA’s followed in
the footsteps of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in Aguilar. Though
initially invalidated, the program was reinterpreted as constitutional in Agostini. Chapter 2
did, however, establish some restrictions for private schools. “Most significantly, the
‘services, materials, and equipment’ provided to private schools must be ‘secular, neutral, and
nonideological.’”619 The materials supplied included “library books, computers, and
computer software, and also slide and movie projectors, overhead projectors, television sets,
tape recorders, VCR's, projection screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips,
slides, and cassette recordings.”620
Justice Thomas, representing four of the Justices, delivered the opinion of the Court
while the concurring opinion written by Justices O’Connor and Breyer agreed that the effect
615
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of the law should be determined based on whether government indoctrination could be
established, whether the grant recipients were religiously affiliated, and if it could be
determined that an excessive entanglement was created. The four person plurality comprised
a very broad approach to the Establishment Clause. Thomas candidly admitted that the
rulings handed down by the various Courts were incredibly confusing. “The case’s tortuous
history over the next 15 years indicates well the degree to which our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while nevertheless retaining anomalies with which
the lower courts have had to struggle.”621 The shift he referred to was the slightly different
interpretations that culminated in the Agostini decision. Thomas continued the logic affirmed
in Agostini and upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 2:
Considering Chapter 2 in light of our more recent case law, we conclude that
it neither results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its
recipients by reference to religion. We therefore hold that Chapter 2 is not a
‘law respecting an establishment of religion.’ In so holding, we acknowledge
what both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits saw was inescapable -- Meek and
Wolman are anomalies in our case law. We therefore conclude that they are
no longer good law.622
Thomas relied on the principle of neutrality to establish whether indoctrination had
occurred. “If the religious, irreligious, and a religious are all alike eligible for governmental
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has
been done at the behest of the government.”623 The concept that parents of school age
children made private choices ensured the principle of neutrality. “The private choices
helped to ensure neutrality, and neutrality and private choices together eliminated any
possible attribution to the government even when the interpreter translated classes on
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Catholic doctrine.”624 The voucher program, held in check, by neutrality was determined to
be constitutional. This concept is the key to current programs that allow federal grants to
religiously affiliated organizations including President Bush’s faith-based initiatives and Save
America’s Treasures. As the concept of aid changed over time, from Everson’s
interpretation that focused on the benefit incurred by the parent not the institution, the
concept of aid changed from one focused on the type of aid to one hat focused on the
recipient of the aid. The neutrality principle has opened doors for the preservation of
historic religious sites with active congregations.
Mitchell v. Helms625 continued in the footsteps of Agostini626 and further leveled the
playing field against the no-direct-aid sentiment. Two years later, the Court built on the
recent precedents and concluded that the school vouchers at issue in the February 20, 2002
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris627case were constitutional. The adjusted focus from the nature of
the recipient to the regulation criteria further opened the door for religious organizations to
gain access to grants.
In 1995, Ohio created a voucher system that was intended to cure some of the innercity woes that the faltering Cleveland schools were experiencing. Delivering the opinion of
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas explained the 5-to-4 decision that declared the voucher program
constitutional. The religion-neutral vouchers were given to parents of school aged children
in participating schools and were used in part to pay for parochial school tuition. Susan Tave
Zelman, representing a group of Ohio taxpayers brought suit against Doris Simmons-Harris
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to enjoin the scholarship vouchers. On appeal from the Court of Appeals from the Sixth
Circuit,628 the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate decision and held that the scholarship
vouchers did not violate the Establishment Clause.
In the 1990’s, the Cleveland, Ohio school system was languishing. In 1995,
Cleveland was described as having a “crisis of magnitude”629 and in 1996 as having a “crisis
that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education.”630 The Pilot Project
Scholarship Program was enacted to bolster the school system. “The program provides
financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been under federal
court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district by the state
superintendent.” 631 The program provided two kinds of assistance including tuition aid to be
applied towards tuition at participating public or private schools and tutorial aid to be
applied for those that chose to stay in the public school system. “The tuition aid portion of
the program is designed to provide educational choices to parents who reside in a covered
district. Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious, may participate in the
program and accept program students so long as the school is located within the boundaries
of a covered district and meets statewide educational standards.”
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Public schools were

eligible for $2,250 tuition grant for each student in addition to the full amount of per-pupil
state funding and “families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority
and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250.”
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the expenditure up to $360 while students from moderate-income families received 75% of
the expenditure.634
The 1999-2000 school year included 56 participating private schools of which 46
were religiously affiliated. Approximately 96 percent of the 3,700 students participating in
the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Overlooking these
statistics, Justice Rehnquist explained that the issue was the assessment of whether the
program had the ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion. Though the Court did not
question the secular intent of the program, the Court made a distinction between
government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and programs of true
private choice. Programs of true private programs were characterized as programs in which
government aid could be traced to religious schools via private choices. Justice Rehnquist
stated that “while our jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of direct aid
programs has ‘changed significantly’ over the past two decades, our jurisprudence with
respect to true private choice programs has remained consistent and unbroken. Three times
we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that
provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious
schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such
challenges.”635 Rehnquist referred to Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest in which the advancement of
a religious mission was found to be incidental because the program was accessible by many
recipients and ensured that parents were able to make deliberate choices. Rehnquist stated
that:
As was true in those cases, the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward
religion. It is part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State of
Ohio to provide educational opportunities to the children of a failed school
634
635

Ibid. § 3313.978(B).
Ibid.

183

district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of
individuals defined without reference to religion, i.e., any parent of a schoolage child who resides in the Cleveland City School District. The program
permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or
nonreligious. Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a
financial incentive to do so. Program benefits are available to participating
families on neutral terms, with no reference to religion. The only preference
stated anywhere in the program is a preference for low-income families, who
receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission at participating
schools.636
The Court determined that when choices were available and parents acted on their ability to
privately choose, the Establishment Clause was not implicated. This choice enabled “the
circuit between government and religion”637 to be broken and thus the Establishment Clause
was not implicated. In a concurring opinion, Justices O’Conner and Thomas emphasized
that the decision in Zelman should not be construed to depart from prior Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. “Courts are instructed to consider two factors: first, whether the
program administers aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious
status of beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether
beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious
organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. If the
answer to either query is ‘no,’ the program should be struck down under the Establishment
Clause.”638 The Supreme Court concluded that the vouchers had neither the primary purpose
nor primary effect of advancing religion while simultaneously upholding the validity of the
Lemon test.
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VIII.

C o n c l u s i o n

The concurrent development of the Religion Clauses has created an interesting
tension between the prohibition against the establishment of religion on one hand and the
interference with its free exercise on the other. The principal guiding force that has emerged
from the Supreme Court jurisprudence to negotiate both Clauses is the principle of
governmental neutrality. This neutrality, however, is precarious. There are always situations
in which laws traverse boundaries and incidentally encroach on these rights. “Unfortunately,
situations arise where government may have no choice but to incidentally help or hinder
religious groups or practices. For example, Congress should not pay the salaries of ministers,
priests, and rabbis, but if the military ships its soldiers to places with no easy access to
churches, synagogues, or mosques, it may hire military chaplains who minister to the
soldiers, so that the government will not interfere with their free exercise of religion.”639
These situations arise when the Courts make distinctions between competing interests. The
delineation of the boundaries between the two Clauses is becoming more precise and
influences a significant aspect of historic preservation, a field which some interpret as
involving objectives that conflict with those of religious organizations.
Religious institutions are a significant part of this country’s foundation and have
historically played an important role in the establishment of communities, cities and states.
Many colonial communities gave churches prominent locations in the main square along
with other government buildings and almost instantaneously became the area’s hub
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representative of the community’s historical, social and cultural significance. A few states
even had established religions. Their spires in and of themselves became landmarks that
were easily recognizable from great distances. Historic Preservation’s noble goal of
preserving these religious structures in order to maintain their significance for future
generations is significant and yet has been met with various obstacles. These obstacles
include preservation ordinances that on one hand, provide the needed structure to ensure
compliance with preservation goals and on the other, represent an infringement on the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
The conflicts that arise between the Religion Clauses and their subsequent
interpretation by the Supreme Court dictates the place of preservation on the list of
competing interests. Recently, the mantra that the government cannot fund that which it
cannot not regulate has been dispelled as applied to the preservation of religious structures.
On April 30, 2002, the OLC amended its position and released its official opinion regarding
the status of the restoration of historic religious properties. The modified policy allowed for
federally funded preservation of religious properties. Religious historic sites with active
congregations have consequently gained access to federal funding for preservation projects.
The historic preservation of religious sites is a consummate legal balancing act. The
successful implementation of preservation ordinances intended to preserve historic religious
properties requires the analysis of the Religion Clause jurisprudence even if only a handful of
cases deal directly with preservation. The historical trends and the nuances on which cases
either distinguish previous precedent or create new precedent are imperative for
preservationists to appreciate. Though Save America’s Treasures is currently considered
constitutional, future Supreme Court interpretations are difficult to predict and
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preservationists need to be armed with the knowledge of the First Amendment
considerations. For example, significant statutes such as RLUIPA at the federal level provide
great obstacles for preservationists. While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of RLUIPA, consistent federal court of appeal rulings have emphatically
upheld RLUIPA. Many fields, including historic preservation, eagerly anticipate the pending
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Cutter v. Wilkinson. Preservationists need to work with
governments to establish strong compelling interests that are implemented by the least
restrictive means. If preservation ordinances can prove a compelling governmental interest
by the least intrusive means, religious landmarks will survive. Conversely, ignorance of what
is appropriate as well as constitutional when confronted with a religious entity’s request to
alter its historic property can lead to legal and financial heartaches.
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Appendix B: U. S. C o n s t i t u t i o n – T h e B i l l o f R i g h t s
Found at http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.billofrights.html

Bill of Rights
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Amendment II
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
Amendment III
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.
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Amendment VII
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined
in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.
Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
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Appendix C: R F R A
Found at http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/RFRA1993.html

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Public Law 103-141
November 16, 1993
103rd Congress
H.R.130
An Act
To protect the free exercise of religion.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
Sec. 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the 'Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993'.
Sec. 2. Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes.
(a) Findings: The Congress finds that-(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable
right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling
justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests.
(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are-(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
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(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government.
Sec. 3. Free Exercise of Religion Protected.
(a) In General: Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial Relief: A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this
section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the
Constitution.
Sec. 4. Attorney's Fees.
(a) Judicial Proceedings: Section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988) is amended
by inserting 'the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,' before 'or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964'.
(b) Administrative Proceedings: Section 504(b)(1)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended-(1) by striking 'and' at the end of clause (ii);
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ', and'; and
(3) by inserting '(iv) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993;' after clause (iii).
Sec. 5. Definitions.
As used in this Act -(1) the term 'government' includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official
(or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a
State;
(2) the term 'State' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and each territory and possession of the United States;
(3) the term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and
of persuasion; and
(4) the term 'exercise of religion' means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment
to the Constitution.
Sec. 6. Applicability.
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(a) In General.--This Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of
that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment
of this Act .
(b) Rule of Construction.--Federal statutory law adopted after the date of the enactment of
this Act is subject to this Act unless such law explicitly excludes such application by
reference to this Act .
(c) Religious Belief Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize any
government to burden any religious belief.
Sec. 7. Establishment Clause Unaffected.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion
of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion (referred
to in this section as the 'Establishment Clause'). Granting government funding, benefits, or
exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a
violation of this Act. As used in this section, the term 'granting', used with respect to
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government
funding, benefits, or exemptions.
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Appendix D:

R L U I P A

Found at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/rluipa.htm
RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
42 USCA § 2000cc
§ 2000cc. Protection of land use as religious exercise
(a) Substantial burdens
(1) General rule
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(2) Scope of application
This subsection applies in any case in which-(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability; or
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or
system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or
informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized
assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.

(b) Discrimination and exclusion
(1) Equal terms
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.
(2) Nondiscrimination
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates
against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.
(3) Exclusions and limits
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No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that-(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.
§ 2000cc-1. Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons
(a) General rule
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(b) Scope of application
This section applies in any case in which-(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.
§ 2000cc-2. Judicial relief
(a) Cause of action
A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or
defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under Article
III of the Constitution.
(b) Burden of persuasion
If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the government shall bear
the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the
burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice
that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion.
(c) Full faith and credit
Adjudication of a claim of a violation of section 2000cc of this title in a non-Federal forum
shall not be entitled to full faith and credit in a Federal court unless the claimant had a full
and fair adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum.
(d) Omitted
(e) Prisoners
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended by that Act).
(f) Authority of United States to enforce this chapter
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The United States may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce
compliance with this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to deny, impair,
or otherwise affect any right or authority of the Attorney General, the United States, or any
agency, officer, or employee of the United States, acting under any law other than this
subsection, to institute or intervene in any proceeding.
(g) Limitation
If the only jurisdictional basis for applying a provision of this chapter is a claim that a
substantial burden by a government on religious exercise affects, or that removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States,
or with Indian tribes, the provision shall not apply if the government demonstrates that all
substantial burdens on, or the removal of all substantial burdens from, similar religious
exercise throughout the Nation would not lead in the aggregate to a substantial effect on
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.
§ 2000cc-3. Rules of construction
(a) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any government to burden any
religious belief.
(b) Religious exercise not regulated
Nothing in this chapter shall create any basis for restricting or burdening religious exercise or
for claims against a religious organization including any religiously affiliated school or
university, not acting under color of law.
(c) Claims to funding unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall create or preclude a right of any religious organization to
receive funding or other assistance from a government, or of any person to receive
government funding for a religious activity, but this chapter may require a government to
incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious
exercise.
(d) Other authority to impose conditions on funding unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall-(1) authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly or indirectly, the activities or
policies of a person other than a government as a condition of receiving funding or other
assistance; or
(2) restrict any authority that may exist under other law to so regulate or affect, except as
provided in this chapter.
(e) Governmental discretion in alleviating burdens on religious exercise
A government may avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this chapter by changing
the policy or practice that results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining
the policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by
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providing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden
religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.
(f) Effect on other law
With respect to a claim brought under this chapter, proof that a substantial burden on a
person's religious exercise affects, or removal of that burden would affect, commerce with
foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, shall not establish any
inference or presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise is, or is not,
subject to any law other than this chapter.
(g) Broad construction
This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.
(h) No preemption or repeal
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt State law, or repeal Federal law, that is
equally as protective of religious exercise as, or more protective of religious exercise than,
this chapter.
(i) Severability
If any provision of this chapter or of an amendment made by this chapter, or any application
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the
remainder of this chapter, the amendments made by this chapter, and the application of the
provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected.
§ 2000cc-4. Establishment Clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that
portion of the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an
establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the "Establishment Clause"). Granting
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the
Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. In this section, the
term "granting", used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not
include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.
§ 2000cc-5. Definitions
In this chapter:
(1) Claimant
The term "claimant" means a person raising a claim or defense under this chapter.
(2) Demonstrates
The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and
of persuasion.
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(3) Free Exercise Clause
The term "Free Exercise Clause " means that portion of the First Amendment to the
Constitution that proscribes laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
(4) Government
The term "government"-(A) means-(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of
a State;
(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause
(i); and
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and
(B) for the purposes of sections 2000cc-2(b) and 2000cc-3 of this title, includes the United
States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any
other person acting under color of Federal law.
(5) Land use regulation
The term "land use regulation" means a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of
such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a
structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or
other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an
interest.
(6) Program or activity
The term "program or activity" means all of the operations of any entity as described in
paragraph (1) or (2) of section 2000d-4a of this title.
(7) Religious exercise
(A) In general
The term "religious exercise" includes any exercise of religion, whether ornot compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.
(B) Rule
The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall
be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the
property for that purpose.
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Appendix E:
R L U I P A C a s e H i s t o r y
Found at http://law.wustl.edu/landuselaw/COMPILATION_of_all_RLUIPA_Constitutional_Cases.html

The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
RLUIPA Constitutional Decisions
I.

Overview of Constitutionality Decisions
A. Land-Use
1. Findings of Constitutionality
a. United States v. Maui, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2003 WL 23148864, (D. Haw. Dec.
29, 2003) (rejecting Enforcement, Commerce, Establishment Clause, and
Tenth Amendment challenges)
b. Guru Nanak Sikh Society v. County of Sutter, No. S-02-1785 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 19,
2003) (rejects Enforcement challenge) NOTE: Notice of appeal filed in 9th
Circuit.
c. Primera Iglesia Bautista v. Broward County, No. 01-6530 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2004)
(adopting Nov. 7, 2003 Magistrate Report and Recommendation) (rejecting
constitutionality challenge, adopting reasoning of Freedom Baptist Church).
d. Murphy v. Town of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003) (rejecting
Enforcement and Establishment Clause challenges). NOTE: on appeal to
2nd Circuit.
e. Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (rejecting Enforcement, Commerce, and Establishment Clause, and
Tenth Amendment challenges) NOTE: on appeal to 2nd Circuit, oral
argument date March 1, 2004.
f. Life Teen, Inc. v. Yavapai County, No. Civ. 01-1490-PCT-RCB (D. Ariz. Mar.
26, 2003) (rejecting Commerce Clause, Enforcement Clause, Separation-ofPowers, Tenth Amendment, and Establishment Clause challenges).
g. Christ Universal Mission Church v. City of Chicago, No. 01-C-1429, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22917 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2002) (rejecting constitutionality
challenge, adopting reasoning of Freedom Baptist Church).
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h. Freedom Baptist Church v. Tp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (rejecting Enforcement, Commerce, and Establishment Clause
challenges).
2. Suggestions of Constitutionality
a. Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., Nos. 233484, 234300,
___ N.W.2d ___, 2003 WL 22520439 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003)
b. Hale O Kaula v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1072 (D. Haw.
2002) (declining to address constitutionality of RLUIPA in detail, but
concluding that “jurisdictional element” of § 2(a)(2)(B) precludes Commerce
Clause challenge, and that § 2(a)(2)(C) “codifies the ‘individualized
assessments’ doctrine”).
c. Cottonwood Christian Center v. City of Cypress, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1221 n.7
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that “RLUIPA would appear to have avoided the
flaws of its predecessor RFRA, and be within Congress’s constitutional
authority,” citing Freedom Baptist Church).
3. Findings of Unconstitutionality
a. Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 2003 WL 22724539 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 21, 2003) (striking down Sections 2(a) as applied through 2(a)(2)(B) and
2(a)(2)(C) as exceeding Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the
Enforcement Clause) (per Wilson, J.). NOTE: request for certification to
9th Circuit granted by the district court Dec. 17, 2003; unopposed petition for
permission to appeal to 9th Circuit pending.
b. Missionaries of Charity, Brothers v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01-8115-SVW
(C.D. Cal. July 11, 2003) (incorporating Elsinore Enforcement Clause decision
by reference, and requesting briefing on Commerce Clause constitutionality)
(per Wilson, J.). NOTE: Case has been stayed pending Ninth Circuit’s
resolution of Elsinore.

B. Institutionalized Persons
1. Findings of Constitutionality
a. Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside (11th Cir.) 366 F.3d 1214 (2004).
b. Open Homes Fellowship v. Orange County, No. 6:03-CV-943-ORL-31 (S.D.Fla.)
(amicus constitutionality brief filed Jan. 2, 2004) (land use case)
c. Benning v. Georgia, No. 602CV139 (S.D.Ga. Jan. 9, 2004) (rejecting
Establishment Clause challenge and rejecting magistrate report and
recommendation) NOTE: case certified for appeal to the 11th Circuit under
FRCP 54(b).
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d. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149-HG
(W.D. Tex.) (oral argument on Oct. 22, 2003 on cross-motions for partial
summary judgment, including constitutionality) (land use case).
e. Madison v. Riter, No. 03-6362, __ F.3d __, 2003 WL 22883620 (4th Cir. Dec. 8,
2003) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge)
f. Charles v. Verhagen, No. 02-3572, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 22455960 (7th Cir.
Oct. 30, 2003) (rejecting Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, and Tenth
Amendment challenges, but declining to reach Commerce Clause challenge).
g. Williams v. Bitner, No. 1:CV-01-2271, 2003 WL 22272302, ___ F. Supp. 2d.
___ (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2003) (rejecting Establishment Clause, Spending
Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment challenges).
h. Sanabria v. Brown, No. 99-4699 (D.N.J. June 5, 2003) (rejecting Spending
Clause, Establishment Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment,
and Separation of Powers challenges, but declining to reach Commerce
Clause challenge).
i.

Gordon v. Pepe, No. Civ. A-00-10453-RWZ, 2003 WL 1571712 (D. Mass. Mar.
6, 2003) (rejecting constitutionality challenge based on Mayweathers district
court decision) (still in discovery at district court level).

j.

Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir 2002) (rejecting Spending
Clause, Establishment Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment,
and Separation-of-Powers challenges), cert. denied sub nom. Alameida v.
Mayweathers, No. 02-1655, ___ U.S. ___, 2003 WL 21180348, 71 USLW 3725
(U.S. Oct. 6, 2003).

k. Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (rejecting
Commerce, Spending, Establishment Clause, and Tenth Amendment
challenges), overruled by Cutter v. Wilkinson, infra.
l.

Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (rejecting
Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, and Tenth Amendment challenges),
overruled by Cutter v. Wilkinson, infra.

m. Taylor v. Cockrell, No. H-00-2809 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2002), vacated on
mootness grounds, Taylor v. Groom, No. 02-21316 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2003).
n. Love v. Evans, No. 2:00-CV-91 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 8, 2001) (rejecting
constitutionality challenge based on Mayweathers district court decision).
2. Findings of Unconstitutionality
a. Cutter v. Wilkinson, Nos. 02-3270, 02-3299, 02-3301 ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL
22513973 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2003) (finding RLUIPA Section 3 violates
Establishment Clause). NOTE: certiorari granted October 12, 2004 by the
United States Supreme Court.
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b. Al Ghashiyah v. Wis. Dept. of Corrections, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. Mar.
4, 2003) (same), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, supra.
c. Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003) (same) overruled by
Madison v. Riter, supra.
d.

In re Rowland, No. HC4172 (Sup. Ct. Cal., Monterey Cy., July 31, 2002)
(same) (appellate court affirmed trial court’s denial of habeas petition without
opinion).

C. Pending
1. Terrero v. Watts, No. CV202-134 (S.D. Ga.) (appeal to district court from
recommendation of magistrate judge that RLUIPA and RFRA violate the
Establishment Clause) (prisoner case)
II. Recent Decisions Applying the Act
A. Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., Nos. 233484, 234300,
___ N.W.2d ___, 2003 WL 22520439 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003) (finding
genuine issues of material fact on “substantial burden” under RLUIPA Section 2(a),
and on “similarly situated” under Equal Protection Clause).
B. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003) (construing “substantial
burden” narrowly – zoning law must render worship “effectively impracticable”).
C. Pending
1. San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, No. 02-15693 (9th Cir.) (argument
before Canby, Kleinfeld, & Rawlinson on May 14, 2003).
2. Grace United Methodist v. Cheyenne (opening brief due end of January)
3. Lighthouse Institute v. City of Long Branch, No. 03-2343 (3d Cir.) (briefing complete,
argument scheduled for either 2nd or 4th week February).
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Appendix F:

Table of Figures

Figure 1
Westchester Reform Temple in Scarsdale, New York.
Provided by Hillary Fontana, WRTemple.org.
Figure 2
Exterior view of Society for Ethical Culture in New York City.
Found at www.nysec.org/rental.htm.
Figure 3
View from Society for Ethical Culture in New York City.
Found at www.nysec.org/rental.htm.
Figure 4
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church in Lakewood, Colorado.
Found at http://www.bethluth.net/.
Figure 5
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church in Lakewood, Colorado.
Found at http://www.bethluth.net/.
Figure 6
Interior view of Society of Jesus of New England in Boston, Massachusetts.
Found at http://www.jucboston.org/history.html.
Figure 7
St. Bartholomew’s Church in New York City.
Found at www.stbarts.org/lgdome.htm.
Figure 8
Sketch of First Covenant Church in Seattle, Washington.
Found at http://www.seattlefirstcovenant.org/index.php.
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Figure 9
St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Church in Cumberland, Maryland.
Found at www.ci.cumberland.md.us/cgi-bin/browse.pl?pic=1820.
Figure 10
First United Methodist Church in Seattle, Washington.
Found at http://www.cityofseattle.net/commnty/histsea/advocacy/firstunitedmethodist.htm.
Figure 11
Interior view of St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas.
Found at http://davisrexrodearchitects.com/stpeteroutline.htm.
Figure 12
Exterior view of St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas.
Found at http://davisrexrodearchitects.com/stpeteroutline.htm.
Figure 13
First Presbyterian Church in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Found at http://www.fpcy.org/.
Figure 14
The Towner House pre-restoration in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Found at http://www.yhf.org/newsletters/2002mARCHyhfnews%20.pdf.
Figure 15
The Towner House post-restoration in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Found at http://www.yhf.org/newsletters/2002mARCHyhfnews%20.pdf.
Figure 16
Exterior view of First Church of Christ Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut. Found at
http://www.christiansciencect.org/ridgefield/.
Figure 17
Interior view of First Church of Christ Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut. Found at
http://www.christiansciencect.org/ridgefield/.
Figure 18
Saint Mary of the Angels Church in Chicago, Illinois. Found at
http://archives.archchicago.org/museum1b.htm.
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